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1. Introduction
New approaches to language description, especially cognitive linguistic 
theories, have taken a radically revisionist position toward Generative 
models and other, by now “traditional” grammars. Many fundamental 
assumptions about language structure have been questioned, revised or 
rejected entirely in frameworks like Construction Grammar (Goldberg, 
1995), Simpler Syntax (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005), or Lexical Functional 
Grammar (Bresnan, 2001). New models and theories of language struc‑
ture find themselves contesting at least some of the following generative 
assumptions:
1. The syntactocentric view of language. Doubt has been cast on the role of 
syntax as the only component responsible for imposing structure on 
sentences.
2. The innateness of UG. The question of how much linguistic complexity is 
innately determined and how much has to be learned has been an on‑
going question whose intractability is comparable to the more general 
nature vs. nurture debate. Recently the pendulum has swung toward 
the learning extreme, with construction grammarians stressing the 
numbers of constructions that make up the knowledge of language.
3. The universal nature of language. An inevitable consequence of question‑
ing innateness is an increased emphasis on cross ‑linguistic diversity. 
Stressing diversity over similarity (or vice versa) is, much like self‑
 ‑serving manipulation of statistics, a function of how linguistic data 
are interpreted, but currently, more effort seems to go into demonstrat‑ 
ing uniqueness.
4. Underlying levels of syntax. Deep structure analyses have been replaced 
by monostratal approaches, which purport to account for sentence 
structure more straightforwardly, without the need for invoking hid‑
den abstract levels of representation.
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5. Derivations. Related to the above abandonment of deep structure is the 
need to replace derivational operations with constraints which allow 
correct syntactic configurations and rule out others.
6. The division between the lexicon and syntax. Rather than being separate, 
lexical and function forms have been argued to occupy a continuum 
with a large transitional midsection of elements that exhibit both lexi‑
cal and syntactic properties.
7. Modularity. Not only are the lexicon and syntax unlikely to be disjoint 
sets, but more generally, it has been argued that genetically deter‑ 
mined modules dedicated to culture ‑dependent skills like reading are 
implausible.
8. The division between core and periphery. The success of the Standard 
Theory was conditional on confining focus to the core phenomena and 
ignoring idiosyncratic idioms relegated to periphery. Recently, as the 
number of idiosyncratic constructions being uncovered grew, it has 
become obvious that periphery has become a much too large a refuse 
heap—an elephant in the room that can no longer be dismissed as 
unimportant to linguistic analysis.
Among reasons behind these mistaken assumptions is that in the early 
days of Generative Grammar, research could not benefit from tools like 
automated corpora, which make it possible to confront theorizing with 
evidence (Stefanowitsch, 2006). Nowadays, analyses of corpus data are 
used, among other things, to illustrate the magnitude of periphery or the 
blurred division between the lexicon and syntax.
However, corpus data are rarely marshaled to question the new post‑
 ‑generative views, even fairly implausible ones, such as the belief in highly 
semanticized closed ‑class constructions (Szcześniak, 2013). The objective 
of this contribution is to attempt to reconcile current and traditional Gener‑ 
ative Grammar models. While the generative assumptions about language 
may have been simplistic, it is unlikely that they are all wrong. Rejecting 
them prematurely may be throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Half 
a century after the beginning of the generative tradition seems like a good 
moment to take stock and consider the opposing views, evaluate their 
relative merits and shortcomings, and find common ground. This study 
of grammatical constructions like the x’s way, incredulity construction, or 
the into ‑gerund construction addresses the following questions:
 — Is it possible to reconcile the lexicon ‑syntax continuum with the tradi‑
tional division view? 
 — Are traditional views of closed ‑class function forms as desemanticized 
elements valid? (Talmy, 2000a)
 — Can peripheral phenomena (like meaningful idiomatic constructions) 
be accounted for by assuming the division of the lexicon and syntax?
111.1. Traditional Distinction
The present study will attempt to answer the above questions by focus‑ 
ing mainly on one contested issue, namely that of the division between 
syntax and the lexicon. It is against the backdrop of the syntax ‑lexicon 
continuum that we will consider the semantic content and formal char‑ 
acteristics of grammatical constructions. Just like increased reliance 
on corpus data helped revisit generative views on language, here too, 
previously unavailable data on the use of grammatical constructions will 
be provided to question some of the more recent cognitive views on the 
semantic capacity of closed ‑class forms and the division between the 
modules of the lexicon and syntax.
1.1. Traditional Distinction
It has traditionally been assumed that language naturally segregates 
its forms into two major superclasses, one containing lexical categories 
like nouns and adjectives, that is, forms with rich lexical meanings, and 
the other including grammatical categories like articles, pronouns or 
conjunctions, classes that do not so much have meanings as functions 
or relational content. The belief in the division is justified by a long list 
of distinguishing features that set the two classes apart, which will be 
discussed below. For example, the very names that the two classes are 
known by, open ‑ and closed ‑class forms, reflect the observation that the 
former readily accept new members, while the latter tend to resist new 
additions. In consequence, open ‑class forms are orders of magnitude 
more numerous, numbering in the tens or even hundreds of thousands 
of items, than closed ‑class forms whose numbers do not exceed a few 
hundred.
The distinction has classical origins and follows straightforwardly 
from the intuitive sense that the lexicon is separate from grammar. This 
is evident in Panini’s distinction into the lexicon dhātupāt.ha and grammar 
kātantra. In Europe, Aristotle divided language forms into those that can 
have their own independent meaning and those whose meaning can only 
be realized in conjunction with other forms. Given this semantic depend‑
ence on conjoining, Aristotle referred to function words as σύνδεσμος 
(syndesmos) “conjunctions,” by which he understood a large category 
including not only conjunctions, but also pronouns and articles (Arens, 
1984, p. 129). The lexicon ‑grammar divide is a partition considered as 
something of an axiom held since the first ancient studies of language, 
and unquestioned until around the 1980s. Thus, the distinction has 
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a venerable tradition continued in the work on grammaticization, one 
of whose major insights is that grammatical items can be traced back to 
lexical words. In the twentieth century, the division into open ‑class and 
closed ‑class forms has figured explicitly or implicitly in analyses of many 
different questions in the linguistic literature. Henry Sweet (1913, p. 31) 
saw it in qualitative terms in his observation that “grammar deals with 
the general facts of language, lexicology with the special facts.” Similarly, 
Jespersen (1924, p. 32) noted that “[w]hen we come to consider the best way 
in which to arrange linguistic facts, we are at once confronted with the 
very important division between grammar and dictionary (lexicology).” 
The division is even more evident in Bloomfield’s (1933, p. 274) dismissive 
pronouncement that the lexicon is “an appendix of the grammar, a list 
of basic irregularities.” Chomsky used this view to justify his decision 
to focus on syntax and disregard the lexicon as a locus of idiosyncrasies 
not worthy of generalizations. The distinction is also at the heart of the 
Words and Rules Theory (Pinker & Prince, 1991; Pinker, 1999), which as‑
sumed that rules and lexical items are processed by two qualitatively 
different mechanisms, namely a pattern ‑based mechanism processing 
rules and a mechanism for handling lexical items as idiosyncratic forms.
1.2. Rejection
Recently, however, the worth of the distinction has been put in question. 
The first signs of problems with the distinction were noted already in 
the early years of Generative Grammar research when Chomsky realized 
that idioms were not easily captured by the generative model, the solu‑
tion being to put aside “phenomena that result from historical accident, 
dialect mixture, personal idiosyncrasies, and the like” in the hope that 
they would be explained later (Chomsky, 1995, p. 20). Then Fillmore’s 
work on idioms led to the recognition that despite their phrasal form, 
they are irreducible units of language not explained by other more ab‑
stract principles, and they cannot be characterized in a level ‑independent 
way. Fillmore, Kay and O’Connor (1988) observed that they are therefore 
in many ways akin to individual morphemes and in others to large freely 
composable phrases accounted for by general rules of syntax. The prob‑
lem that idioms pose is that they cannot be placed on either side of the 
lexicon ‑grammar divide. The sense of fuzziness is further aggravated by 
the fact that idioms themselves are not a homogenous group; they come 
in varying degrees of schematicity, some being strongly substantive and 
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others fairly schematic and open to be filled with lexical material. Such 
a varied set of lexico ‑syntactic forms sprawls astride the division, which 
can be taken as an argument for questioning its purpose or even very 
existence. One indication of the fuzziness problem is that some categories 
are treated differently by different scholars. For example, prepositions are 
considered closed ‑class items by some (e.g., Talmy, 2001; Tyler & Evans, 
2003; Langacker, 2008), others place them between open and closed ‑class 
categories (Zelinsky ‑Wibbelt, 1993; Saint ‑Dizier, 2006). This is no doubt 
due to the transitional status of prepositions which cannot be grouped 
unequivocally with either of the two.
This has made it reasonable enough to either downplay or openly reject 
the notion of a lexico ‑syntactic division, a decision made by scholars 
representing many models of grammar. Among the main assumptions of 
Hudson’s Word Grammar is the claim that “[n]o distinction is assumed 
(or found) between ‘rules’ and ‘lexical items.’” (Holmes & Hudson, 
2005, p. 243). The distinction is also suspended in HPSG (Pollard & Sag, 
1994), where lexical items come with detailed information on both their 
semantic and syntactic properties. Culicover & Jackendoff (2005, p. 26) 
claim that “the traditional distinction between lexicon and grammar 
is mistaken.” In another work, Jackendoff also refers to the lexicon 
grammar distinction as a “fundamental mistake” (Jackendoff, 2007, p. 53). 
The fuzziness of the lexicon ‑syntax divide is taken as an example of 
a more general tendency for mental components to transition smoothly 
rather than exhibit sharp divisions; a position assumed in Lewandowska‑
 ‑Tomaszczyk’s (2007) analysis of polysemy, which “as understood in cog‑
nitive terms, is an exponent of the absence of clear boundaries between 
semantics and pragmatics (as it is an exponent of the absence of clear 
boundaries between lexicon and syntax…)” (2007, p. 154). The boundary 
is also questioned in Goldberg’s Construction Grammar (1995; 2006) 
and Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (2008). The objections put forth by 
cognitive scholars can be summed up as the belief that the distinction 
is at odds with the symbolic thesis, which treats syntactic constructions 
as inherently meaningful. Briefly, because the distinction presupposes 
semantic austerity of closed ‑class forms, including syntactic patterns 
which clearly and unequivocally do have meanings, it does not seem 
an exaggeration to conclude that observing the distinction may be an 
obstacle for research focusing on the meaning content of constructions. 
In light of that, it seems only reasonable to ignore the distinction. Thus, 
the cognitive linguistic skepticism of the separation of lexicon and 
grammar has been motivated by the very view of language which is 
now seen in its entirety to consist of meaning ‑form pairings. In short, 
suspending the restriction against meanings in closed ‑class forms meant 
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getting a major obstacle out of the way of theorizing about “the detailed 
semantics and distribution of particular words, grammatical morphemes, 
and cross ‑linguistically unusual phrasal patterns” (Goldberg, 2006, p. 5). 
It is evident enough that the distinction is a non ‑banal issue. It is unlikely 
to be a mere illusion that persisted until the end of the twentieth cen‑
tury. As will be demonstrated below, there is an overwhelming amount 
of evidence in favor of postulating a qualitative division that organizes 
language forms. Yet at the same time, rather paradoxically, the strong 
sense of separation does not translate into a binary distinction by a sharp 
line. The more one reviews intermediate cases of forms that seem to fall 
where the division should lie, the more the distinction turns out to be 
a disappointingly facile dichotomy.
Incidentally, it is rather obvious why the two domains are separated 
by a blurred intermediate district, and not a sharp on ‑off distinction. The 
indistinct division is a direct consequence of grammaticization, which 
is itself characterized by gradual and not discrete stages. The division 
is fuzzy because that is the only way an item can cross over: dramatic 
changes cannot happen overnight as one ‑fell ‑swoop transformations; 
they have to be gradual. Many forms located in the middle are elements 
in transit (it is not mere speculation to predict that transitional forms 
like concerning or notwithstanding will continue their progress toward 
becoming full ‑fledged prepositions and will at some point approach the 
closed ‑class extreme). Furthermore, a form in transition is often found to 
exhibit a considerable synchronic distribution of meanings: a case in point 
is the verb can, which retains a range of meanings, some of which more 
lexical than other, more grammaticized ones (Bybee & Pagliuca, 1987; 
Bybee, 2010). A glance at the definitions of can in any dictionary shows 
a range of meanings at various stages of grammaticization, from the lexi‑
cal ‘knowledge, skill’ to more grammatical ‘general possibility’ meanings. 
The coexistence of such varied meanings within a single verb is itself an 
indication of the inherently fuzzy nature of the lexicon ‑syntax system. 
The fuzziness is a synchronic reflection of diachronic developments.
The difficulty in finding a division is in fact a restatement of the 
difficulty in determining the point at which lexical items turn into 
grammatical forms. As Bybee and others (1994, p. 10) observe, “[o]ne 
problem in identifying the properties of lexical items that are candidates 
for grammaticization is the problem of determining at exactly what point 
we can say that grammaticization has begun.” Of course, one cannot 
determine any such point exactly, except perhaps arbitrarily. Still, 
this does not make it impossible to talk about grammaticization, its 
directionality, irreversibility and end product that is qualitatively differ‑ 
ent from the original material.
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Apart from blunt observations that the distinction is misguided, a wide‑ 
ly adopted solution has been to approach it as a continuum, a view 
proposed by Langacker (1987; 2008), Gentner and Boroditsky (2001) or 
Evans and Green (2006). As Langacker puts it:
There is no meaningful distinction between grammar and lexicon. 
Lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of symbolic stru‑
ctures, which differ along various parameters but can be divided into 
separate components only arbitrarily. (1987, 3)
1.3. Meaning
This may seem like a reasonable move, accounting for the fuzziness of 
the boundary, but it does not really do it justice in practice. Proposals by 
many scholars to preserve the distinction in gradient form are merely 
verbal declarations, and in reality the continuum compromise provides 
a justification to ignore the distinction altogether, the thinking being 
that since all language forms are symbolic in nature (Langacker, 2008), 
then closed ‑class forms may have any kind of meaning. This is either 
an implicit assumption in many constructionist analyses of syntactic 
patterns or is an open assertion, as in Kay and Michaelis (2012, p. 2278), 
who propose that “[p]robably any kind of meaning that occurs can be 
the semantic contribution of a construction.” Similarly, Wierzbicka (2006) 
claims that there exist “[l]inks between culture and grammar” and that 
“grammatical categories of a language also encode meaning” (p. 171), 
which she demonstrates by means of many items, among which an “ex‑
tremely rich and elaborate system of expressive derivation applicable to 
proper names (specifically, names of persons)” (p. 171) (to be discussed 
below here). To take another example, in a study of future constructions, 
Hilpert (2008) signals that they “are viewed as linguistic forms that are 
endowed with rich meanings that include, but may well go beyond, fu‑
ture time reference” (p. 1).
What is striking about the above views is that they seem to rest on 
the assumption that constructions located toward the closed ‑class end 
of the continuum have meanings whose degree of specificity may in 
principle be comparable to what is observed in open ‑class forms. This 
extreme claim is endorsed by Goldberg (2006) who points out that the 
concern with meanings of constructions is a hallmark of constructionist 
approaches:
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the hypothesis behind this methodology is that an account of the rich 
semantic/pragmatic and complex formal constraints on these patterns 
readily extends to more general, simple, or regular patterns. (Goldberg 
2006, p. 5)
In the same vein, the presumption of semantic equality throughout the 
continuum is also present in Croft’s declaration that “[t]he only difference 
is that constructions are complex, made up of words and phrases, while 
words are syntactically simple” (Croft, 2007, pp. 470—471, my emphasis).
I am not the first to voice skepticism about the cognitive insistence on 
postulating detailed meanings in schematic constructions. For example, 
Ward (1994) takes issue with Lakoff’s (1977) characterization of the “pro‑
totype of transitivity.” What he criticizes is precisely the overfine detail 
proposed by Lakoff:
Lakoff’s (1977) prototype for transitivity includes the provisions that 
the agent be looking at the patient and that he perceive a change in 
the patient. This is plausible as an experiential prototype (gestalt), and 
if it turns out that language indeed refers to such information, then 
some sophisticated matching of constructions to meanings may well be 
needed. However, Lakoff did not show that these provisions are neces‑
sary for explaining language use, and so, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, I conjecture that matching can be done by independently 
scoring across each of the dimensions involved.
What is particularly interesting about this example is that transitivity 
is probably among the most grammatical categories conceivable, the most 
removed from the open ‑class part of the continuum, and could therefore 
be expected to exhibit only sparse abstract meanings. And yet, even in 
such cases, cognitive characterizations cast them as involving concrete 
semantic elements such as “the agent is looking at the patient, the change 
in the patient is perceptible, and the agent perceives the change” (Lakoff, 
1987, p. 55).
This is not to say that the entire cognitive linguistic community has 
abandoned the lexicon ‑syntax distinction. Talmy’s (2000a) influential 
Conceptual Structuring System presupposes a strict divide between the 
lexical and grammatical subsystems and proposes that the former is 
responsible for the content of a sentence’s cognitive representation, while 
the latter determines its structure. Bowerman (1996) stresses the sparse‑
ness of meanings conveyed by closed ‑class items as follows:
In searching for the ultimate elements from which the meanings of 
closed ‑class spatial words such as the set of English prepositions are 
171.4. Against Rejecting Too Soon
composed, researchers have been struck by the relative sparseness 
of what can be important. Among the things that can play a role are 
notions like verticality, horizontality, place, region, inclusion, contact, 
support, gravity, attachment, dimensionality (point, line, plane or 
volume), distance, movement, and path … . Among things that never 
seem to play a role are, for example, the color, exact size or shape, or 
smell of the figure and ground objects … . (p. 422)
Sullivan (2013, p. 125) observes that a “combination of open ‑class items 
… can express any conceptual metaphor” while “the literal meanings 
of closed ‑class items … are limited to simple spatial, force ‑dynamic 
and image ‑schematic meanings.” Boas (2010) points out that Goldberg’s 
(1995) own analysis is actually predicated on there being “at least two 
distinct categories of linguistic information that interact with each other, 
namely lexical entries and argument structure constructions.” He goes 
on to observe that this “suggests a de facto separation between syntax and 
the lexicon, despite her claim that ‘the lexicon is not neatly differentiated 
from the rest of grammar’” (Boas, 2010, p. 57). Similarly, Van Valin (2007, 
p. 236) points out problems with Goldberg’s (2006) decision to fuse the 
lexicon with syntax and to equalize all language forms, as expressed in 
the manifesto “all levels of grammatical analysis involve constructions: 
learned pairings of form with semantic or discourse function, including 
morphemes or words, idioms, partially lexically filled and fully general 
phrasal patterns” (Goldberg, 2006, p. 5). As Van Valin argues, the claim 
that everything is a construction has little content, whether theoretical 
and empirical. Moreover, if constructions are merely learned form‑
 ‑meaning pairings, they can only be language ‑specific. This position is 
quite inconsistent with and has no way of accounting for cross ‑linguistic 
generalisations.1
1.4. Against Rejecting Too Soon
This study will seek to demonstrate that the lexicon ‑syntactic divide may 
have been dismissed too soon. Even if the boundary is inherently and ir‑
reparably fuzzy and no practical way of demarcating the two magisteria 
can be found, this is no reason to abandon the distinction. It is one thing 
to establish the fuzziness of the boundary, and quite another to conclude 
1 In fact, Goldberg goes so far as to claim that except for cognitive generalizations, 
there are no cross ‑linguistic generalisations.
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that it means the absence of that boundary. To take this tack is to commit 
the continuum fallacy, which involves arguing that if two extremes are 
connected by small intermediate differences and if at no step can one 
indicate a decisive difference, then the extremes are the same. To use an 
analogy, inability to specify at what temperature cold turns to hot should 
not lead to the conclusion that cold is really the same as hot. But this 
is more or less what happens when the fuzziness of the distinction is 
taken as a justification of viewing all language forms as constructions 
and granting them equal semantic potential.
One could even suspect that the revisionist atmosphere surrounding 
discussions of the lexicon of syntax may be an artifact of the emphasis 
on fuzziness as a crucial feature of the most fundamental concepts in 
linguistics such as degree of grammaticalness (Chomsky, 1961) or proto‑
type (Ross, 1972; Rosch, 1975a; 1975b). Applications of prototype and its 
inherent fuzziness are not limited to analyses of conceptual categories 
within semantics (Geeraerts, 1989), but are also invoked in studies in 
phonology (Jaeger, 1980) or syntax (Ross, 1973; Kalisz, 1981). Indeed, the 
use of prototypes as a linguistic tool is so widespread that Wierzbicka 
(1996) and Posner (1986) warn against its overuse. Posner admits that 
linguists were “enamored of the prototype idea” (1986, p. 55) because of 
its promise of explanatory power. Wierzbicka remarks that prototype has 
been “treated as an excuse for intellectual laziness and sloppiness,” and 
goes on to attempt the prediction that “if [fuzzy prototype] is treated as 
a magical key to open all doors without effort, the chances are that it will 
cause more harm than good” (1996, p. 167). One could explain away any 
exception, anomaly or contradiction as a case of fuzziness; constructions 
could also be treated as family resemblance structures with no necessary 
conditions for natural usage, and this way no violated constraint will be 
a problem, but this would effectively make it unnecessary to attempt to 
describe construction. The prototype idea and the family resemblance 
structure both presuppose that constructions involve a high degree of 
inherent imprecision, which is a plausible hypothesis, but a hypothesis 
nonetheless. I believe that prototype and family resemblance should be 
invoked only as a last resort, when no other descriptions are capable of 
capturing the nature of a construction with some precision.
Here, in the context of the lexicon and syntax too, the case of fuzzi‑
ness is probably being overplayed. Put more simply, I believe that a fuzzy 
distinction is better than none at all. The insight from the distinction that 
closed ‑class forms have functions rather than meanings is still valid; 
that is, although closed ‑class forms can easily be demonstrated to carry 
meanings, these can and should be expected to be constrained. At the 
moment, many constructionist studies of syntactic patterns such as the 
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way construction (YouTube your way to fame) or the incredulity construc‑
tion (Him pilot spacecraft?!) postulate meanings that are implausibly rich. 
Some care should be taken to verify the observed semantic and pragmatic 
effects against what closed ‑class forms are normally capable of convey‑
ing. As I will show below, many such fantastically colorful effects can 
be explained as contextual interpretations of far more basic meanings 
that a construction has. However, this is not to say that no multi ‑word 
pattern can convey contentful meanings. Obviously, intermediate forms 
that share properties of lexical and function forms can be expected to 
contribute richer semantic content than a completely abstract function 
form could. 
This suggests that it should be possible to predict the degree of 
semantic complexity of a language form. Just how rich a meaning of 
a construction is, depends on the degree to which it is substantive. While 
completely abstract forms are spare in meaning, the closer an item is to 
the lexical end of the continuum (that is, the more it is filled with lexi‑
cal material) the richer its meaning. One corollary of this is that richer 
meanings found to occur in a syntactic pattern should be traceable to 
the lexical material embedded in the pattern. That is, if a construction is 
claimed to convey an open ‑class ‑style contentful meaning, it should be 
possible to point out a lexical item that is part of the construction and is 
responsible for that meaning.
To sum up, the present study will attempt to demonstrate the follow‑
ing four main points:
1. The lexicon ‑syntactic divide may have been dismissed too soon;
2. The meanings of syntactic constructions as presented in the literature 
are too rich;
3. The only exceptions to (2) are relatively contentful meanings that 
are normally associated with closed ‑class forms (e.g. possession, 
path or goal). These are found in many function forms in many lan‑
guages.
4. Just how rich a meaning of a construction is, depends on the degree to 
which it is substantive.
1.5. Construction Grammar
The present study will focus on a number of examples of grammati‑
cal patterns analyzed within the framework of Construction Grammar 
(henceforth CxG). In line with CxG’s tradition, it will follow the symbolic 
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thesis and the claim, held by many and put forth explicitly by Fried and 
Östman (2004, p. 24), that “a grammar is composed of conventional as‑
sociations of form and meaning,” following Goldberg’s (1995) definition 
of constructions as pairings of form and meaning, or “learned pairings 
of form with semantic or discourse function” (Goldberg, 2006, p. 5). As 
will be shown in the discussion of each case reviewed in chapters 3—5, 
the constructions in question cannot be accounted for by general rules 
of syntax, and are therefore consistent with Croft’s characterization of 
constructions as “pairings of form and meaning that are at least partially 
arbitrary” (Croft, 2001, p. 18). In this sense, patterns like the way construc‑
tion or the “time” away construction are real (as opposed to being some 
sort of special instances of more general rules) and must be stored as 
entries in the mental lexicon. The semantic effects that will be presented 
below are strong enough to justify a constructional approach. The CxG 
framework provides an explicit structure for analyzing such construc‑
tions that would be difficult, if not impossible, to capture in terms of 
general syntactic principles.
However, although this analysis fully subscribes to the view that 
syntactic patterns can carry specific and evident meanings, it will be 
argued that the meanings of syntactic constructions are constrained 
in very specific ways. Central in this contribution is the proposal that 
the meanings postulated for many constructions were implausibly 
rich and in some cases these elaborate effects can be shown to be 
contextual inferences rather than a construction’s inherent content. 
The present study will therefore attempt to separate the construc‑
tion’s real meaning from that meaning’s pragmatic consequences 
of conversational principles. One of the welcome aspects of this ap‑
proach is that it makes it possible to analyze the semantic effects 
of constructions without suspending the lexicon ‑grammar distinc‑
tion, which presupposes a degree of semantic austerity for function 
forms.
Because most CxG analyses question the division between syntax and 
the lexicon, I will first review arguments against a modular organization 
of language put forth by cognitive linguists and construction gram‑ 
marians. I will attempt to demonstrate that modularity in general and the 
lexicon ‑syntax division in particular do not have to be incompatible with 
the framework of CxG.
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1.6. Dimensions of Constructions
In this section, Taylor’s (2002; 2004) approach to constructions will be 
reviewed. His views on the dimensions along which constructions vary 
will serve to introduce the working definition of “construction” used in 
the present study. Taylor identifies four dimensions: schematicity, pro‑
ductivity, idiomaticity, and entrenchment.
1.6.1. Schematicity
Schematicity is the property of more general constructions whose use in‑
volves incorporation of variable items. Schematic constructions are those 
which, unlike fully specified structures, comprise empty slots. Schematic 
constructions can have more than one instantiation. For example, the 
expressions (from) door to door, (from) cover to cover, (from) mouth to mouth 
and other similar cases are related both by a common semantic pattern 
and the same syntactic frame. The commonality present in all of them is 
captured by the schematic formula [(from) X to X]. Otherwise, fully speci‑
fied structures like once ‑over in the sense of ‘a quick look or appraisal’ 
are non ‑schematic. The components of the structure are not subject to 
replacement to produce related instantiations of the construction.
1.6.2. Productivity
A related but separate property of constructions, productivity is the 
degree to which a schematic construction can yield new instantiations. 
While some very general constructions are almost completely produc‑
tive (like the transitive construction), others are restricted. For example, 
Taylor shows that even very schematic constructions, such as [X by X], 
are limited in terms of their productivity. The [X by X] construction is 
realized in some established instantiations like day by day, one by one, 
page by page, step by step, or piece by piece, but the [X by X] schema does 
not always yield acceptable instantiations: several by several or spend one’s 
inheritance, cheque by cheque (Taylor, 2004, p. 62).
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1.6.3. Idiomaticity
Idiomaticity is perhaps the most obvious property of constructions and, 
indeed, it is invoked as a defining criterion by Goldberg (1995). A con‑
struction is idiomatic to the extent that its meaning is non ‑predictable. 
Goldberg restricts her definition of constructions to those structures 
whose properties are not “strictly predictable from knowledge of other 
constructions existing in the grammar” (p. 4). A structure like come to 
grips with is idiomatic because its non ‑transparent sense of ‘begin to deal 
with or understand’ cannot be predicted from the parts of the expres‑
sion or from the general schema [V to N with]. By contrast, expressions 
such as come to an agreement are considerably more transparent, and ones 
like come to a party are even more so. It is a question of some interest 
whether expressions like come to a party should be considered idiomatic 
at all. I daresay that even such obviously transparent examples retain 
a degree of idiomaticity at least in the sense that the choice of words is 
formulaic here. Speakers of English seem to follow a schema along the 
lines of [come to NEVENT], yielding examples like come to a meeting, dinner, 
the inauguration ceremony, etc. Alternatives like come on a party, move to 
a party or visit a party would either sound odd or would require a special 
context to justify them.
It should also be born in mind that full predictability is rarer than 
one thinks. Many patterns may seem completely transparent, but that is 
often a result of familiarity. Philip (2011, p. 24) discusses the impression 
of transparency created by the collocation fish and chips, and notes that 
the meaning most speakers know is not in fact conveyed precisely by 
the component parts. That is, the name does not refer to any kind of fish 
(but typically to cod, haddock or plaice), and it refers to fish that has been 
deep ‑fried.
The dimension of idiomaticity overlaps somewhat with Makkai’s 
(1972) terminology. Highly idiomatic constructions are what he refers 
to as “idioms of decoding,” while many predictable constructions are 
“idioms of encoding.” The latter include formulaic patterns that a person 
learning the language may not have come across, but can be expected to 
understand readily when exposed to them. Makkai gives the example of 
the use of the preposition at in expressing speed in English (e.g. I drove at 
50 miles per hour), which will be predictable enough to someone without 
a prior knowledge of this use, but it is idiomatic given that this sense can 
be and is expressed by means of different prepositions in other European 
languages, like avec in French or mit in German (pp. 24—25).
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1.6.4. Entrenchment
Entrenchment is the degree to which a construction is established and 
represented in a speaker’s knowledge of grammar. At first glance, it 
may seem that it is practically the same thing as idiomaticity. Indeed, 
Goldberg affirmed that “[i]t is clear that knowledge about language must 
be learned and stored as such whenever it is not predictable from other 
facts” (Goldberg, 2006, p. 64). However, the two are separate properties. 
Goldberg admits that “patterns are also stored if they are sufficiently fre‑
quent, even when they are fully regular instances of other constructions, 
and thus predictable” (p. 64). Taylor gives the example of have a nice day, 
which is highly entrenched despite not being very idiomatic—its meaning 
can be predicted from the senses of its individual components and from 
the semantics of the imperative construction. Similarly, it is likely that 
for most speakers, the expression game over is entrenched, even though 
a speaker unfamiliar with it could predict its meaning based on the 
meanings of the two component parts alone. The need for entrenchment 
comes from conventionality. Even when an expression is predictable by 
virtue of being a regular instance of a more general construction, the 
exact wording has to be stored as a standard collocation preferable to 
possibilities like live a nice day or game finished—these may not be unac‑
ceptable, but are decidedly unusual and unidiomatic.
1.7. Definitions of “Construction”
Before we proceed, a review of various positions on constructions 
will be presented. This will serve as a starting point to propose an ap‑
proach to constructions (in section 2.8 below) adopted in the following 
chapters.
As was pointed out above, within the framework of CxG, all concrete 
units of language are considered grammatical constructions. In Goldberg’s 
(1995) words,
According to Construction Grammar, a distinct construction is defined to 
exist if one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from 
knowledge of other constructions existing in the grammar: C is a CON‑
STRUCTION iffdef C is a form ‑meaning pair <Fi, Si> such that some aspect 
of Fi or some aspect of Si is not strictly predictable from C’s component 
parts or from other previously established constructions. (p. 4)
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This definition can be traced back to Lakoff’s (1987) view which he charac‑
terizes as an “enriched version” of the traditional sense of construction as
a configuration of syntactic elements (like clause, noun, preposition, 
gerund, etc.) paired with a meaning and/or use associated with that 
syntactic configuration. (p. 467)
The similarities are evident also in how the two formalize the definition. 
Lakoff specifies the two sides of the pairing as elements F and M, “where 
F is a set of conditions on syntactic and phonological form and M is a set 
of conditions on meaning and use” (p. 467). One important difference is 
that while Lakoff limits his definition to syntactically complex patterns, 
under Goldberg’s interpretation, the term ‘construction’ can apply equally 
aptly to single lexical units (watermelon, require, etc.) on the one hand, and 
to larger, more general syntactic configurations (resultative construction) 
on the other. Goldberg’s definition is thus more inclusive, as she expands 
the store of constructions to include all language forms that are paired 
with meaning.
Taylor’s (2004) definition represents an even more radical move:
A construction is a linguistic structure that is internally complex, that 
is, a structure that can be analyzed into component parts. (p. 51)
This definition includes all those entities that Goldberg regards as con‑ 
structions, but includes also non ‑idiosyncratic, predictable linguistic struc‑ 
tures, as long as they are “analysable into component parts” (Taylor, 2002, 
p. 567). The two authors differ in their approach to the question of learn‑ 
ability of constructions. Goldberg is interested only in those elements that 
have to be learned because of their unpredictability, while Taylor’s “crite‑
rion for identifying a construction concerns only an expression’s internal 
structure, irrespective of the schematicity with which the construction 
is specified, and also irrespective of whether the properties of the con‑
struction are predictable (or, conversely, idiosyncratic)” (p. 567). Taylor’s 
approach coincides with Goldberg’s as regards the first two dimensions 
discussed in sections 1.6.1 and 1.6.2: both recognize that a construction 
may or may not allow unspecified variable slots to be filled with lexical 
material (schematicity) and that schematic constructions can have vary‑
ing degrees of productivity, some allowing a wide range of creations and 
others being more restricted.2 However, for Goldberg, only idiomatic and 
2 For example, Taylor shows that even a highly schematic construction, such as
X by X (one by one, day by day, page by page) is not very productive, and some theoretical 
creations (e.g. *several by several) are not possible (Taylor, 2004, p. 62).
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entrenched entities (sections 1.6.3 and 1.6.4 above) count as constructions, 
while on Taylor’s definition, non ‑idiomatic and non ‑entrenched entities 
are considered constructions despite not necessarily being represented in 
a speaker’s mental grammar. As an illustration, he proposes that “[t]he 
sentence you are now reading is a construction, in that it can be broken 
down into its component words and phrases” (Taylor, 2012, p. 124).
At first glance, there is a sense that such non ‑idiosyncratic and non‑
 ‑entrenched entities go beyond the bounds of the constructicon. Most 
authors would not consider them constructions, for example, novel non‑
 ‑entrenched instances like obese cat are termed as “constructs” by Sul‑
livan (2013, p. 13) if only because doing so would make constructions an 
unlimited set including both established forms and potential structures 
that need not be listed in the mental lexicon. As a consequence, refer‑
ring to each internally analysable entity as a construction would hinder 
the description of a language user’s knowledge as opposed to her abil‑
ity to comprehend novel structures. This is another way of saying that 
a radically all ‑embracing approach would blur the distinction between 
Chomsky’s E ‑language, that is “external language” as it occurs in the 
world (with its non ‑entrenched uses), and I ‑language, or the “internal 
language” as represented and entrenched in the mind. On the other hand, 
a possible defense can be raised by pointing out that the distinction 
between entrenched constructions and those about to enter the lexicon 
is also blurred, and hence all of them should be included. After all, en‑
trenchment is a “gradual process of cognitive routinisation” (Langlotz, 
2006), and this is so in at least two senses. First, any stretch of language 
appearing with sufficient frequency could in principle become part of 
the language. Second, at the level of an individual speaker, an expression 
enters the lexicon gradually through increasing degrees of neuronal asso‑
ciation, and it would be arbitrary to insist that at some specific point that 
expression suddenly becomes entrenched—excluding any entities before 
that point could only be done arbitrarily. Further blurring the distinction 
is the fact that the status of the linguistic material in question will dif‑
fer from speaker to speaker. Some may have come across it but hardly 
registered it, while for others it may be partly or fully entrenched.
Should nonce expressions like thirty nine buttercups, to photograph 
a dumbbell or new variety of high ‑fiber apple be considered constructions? 
They are each non ‑schematic, non ‑productive, non ‑idiomatic and non‑
 ‑entrenched (none yielded any results in a Google search). If Taylor’s 
dimensions can be treated as features in a prototype model, they would 
each be the least prototypical examples of constructions, if they are con‑
structions at all. It seems counterintuitive to think of the above examples 
as constructions—if they are, is there anything that is not a construction? 
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The concept of “construction” becomes so all inclusive that it is nearly 
meaningless. What is striking here is that the reason why fully predict‑
able structures should be regarded as constructions is the same as why 
fully lexical ones are regarded on a par with syntactic entities as con‑
structions on Goldberg’s definition—the division between the extremes 
of each continuum is equally blurred. 
If one can be skeptical about including predictable and non ‑entrenched 
entities under the category “constructions” solely on the grounds that 
a fuzzy boundary between entrenched and non ‑entrenched is insufficient 
to exclude the non ‑entrenched, one should reserve an equivalent degree 
of skepticism in relation to squaring lexical items with syntactic patterns 
under one umbrella term. As I will argue in the following section, a line 
should be drawn somewhere, even if only arbitrarily. Fuzzy boundaries, 
whether they occur between lexical and syntactic entities or between the 
predictable and the idiosyncratic should not be taken as an excuse to 
extend definitions indefinitely.
1.8. Terminological Note
Goldberg’s definition of constructions quoted in the above section in‑
cludes all established language forms ranging from traditional syntactic 
constructions to small lexical items. This is no doubt a bold move honor‑
ing the undeniable similarities that single lexical items share with larger 
patterns, the main one of which is that all of them are pairings of form and 
meaning that are not fully predictable, and therefore must be learned and 
stored. However, while I will not devote this study to questioning Gold‑
berg’s definition of “construction,” I will limit my analysis to syntactic 
patterns larger than single lexical items or even multi ‑word expressions. 
These may be entirely substantive phrases such as walk the plank, chew 
the fat or numerous other examples of what Nunberg and others (1994) 
term “idiomatic phrases” (e.g. saw logs) or the more syntactically flexible 
“idiomatically combining expressions.” While these allow a degree of 
decomposition and some of their parts can be modified by adjectives or 
relative clauses (Nunberg et al., 1994, p. 500), there are reasons to consider 
them as units on a par with single lexical items that belong in the lexicon. 
What distinguishes them most sharply from syntactic patterns is that if 
indeed there are empty slots in idiomatic phrases and idiomatically com‑
bining expressions, they are entirely optional; idioms do not leave empty 
slots to be obligatorily filled—a use of an idiom such as (11b) is perfectly 
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acceptable. By contrast, empty slots in syntactic patterns must be filled or 
else are ungrammatical (12b).
(11) a. We must leave no legal stone unturned.
b. We must leave no     stone unturned.
(12) a. We danced the evening away.
b. *We     the evening away.
Whenever it is relevant, I will attempt to preserve the distinction by using 
the terms “single lexical items” when referring to single substantive items 
and fixed idiomatic expressions on the one hand, and “syntactic patterns” 
when referring to larger at least partially abstract forms on the other.
A drastic leveling of all language forms under one label amounts to 
deciding that everything in a language is a “form,” “pattern,” or any 
other noncommittal designation, analogically to biologists suddenly 
referring to everything as “life forms” while, at the same time, down‑
playing traditional taxonomic distinctions. To disregard the traditional 
distinctions is to forego categorizing and the advantages that flow from 
it. One important purpose of categorizing is that it renders it possible 
to make valuable inferences about members of categories. In the case of 
open ‑ and closed ‑class forms, one can predict properties of constructions 
that have not been observed yet or properties eclipsed by observations 
of questionable accuracy. In other words, relying on categorization may 
help avoid postulating inaccurate properties for closed ‑class items.
Of course, opponents of categorizing could argue, as they do, that the 
categories closed ‑ and open ‑class forms or lexical and grammatical items 
cannot serve as bases for inferences, because they are very imprecise and are 
not separated by a clear division. But this is true of all categories. No truly 
discrete categories exist3 (that is, ones that do not transition into neighbor‑
ing categories), but even imprecise idealizations are still useful enough.
Thus, despite an evident concern to treat all constructions equally as 
capable of exhibiting rich non ‑banal properties that should be studied 
regardless of the kind of language pattern they represent, this egalitarian 
approach may conceal peculiarities of constructions distinguishing one 
kind of linguistic patterns from another. I believe that equating them ob‑
scures the fact that constructions in the traditional sense (i.e. as templates 
of variables with some substantive slots) have meanings that differ from 
the kinds of meanings one can find in open ‑class items. If their meanings 
3 Richard Dawkins observes that even categories such as “animal species” which are 
habitually taken for granted as inherently discrete are illusions, as many species have 
been found to have intermediate forms (Dawkins, 2004, p. 17).
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can be more contentful, it is by virtue of fixed lexical material embed‑
ded in the constructions. It is through the fixed lexical material that the 
meaning of a construction can be enriched. I do not take issue with the 
idea that grammatical constructions are characterized by varying degrees 
of semantic content, but as a rule of thumb, the more lexically specified 
a construction, the more contentful the meaning it can carry.
Referring to all items of a language as constructions is motivated by 
the difficulty of drawing a sharp distinction between what is and is not 
a construction in the traditional sense. Larger patterns are not demar‑
cated sharply from single lexical items but transition smoothly into them, 
as Table 1 illustrates.
Table 1. The syntax ‑lexicon continuum (Croft & Cruse 2004, p. 255)
Construction type Traditional name Examples
Complex and (mostly) schematic syntax [SBJ be ‑TNS V ‑en by OBL]
Complex, substantive verb subcategorization frame [SBJ consume OBJ]
Complex and (mostly) substantive idiom [kick ‑TNS the bucket]
Complex but bound morphology [NOUN ‑s], [VERB ‑TNS]
Atomic and schematic syntactic category [DEM], [ADJ]
Atomic and substantive word/lexicon [this], [green]
However, the distinction is not as blurred as the transition from 
closed ‑ to open ‑class items, although the two distinctions do correlate 
in that schematic grammatical constructions lie toward the closed ‑class 
end of the continuum. One useful diagnostic of a construction is based 
on the traditional notion of a construction as a way of combining parts 
into larger groupings. Thus, a construction should be at least partially 
amenable to integration. In other words, what makes a unit a construc‑
tion is its ability to productively form new expressions by means of open 
variables, as is the case of the x’s way construction (He conned/faked/aced 
his way to Harvard) or the time away construction (We danced/schmoozed/
drank the night away). The term grammatical construction should be 
reserved to grammatical complexes with at least one slot left unfilled. 
This study will look at examples of grammatical constructions as they 
are defined by Bybee (2010, p. 25), who states that “most or all construc‑
tions are partially schematic—that is, they have positions that can be 
filled by a variety of words or phrases.” They are closed ‑class in nature.4
4 This is not to say that closed ‑classedness is a redundant construct, duplicating the 
idea of construction. Some constructions are more closed ‑class than others, which tend 
strongly toward the open ‑class territory. Also, many single lexical items such as prono‑
uns are closed ‑class.
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Single lexical units, compounds (hot ‑dog, lowdown) and fixed phrases 
(such as over ‑egg the cake) clearly do not meet this criterion.5 Similar 
assumptions seem to be implicit in Croft’s (2007) approach to construc‑
tions. Although he equates larger syntactic patterns with single lexical 
words under the label “construction,” he also views syntactic con‑
structions as “grammatical structures larger than just a single word” 
(p. 465) and refers to a construction in the traditional sense as “a pair‑
ing of a complex grammatical structure with its meaning” (p. 463, my 
emphasis).
Viewed this way, constructions belong to the closed ‑class system, 
which also includes elements like function words and bound morphemes 
responsible for inflection. This is what Table 2 illustrates: the continuum 
championed by most cognitive linguists is presented here as containing 
entities varying along two dimensions. First, they range from being sub‑
stantive to schematic, but stretched between these extremes are entities of 
two kinds: the atomic and the complex. Thus, toward the fully schematic 
extreme (which coincides with the closed ‑class end of the continuum) are
Table 2. A two ‑dimensional syntax ‑lexicon continuum
Atomic Complex
Fully 
schematic
Syntactic categories
[DEM], [ADJ]
Syntactic patterns
[SBJ V OBJ]
↑
|
|
|
|
|
|
↓
Function morphemes (bound)
[NOUN ‑s], [VERB ‑TNS]
Syntactic patterns
[SBJ be ‑TNS V ‑en by OBL]
[(as) ADJ as DET N]
Function morphemes (free) 
[the], [which]
Idioms
[kick ‑TNS the bucket]
Lexical ‑function (prepositions)
[along], [aboard]
Phrases, compounds
[hot dog]
Fully 
substantive
Simplex lexical words
[require], [green]
Complex lexical words
[requirement], [greenish]
5 Note that transitive verbs do not belong under this classification, even though they 
carry an open slot for an object, and thus combine with objects to form collocations 
or completely novel combinations. For example, the verb treat can participate in a po‑
tentially infinite number of combinations which, apart from collocations (treat a patient,
treat sewage, etc.), also include freer combinations as in “the paper treats abstract
understanding/the viability of economy.” Despite this rampant combinatoriness, the 
verb treat is not a construction. What is responsible for the combinations is the transitive
construction V+NP which incorporates lexical items. The transitive pattern is a construc‑ 
tion in the sense that it is a productive pattern that can incorporate smaller lexical 
entries.
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both complex entities such as schematic grammatical constructions (e.g. 
the passive construction) and atomic elements such as function words or 
syntactic categories. These have all been traditionally been classified as 
closed ‑class forms.
There are a considerable number of properties that closed ‑class forms 
have in common and these will be reviewed in the next chapter. These 
commonalities suggest that despite the inherent fuzziness, the distinction 
between the lexicon with its lexical items and fixed phrases, and syntax 
with its constructions and other closed ‑class forms is real enough to be 
observed, and it may be misguided to treat the contents of these two 
components on equal terms.
1.9. Overview
The next chapter will look at the question of the lexicon ‑syntax distinc‑
tion. It will focus on the reasons why it has been suspended in recent 
theorizing, and will then go on to review a number of characteristics 
of open ‑ and closed ‑class forms that set the two systems apart. Chap‑
ter 3 will concentrate on a number of constructions reported in recent 
constructionist literature that purportedly exhibit striking elaborate 
semantic effects. Because the rich meanings of these constructions pose 
a challenge to the main thesis of this study, they will each be analyzed 
in some detail in order to establish that the effects in questions are not 
stable components of these constructions’ semantic content.
Then in Chapters 4 and 5, two large constructions—the Manner of 
Obtainment Construction and the x’s way construction—will be analyzed 
so as to demonstrate how their semantic content is the product of blend‑
ing event schemas. In Chapter 6, some examples of schematic patterns 
will be shown to exhibit what at first glance may appear to be fairly exotic 
semantic effects. However, these will be argued to be instances of more 
general metonymic processes, not independent meanings developed 
individually by each of the constructions in question. The significance 
of the difference is that metonymic processes are far from being detailed 
contentful meanings; instead, they are firmly in the universal inventory 
upon which constructions can draw freely enough. In Chapter 7, we will 
revisit the question of the lexicon ‑syntax continuum. In light of the find‑
ings from the preceding chapters, a revised model of the constructicon 
will be attempted.
2. The Lexicon ‑Grammar Distinction
2.1. Modularity
Part of the reason why the distinction into closed and open class forms 
has been questioned so strongly is that it became tainted by association 
with modularity. Indeed, the much debated division between the lexicon 
and syntax can be viewed a specific instance of the more general view 
of language and mind assuming their modular organization. One of the 
hallmarks of cognitive linguistics is its sweeping renunciation of language 
as an autonomous cognitive faculty and of the notion that the mind is 
divided into separate components, each governed by its own principles 
and functioning independently of others (Kardela, 2014; Dirven & Ruiz 
de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2010, p. 14). Indeed, as Kardela (2014, p. 2) observes, 
Cognitive Grammar “can be best characterized in opposition to Noam 
Chomsky’s Generative Grammar (TG), a modular approach to language.” 
Dividing language forms into disparate categories carries the implication 
that they should be handled by different modules. “The non ‑modular 
character of CxG involves specifically the treatment of form and meaning 
as part of each grammatical element, that is, rule or construction, rather 
than in separate components of the grammar” (Kay, 1995, p. 171).
CxG has developed in response to, among other things, the claims of 
linguistic modularity as propounded by Chomsky and later Fodor (1983), 
who argued for the semi ‑autonomy of mental units specializing in the 
processing of separate kinds of input. Cognitive linguists have questioned 
the nativist notion that the faculty of language should be independent of 
other modules of the mind.1
1 Popular in the early days of Generative Grammar, the idea of linguistic uniqueness 
was recently questioned even by Chomsky himself (Hauser et al., 2002), who admits that 
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As Langacker (2008) puts it:
[I]t is hard to fathom why our species would have evolved an autono‑
mous grammatical system independent of conceptual and phonological 
content. Is it not more reasonable to suppose that grammar, rather 
than being separate and distinct, is merely the abstract commonality 
inherent in sets of symbolically complex expressions? (Langacker, 2008, 
p. 6)
In this spirit, CxG is defined by what it is not—namely, it is not 
a model assuming a modular organization of language. “Construction 
Grammar (CxG) is a non ‑modular, generative, non ‑derivational, monostratal, 
unification ‑based grammatical approach, which aims at full coverage
of the facts of any language under study without loss of linguistic 
generalizations, within or across languages” (Kay, 1995, p. 171, original 
emphasis).
This is perhaps because it is easy to get the impression that some 
important insights derived from CxG research are inconsistent with 
some logical consequences of modularity. Specifically, the fuzzy division 
between the lexicon and syntax may be taken as evidence against the 
existence of two separate modules responsible for the two components. 
However, this is an unfortunate result of reading of evidence, and as will 
be argued shortly, there is no real inconsistency.
Another problem with a strictly modular view is that it insists that 
the lexicon and syntax exhibit a strict division of labor in the composi‑
tion of a sentence, where syntax deals with the ordering of lexical items, 
while these contribute meaning. This otherwise unsurprising traditional 
view of what the lexicon and syntax are entails the uncompromising 
logical consequence that the meaning of a sentence is an exclusive 
responsibility of lexical items and, apart from assembling the meaning 
pieces, syntax has no real say in the formation of its semantic content. 
That is, the meaning of a sentence should be entirely traceable to the in‑
dividual words found in that sentence, and no part of it can be observed 
as coming from syntax. The notion that the meaning of a sentence is the 
sum of the meanings of individual words has a long standing tradition 
and thus it is not an innovation flowing from Generative Grammar. 
Captured by the Principle of Compositionality, it is also associated with 
Gottlob Frege, who formulated it as an idea in logic. However, while the 
semantic neutrality of syntax is implicit in the traditional conception 
the faculty of language shares its properties not only with the remaining cognitive facul‑
ties, but also with non ‑human animals, with recursion probably being the only property 
of language that is uniquely human.
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of compositionality of sentential meaning, Generative Grammar turns 
this corollary into a working assumption, evident in Katz & Postal’s 
(1964) proposal of paraphrastic transformations, or in other words, the 
restriction that only meaning ‑preserving transformations be admitted. 
Jackendoff disapprovingly refers to this stance as the syntactically trans‑
parent semantic composition (Jackendoff, 1997a, p. 48). According to the 
strong syntactic transparency view, grammatical constructions should 
not have meanings, a prediction clearly falsified by the growing body 
of research on syntactic patterns with evident semantic and pragmatic 
effects.
Yet another objectionable consequence of the modular view of lan‑
guage is that it does not recognize idiosyncrasy in structures larger than 
a word. Generative Grammar models separate the lexical and syntactic 
components, each of which is concerned, respectively, with idiosyncratic 
meanings and general word order rules. Any problematic configurations 
of words remain within the domain of syntax and should be accounted 
for by general syntactic rules. In other words, constructions do not exist. 
In Chomsky’s words:
Things like traditional constructions, say relative clauses, are just taxon‑ 
omic artifacts. They’re like ‘large mammal’. A large mammal is a real 
thing, but it has no meaning in the sciences. It’s just something that 
results from a lot of different things interacting. The same seems to be 
true of the passive: it’s not a real thing; it’s just a taxonomic phenome‑
non. (Olson & Faigley, 1991, pp. 31—32)
Thus, what counts as standard unexceptionable patterns in traditional 
grammar and used to be accommodated by the earliest versions of 
Generative Grammar, is now viewed as nothing short of a syntactic 
illusion. Even more problematic than relative clauses or the passive 
voice are idioms (tickle the ivories) and non ‑canonical uses (drink the
night away). These are swept under the rug of periphery reserved for 
“phenomena that result from historical accident, dialect mixture, per‑
sonal idiosyncrasies, etc.” (Chomsky & Lasnik, 1993, p. 510). Chomsky’s 
rationale for this is that such is the common practice in research en‑
deavors:
Throughout the history of the serious sciences many problems in ex‑
plaining facts were put aside, in the hope that they would be explained 
some day. … The great success of physics is due in part to the willing‑
ness to restrict attention to the facts that seem crucial for the theory, 
without taking into account even evident facts … sometimes even when 
they appear inconsistent with it. (Chomsky, 1998, p. 108)
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As Jackendoff notes, this approach to exceptional cases is indeed 
reasonable, but it carries the presumed commitment of getting back 
to them at some point, the problem being that any hope of eventually 
capturing them within the framework of Generative Grammar is still no‑
where in sight, despite two decades of intensive research. Meanwhile in‑
stead, the number of what Culicover (1999) calls syntactic ‑nut phenomena 
uncovered by linguists, has increased well beyond a point where it 
would still be justifiable to consider them peripheral. As Culicover and 
Jackendoff (2005, p. 25) put it, “‘periphery’ tends to become a tempting 
dumping ground for any irregularity one’s theory cannot at the moment 
explain.”
Reservations about modularity also stem from the belief that mod‑
ules must be innate, which raises the problem of how such complex 
specialization can possibly be coded in the genome. This is associated 
with the broader skepticism about the plausibility of genetic determinism 
of language in general, especially in the face of linguistic diversity bely‑
ing strong claims of a copious and finely tuned Universal Grammar.2 
However, this problem subsides if it is supposed that modules do not 
necessarily have to be hardwired, but evolve to become specialized 
2 More generally still, recent developments in cognitive linguistics have brought 
a sense of veritable dishonor of Universal Grammar itself and the associated ambition to 
analyze the diversity of grammar into a small set of parameters. As Jackendoff (2002b, 
p. 190) remarks, “research has uncovered many phenomena across languages whose dif‑
ferentiation from each other would require parameters of such niggling specificity that 
they are hardly plausible as universal possibilities.” It is worth noting that this is not the 
first time that skepticism has been voiced regarding the notion of universal properties of 
languages. In the opening pages of his discussion of the generative approach to langua‑
ge structure, Chomsky (1986, p. 2) recalls that the universalist ideas that are the essence 
of Generative Grammar have a long history dating back to medieval times. Roger Bacon 
is credited as being among the pioneers of universal views such as the claim that “with 
respect to its structure, grammar is one and the same in all languages, though it does 
vary accidentally.” Chomsky goes on to point out that in the first half of the twentieth 
century, such views were met with scornful disapproval by structuralists who now had 
access to “a much richer variety of languages than were known to earlier scholars, lan‑
guages that appeared to violate many of the allegedly a priori conceptions of the earlier 
rationalist tradition.” The point flowing from looking back at these vicissitudes is that 
views on linguistic diversity and commonality are inevitably impressionistic to some 
degree. The structuralist rejection of attempts to find common attributes in languages 
was a result of a temporary disbelief that the diversity they had encountered, could 
be subsumed under any general principles. Later successes by generative grammarians 
testify to the possibility of sorting out even the most mind ‑boggling data. It is justified 
to expect history to repeat itself and the nativist views to be vindicated at some point 
in the future when it is appreciated that the linguistic diversity that spurred alternate 
approaches emphasizing “abundance of the stimulus” can after all be accommodated 
within generative frameworks.
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subsystems in charge of their respective domains in response to environ‑
mental stimuli.3
Nevertheless, the rejection of modularity poses a paradox, because 
despite the undeniable fact that insights from CxG may be hard to 
reconcile with what is known about modularity, it is hard to dismiss 
modularity completely and CxG research cannot proceed in denial of 
some facts about modularity that pertain to constructions. The follow‑
ing discussion will focus on some criteria for modularity identified by 
Fodor. His list includes nine criteria, but here only those characteristics 
of modularity relevant to constructions will be discussed. The point of 
the following review is simply to demonstrate that modularity cannot be 
plain misguided.
2.1.1. Domain specific processing
Modular systems are dedicated to specific kinds of data, and no other. 
Fodor (1983) illustrated this point with the example of phonetic feature 
detectors which specialize in registering the presence of features like 
nasalization, voicing or aspiration. As far as we know, these phonetic 
feature detectors probably have no use elsewhere. Similarly, it seems 
the interpretation of function forms such as the neuter dative singular 
suffix is performed by a modular system that, given the unique nature 
of grammatical markers, applies only to this restricted domain and to 
nothing else.
Here, a note of caution should be sounded. Compelling though they 
seem, such examples do not provide absolute support to the idea that 
modules responsible for the processing of one kind of information cannot 
be involved in the processing of other kinds too. As Grodzinsky (2006, 
p. 467) notes, there are “relatively clear signs that specific linguistic rules 
have an identifiable brain locus,” but adds that “there seem to be some 
findings to suggest that non ‑linguistic, potentially motor functions are 
represented in the same region as well.”
One way or another, it seems that the requirement that a module 
be involved in the processing of one kind of information may be too 
3 Coltheart (1999) argues that modularity of mental processing could just as well
arise as a result of the combination of learning and innate knowledge. In other words, 
the modules do not have to be specified down to the most minute detail of their complex 
architectures. In any case, doubts about the plausibility of the genetic design of modular‑ 
ity should not a priori preclude the possibility of its existence.
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stringent. Of course, if it could be demonstrated that that is the case, this 
would serve as a very convincing, perhaps even undeniable indication 
of domain specialization. However, what is really crucial is not whether 
a given module performs exclusively one task or two, but whether a given 
kind of information can be processed by modules other than those 
specifically designed for it. The answer to the latter question should be 
quite obviously in the negative. For example, visual information can‑
not be analyzed by just any given area in the brain. Although cases of 
functional takeover have been documented, where victims of strokes to 
one area in the brain can regain the affected abilities thanks to the brain’s 
ability to rewire another area to take over the lost function, the processing 
is not as nimble. Also, the brain does not do this except when necessary. 
Otherwise, modules specialize in their domain ‑specific functions.
2.1.2. Speed
Perhaps the most readily appreciable appeal of the modular view lies 
in its attempt to account for the reflexive nature of language processing. 
Linguistic data are handled by fast ‑acting mechanisms which manage 
to accomplish this complex task in real time. This would be beyond the 
powers of a general purpose mechanism, and instead, language data 
must be processed by highly specialized domain ‑specific modules, which 
are also referred to as dedicated computational devices, working in paral‑
lel. This organization makes it possible to handle language data online in 
a reflex fashion.
2.1.3. Limited central access
Such efficiency is accomplished by keeping the operation of the modules 
closed to conscious supervision. Fodor argues that modularity allows 
only limited central access to its functioning, which means that in practice 
the perceiver cannot fully reflect upon it consciously. He illustrates this 
property with an example from speech perception, namely the observa‑
tion that listeners do not attend to subphonemic properties of speech. 
Thus, listeners are unaware of features like aspiration, vowel shortening 
or voicing. Even if one pays deliberate attention to these features, it is 
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hard to follow and register all the features that are processed below the 
threshold of conscious perception. As Jackendoff (1997a) argues, in many 
cases, even understanding the logic behind certain processes does not 
help us “catch ourselves in the act” of perceiving them. For example, “we 
can’t be aware of the frequency analysis our auditory system performs 
on an incoming sound wave; we just hear a sound” (Jackendoff, 1997a, 
p. 181). Most importantly though, even if one is trained to consciously at‑
tend to the features in question, it is certainly not by means of conscious 
attention that these features are assembled into the intended interpreta‑
tion that is submitted to higher levels of language processing. One may 
merely witness the features while they are computed to yield a meaning‑
ful representation.
The above remarks on the inscrutability of mental operations provide 
[indirect] evidence in support of the traditional distinction between syn‑
tax and the lexicon, contested by adherents of Construction Grammar. 
The argumentation is predicated on the premise that the peripheral sys‑
tem responsible for perception is separate from the central processes (of 
conscious experience, thinking, inference, etc.). To take one example, in 
speech perception, information is relayed from the periphery, which picks 
it up as sound waves, to the central processing system which interprets 
the meanings of the utterances heard. It is an obvious and uncontrover‑
sial assumption that the two ends cannot be connected directly, because, 
as the above discussion should have made it clear, raw stimuli do not 
lend themselves to processing by conscious attention. They arrive in the 
central system pre ‑processed by the intermediate interfaces responsible 
for the translation of the input into comprehensible meanings. This much 
is straightforward enough and arouses little controversy. Fodor’s claim is 
that the way between the periphery and the central system is not a ho‑
mogenous conduit, but exhibits multiple levels of encoding. The relay 
of information between these two ends proceeds through interfaces of 
increasing levels of cognitive structure, where the gist is the highest ‑level 
representation, the sound wave the lowest one, and details of syntax and 
other linguistic information are situated in the intermediate levels. Fodor 
(1983, p. 56) suggests a general rule that “access goes from top down (the 
further you get from transducer outputs, the more accessible the repre‑
sentations recovered are to central cognitive systems that presumably 
mediate conscious report).”
Fodor does not specify how the intermediate levels are arranged, but 
it is tempting to suppose that lexical information and details of syntax 
occupy different levels; that is, lexical information is probably higher 
than the function items. This may be hard to demonstrate beyond doubt, 
but one can come up with observations showing that something of that 
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nature is going on. For example, it is easier to recall specific words than 
their syntactic ordering. Without looking back at the previous paragraph, 
when asked which of the following phrases was used—relay of informa‑
tion, transfer of information, informational relay or informational transfer—it 
should be easy to eliminate the phrases with transfer, because the lexical 
difference between transfer and relay is more salient than the morpho‑
 ‑syntactic difference between informational and of information.4
Concerning function forms, they are not only hard to recover, but 
often plain overlooked. Psycholinguistic experiments have shown that 
while reading, eye movements behave differently, in that the eyes do not 
fixate on closed ‑class forms as often as on content words (Field, 2003, 
p. 74). This phenomenon is demonstrated by the following lines.
Elizabeth II
becomes
queen of
of the United Kingdom
Most people reading the above do not notice that there are two preposi‑
tions “of.” In more technical terms, the eye movements, referred to as 
saccades, which span several characters, proceed over function words. 
This suggests that the processing of closed ‑class forms does not receive 
the attention normally reserved for content words. For the sake of fair‑
ness, one should address the more prosaic possibility that fixations do 
not occur on content words, but on the longer sequences of characters. 
However, if the “II” were replaced with “XV,” the inconsistency would 
be more apparent. Thus, it seems a justified conclusion that “the skip‑
ping of so many function words suggests that this class of items may be 
recognized in a highly automatized way and accorded less attention than 
content words” (Field, 2003, p. 74).
A similar effect obtains when people are asked to count all the in‑
stances of the letter “f” in the sentence
FINISHED FILES ARE THE 
RESULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY COMBINED WITH THE 
EXPERIENCE OF YEARS
4 Psycholinguistic research suggests that top ‑down processing requires parallel pro‑
cessing of various modes of information, where the output of one modules prompts the 
processing to go back and renegotiate the interpretation of information from a previous 
step. This, however, does not rule out a hierarchical organization of modules.
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(Again, most people see only three “f’s,” because they do not count 
the prepositions). These effects suggest that open ‑class forms are open 
in one more sense—that is, they are open to conscious experience, while 
closed ‑class items seem more hidden from awareness. Lexical items 
are also much easier to define than function words. Examples of desi‑ 
nences, such as the dative case which seem to have semantic meanings 
turn out to be elusive upon closer inspection. On the other hand, lexical 
items are for the most part, quite straightforward, and if they do present 
any difficulty, it is for meanings that are inherently hard to grasp. Thus, 
closed‑class items differ in so many ways from lexical items that there is 
reason to believe that the two types are handled differently by separate 
modules.
2.1.4. Fixed neural architecture and specific patterns of breakdown
Modular processes rely on a fixed architecture of brain areas, each spe‑
cializing in different tasks. For example, the motor control circuits are 
located in the cerebellum. Damage to the cerebellum normally results in 
a loss of equilibrium or other motor dysfunctions, while other cognitive 
functions remain intact. Similarly, language is known to be located in 
two fixed areas, the Wernicke’s area and the Broca’s area. Damage to 
these areas usually results in language disorders, although it should be 
stressed that at the current stage of our knowledge, the exact patterns of 
breakdown are hard to predict. Most typically, damage to the Broca’s area 
is associated with agrammatism, a condition involving difficulty using 
and comprehending function forms and syntactic patterns, while being 
perfectly able to use and comprehend content words. On the other hand, 
a lesioned Wernicke’s area leaves a patient suffering from the so called 
jargon aphasia, a condition where a person can produce syntactically 
well ‑formed sentences, but displays such an erratic command of content 
words that the resulting speech is incomprehensible. These facts suggest 
that content words (or at least some aspects of content words) are stored 
differently from and probably also separately from function words.
Further support for a divided neural organization of lexical and func‑
tion items comes from Kemmerer (2006). He offers evidence suggesting 
that separate brain subsystems are involved in computing two types of 
spatial relations. The right hemisphere is predominantly responsible for 
precise metric specifications of distance, orientation or size, as in On the 
map, the two towns are 15 centimeters apart. In contrast, rough topological 
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descriptions involving binary oppositions like above/below, in/out, here/
there, as in On the map, town A is below town B, are handled by the left 
hemisphere. The two hemispheres seem to specialize in two distinct 
kinds of spatial descriptions, one dealing with detailed Euclidean refer‑
ence and the other with relative descriptions, which rely more strongly 
on language ‑specific markers.
At this point, it is worth clarifying in what sense the binary oppo‑
sitions realized by prepositions are language ‑specific and the precise 
Euclidean terms are independent of language. The difference between 
them is that precise specifications expressed by means of units like “cen‑
timeters” are universal and their values are identical across languages. 
By contrast, spatial oppositions expressed by prepositions exhibit more 
or less pronounced variation from language to language. Even closely 
related languages like Polish and English organize their spatial relations 
differently. For example, while English contrasts in/out and on/off, Polish 
has one equivalent z for both out and off. More dramatic differences can 
be found. A well ‑known example is the Korean contrast between tight‑
 ‑fit (kitta) and loose ‑fit (nehta) containment relations which cross ‑cut the 
English in/on. For Korean, the kind of containment of a figure relative 
to the ground is more relevant than whether an object is on the surface 
(English on) or inside something (English in).
It therefore makes sense that the more language ‑specific forms are 
processed primarily by areas located the left hemisphere, while Eu‑ 
clidean specifications are processed by the right hemisphere, given that it 
is known to be responsible for spatial awareness.
2.2. Conclusions
The issue of modularity will certainly remain a subject of debate for quite 
some time. Although it is currently rather unfashionable, it certainly does 
not seem an absurd proposition to be consigned to history; there are 
too many arguments in its favor to reject it outright. The present study 
of grammatical constructions is meant to contribute some arguments 
in favor of discrete distinctions between modules, showing that the 
cognitive skepticism toward all things modular may be too strong.
But before any serious attempts can be made to settle the issue, it 
is first necessary to define what is meant by a nonmodular outlook or 
nonautonomy of grammar. One serious problem with the current critique 
of modularity is that it is not exactly clear what the alternative really 
412.2. Conclusions
means. One pitfall is to think about the issue in absolute terms, as if 
modularity is either a fact of life or a false impression. It is easy to see 
why this way of thinking is wrong: The latter possibility, a complete 
rejection of modularity (i.e. no specialization, everything performed by 
a general ‑purpose mechanism), does not make much sense, so it cannot 
be what the opponents of modularity have in mind. This is evident in the 
language chosen by cognitive linguists, who often talk about strong or 
moderate versions of modularity, implying that it is not an all ‑or ‑nothing 
proposition; it is more reasonable to think of the presence or absence 
of modularity as a matter of degree. If the new cognitive approach is 
defined as a reaction to a strongly modular view, it would therefore be 
the exact opposite to the untenable position that language is entirely 
autonomous and independent of other more general cognitive systems 
(such as perception, memory or categorization). But just as no one would 
seriously argue for modularity in its purest most uncompromising form, 
so too it would be hard to entertain the opposite possibility that language 
is a completely undifferentiated part of a larger monolithic unit. Clearly, 
the faculty of language must be demarcated one way or another from 
the rest of the mind, for it is simply hard to imagine it as being truly 
one with the universe of the mind. But by the same token, despite the 
demarcation, language cannot be an island either, cut off from the rest, 
a perfectly self ‑contained unit unaffected by any other components and 
never drawing on other abilities.
The real question therefore is what degree of separation there is 
between language and the other facets of cognition.5 Langacker (2008) 
suggests that there is no definite boundary between linguistic and ex‑
tralinguistic knowledge. He argues that “the linguistic and the extralin‑
guistic form a gradation rather than being sharply distinct” (2008, p. 37). 
According to Langacker, any boundaries posited to hold between linguis‑
tic meaning and pragmatic inference are not observed by linguists but 
imposed, dictated by received wisdom. Freed from traditional theoretical 
preconceptions, Langacker suggests, careful and objective observation 
should reveal the fuzziness of the traditional distinctions.
I wish to present a third option, and a rather paradoxical position, 
namely that it is possible to reconcile the fuzzy with the discrete. The 
observed blur characterizing boundaries does not have to preclude strict 
separation. This seemingly self ‑contradictory juxtaposition is possible not 
only in the banal sense that a fuzzy boundary is better than no bound‑
5 And if modularity in general is any measure of its particular instances, one
can also ask, by extension, what degree of separation there is between syntax and the 
lexicon.
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ary at all, but really in the bold sense that a blurred boundary conceals 
a strict division. Indistinctness of boundaries is an effect observed when 
two components operate in parallel and both contribute input processed 
by elements that access them at the same time. This idea will be described 
in more detail in section 2.4 and in the Final Remarks section.
Finally, it is important to mention a non ‑sequitur. Part of the motiva‑
tion behind the non ‑modular approach as well as the lexicon ‑syntax con‑
tinuum was the need to analyze syntax as being grounded in meaning, 
in line with the symbolic view of language and account for the semantic 
and functional constraints on grammatical structure. However, viewing 
grammatical structure as being conditioned by semantic and functional 
considerations does not entail that syntax and the lexicon (or extralin‑
guistic abilities) should be combined and inseparable.
The above characteristics setting apart closed ‑ and open ‑class forms 
are rather straightforward consequences of and consistent with insights 
concerning modularity. What follows is a rather lengthy list of further 
differences between the two types of forms suggesting that they consti‑
tute qualitatively distinct categories. The following discussion is meant 
to demonstrate the significant degree to which lexical items differ from 
function words.
2.3. Differences Between the Two Classes
There are two reasons for a comprehensive review of closed ‑class proper‑
ties. First, quite simply, the differences are relevant to the discussion of 
constructions. The properties, especially those of function words, listed 
in the review will be shown to hold for schematic constructions. Because 
grammatical constructions do not form a uniform group, with some of 
them being positioned toward the closed ‑class end of the continuum and 
others bearing some properties of lexical items, it is necessary to construct 
a gauge for establishing the degree to which a construction is capable of 
conveying lexical meaning. Without that gauge, hypothesizing meanings 
for given constructions runs the risk of mere speculation.
Secondly, because one of the major claims of the present contribu‑
tion will consist in demonstrating that the meanings of grammatical 
constructions are not free from the constraints of the distinction, it 
will be necessary to demonstrate that the distinction is a real linguistic 
construct, rather than a terminological illusion. The following discussion 
should substantiate this point.
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2.3.1. Openness to additions
As their name suggests, open ‑class forms are freely open to new ad‑
ditions, and their numbers are truly staggering compared to the puny 
number of function forms. While the typical examples of the latter count 
in the dozens, a number which can grow to hundreds if one includes 
transitional forms with lexical properties, the truly open ‑class forms 
have the potential of being infinitely numerous. Unabridged dictionaries 
list hundreds of thousands of entries, but do not include many technical 
terms (my Webster’s lists only eight aldehydes out of thousands extant) 
or obscure slang terms. Neither do they list examples like JFK, Big Apple, 
Pink Floyd or Savannah, Georgia, which can safely be said to be part of 
most native speakers’ lexicons. To appreciate the capacity of the lexicon, 
one does not even need to wonder at the rapid development of science 
and technology yielding untold numbers of technical terms. It is enough 
to note the infinite combinatorial nature of organic compounds, each 
of which can be given a unique name, showing that the capacity of the 
lexicon is also infinite. Of course, the capacity of the memory is not, so 
the combinatorial capacity of the lexicon cannot be exploited fully, but 
the point is that in its free flexibility, the lexicon clearly differs from the 
set of closed ‑class forms. These are not admitted into the store of func‑
tion words except in an imperceptibly slow process of grammaticization, 
which normally takes centuries to occur. The difference between the 
rates of admission for lexical items and functors is so enormous that one 
can safely say it is not a difference of degree, but of quality. Comparing 
the instantaneous process of coining new lexical items and the prolong‑ 
ed process of grammaticization brings to mind the dynamic world of 
animals and the world of plants, which for all practical purposes seems 
static by comparison.
Theoretically, of course, new function words can be coined, and at‑
tempts at inventing pronouns—specifically, candidates for a gender ‑free 
third person singular epicene pronoun—have been made. As is well 
known, however, such attempts have failed (Baron, 1981). To gain genuine 
currency, a function word needs not only a long time to enter the scene, 
but also a degree of imperceptibility. New function words can enter 
a language through unconscious acquisition, where an existing word is 
reanalyzed, as in the case of verbs becoming prepositions (e.g. concern‑
ing) or a lexical verb becoming an auxiliary verb. Speakers simply resist 
using intentionally decreed coinages of function words. It is as if function 
words have an aura of exclusivity about them that makes coining them 
feel like forging money.
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The process whereby a lexical item is re ‑analyzed and gradually 
transforms into a function form—referred to variously as either gram‑
maticalization or grammaticization—has been studied widely in recent 
years, with changes being accounted for in terms of lexical re ‑analysis 
(Givón, 1975; Agheyisi, 1986), generalized invited inference (Traugott & 
Dasher, 2002), invited inference (Heine & Kuteva, 2005), or context induced 
reinterpretation (Heine et al., 1991). What is important to mention here is 
that grammaticization seems to be the only way for grammatical forms 
(which will often be referred to below as “grams”) to emerge in a lan‑
guage. This has led many researchers to observe that grammaticization is 
characterized by unidirectionality (Heine et al., 1991; Bybee et al., 1994; 
Haspelmath, 1999), which manifests itself grammaticization proceeding 
only from lexical items to grams, but not vice versa. The phenomenon of 
unidirectionality has been approached as a challenge eluding a simple 
explanation: Why does there not seem to be grammaticization in reverse? 
Why do at least some lexical items not originate from grams? One pos‑
sible answer is that grammaticization, whether it proceeds forward or 
backward, is a slow long process, and it is only undergone by those forms 
that have no other alternative, that is, grammatical forms. Lexical items 
do not have to take the arduous route, because they can be entered in the 
lexicon more easily, through instantaneous coining. Further, lexical items 
are coined in response to a need, in the course of a more or less deliber‑
ate effort, while grammaticization is a process, where speakers are not 
even aware that new grammatical structures are being created. Whatever 
the underlying causes, unidirectionality is a fact of language function‑
ing which can also be taken as an illustration of qualitative differences 
between open ‑ and closed ‑class forms.
Thus, because the two kinds of language forms are created by two 
different processes, the contents of the two stores differ dramatically. 
Neologisms are routinely found in the lexicon, while almost never in the 
set of closed ‑class forms. Adult native speakers are not likely to come 
across a new closed ‑class form they have not been familiar with before. 
While encountering a neologism does not leave a language user feeling 
very surprised, probably no speaker can be confronted with a previously 
unseen grammatical pattern, determiner, or pronoun, (unless it is an 
archaic or a regional one like the Scots ane (one). 
This is because function forms are as a rule at least relatively common 
(the twenty most frequent words in English are all functors), so by the 
time a person becomes a competent speaker, this person will have heard 
them all. Not so with lexical forms. These include forms ranging from 
fairly frequent words like house and girl to extremely infrequent ones like 
flother (obsolete for ‘snowflake’) or bandore (‘a lute ‑like string ‑instrument’). 
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Open ‑class forms include countless examples of words that appear spo‑
radically and only in some bodies of text. They also feature nonce words 
like affluence ‑schmaffluence (only one appearance online, accessed April 4, 
2012) coined so easily and naturally that one can often fail to recognize 
them for what they are: unquestionably novel items that would perhaps 
be impossible among closed ‑class forms (*Schme United States).
2.3.2. Substitution
One consequence of the abundance of open ‑class forms is that any word 
may have a large number of synonyms with various shades of meaning. 
This is not true of closed ‑class forms, where there are few if any pos‑
sibilities for substitution. In the sentence The spelunkers rappelled down the 
crevasse, the markers the,  ‑s,  ‑ed, and perhaps down cannot be replaced 
by synonymous forms, because no such forms exist (though they can be 
replaced by other grammatical markers with different functions). There 
are no plural suffixes that could substitute the  ‑s, no past markers other 
than  ‑ed that could attach to rappel, and although the definite article can 
be replaced by these or those, the resulting difference—between a presup‑
posed definiteness and emphatic definiteness—is rather significant. On 
the other hand, the open ‑class form spelunker can be replaced by caver, 
potholer, or speleologist. Similarly, the idea conveyed by the lexical item 
crevasse can also be conveyed by fissure, crack, rift or cleft.
Lexical forms tend to have numerous synonyms; grammatical forms 
have few or none. Therefore, as the following Markov model table illus‑
trates (Table 3), lexical forms lend themselves to paradigmatic substitut‑
ability more openly than the function markers.
Table 3. Substitutability of open ‑class and closed ‑class forms
The
These
Those
spelunkers 
cavers
potholers
speleologists
 ‑s
 ‑Ø
rappel
plough
plummet
jump
look
smile
etc.
 ‑ed
 ‑Ø
down
up
the
a
that
this
crevasse.
hole.
abyss.
pit.
cliff.
etc.
This difference in substitutability is a direct consequence of grammati‑
cization pressures. While a lexical item needs only the slightest nuance of 
meaning to be justified as a new addition to the lexical store in a language, 
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grammatical items are admitted on condition that they are general enough 
to apply in many uses. This is in some contradiction to Hopper’s principle 
of specialization which states that “at one stage a variety of forms with 
different semantic nuances may be possible” (Hopper, 1991, p. 22), but 
Hopper adds that “as grammaticization takes place, this variety of formal 
choices narrows and the smaller number of forms selected assume more 
general grammatical meanings.” A distinction between definiteness and 
indefiniteness is enough to become grammaticalized, but one between 
a conflict and a quarrel is obviously not. Even the concept of a conflict 
alone is too endemic to specific contexts to become subject to grammatici‑
zation processes. This point will be addressed in section (2.3.5).
2.3.3. Obligatoriness
Following Boas’s (1938, p. 132) observation that “grammar … determines 
those aspects of each experience that must be expressed,” it has been 
accepted that grammatical and lexical meanings contrast in this respect. 
Whether a grammatical meaning is relevant to the message or not, the 
speaker is forced to express it. For example, in general statements such 
as The lion hunts at night, the use of the present tense is obligatory even 
though the sentence does not describe events that are confined to the 
present. What is being described is not the temporal placement of the 
proposition, but an atemporal fact. Still, English does not permit, even 
in such cases, verbs in finite clauses to appear without tense inflections.
Sometimes, a grammatical meaning is manifested overtly, as in the 
case of the  ‑s ending in the present tense inflection of the third person 
singular, but it can also be realized without overt marking, as in the 
singular number in lion in the example above. However, when a gram‑
matical meaning is realized overtly, its formal marking is obligatory. This 
is especially true of inflectional markers. Bybee and others (1994, p. 8) 
observe that when a form has come to be used obligatorily in all contexts, 
whether its use is redundant or not, its absence becomes meaningful. 
Cases where an expected grammatical form is missing are interpreted as 
signaling a meaning other than ordinary.
What is interesting is that grammatical forms without a clear mean‑
ing are obligatory too. In the sentence I want to go to the zoo later, the 
preposition to cannot be omitted as freely as the adverb later. Also, the 
first use of the preposition is more fixed than the second one, which is 
more semantically contentful and which can be replaced with a number 
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of options, such as through or toward. The fact that a preposition can have
lexical and functional uses is not inconsistent with my insistence on the 
division between lexical and function forms. This peculiarity is captured 
in a revised model of language organization presented in Final Remarks.
2.3.4. Propositional content vs. the scaffolding meaning
Talmy (2000a) notes that grammatical forms tend to have very spare 
semantic content, a property that sets them apart distinctly enough from 
lexical items. This is a widely recognized regularity, and many authors 
admit that while lexical words have meanings, function words carry 
“simple meanings” (Givón, 1993, p. 77) and their main purpose is to signal 
grammatical functions. The meanings of lexical items are not only rich 
and varied, but are also responsible for most of the propositional content 
of a sentence. In the sentence The spelunkers rappelled down the crevasse, 
the essentials and the minutia of the entire scene are conveyed by lexical 
items. On the other hand, the function markers here provide a conceptual 
scaffolding that does not affect the propositional content of the sentence.
The following is a closer look at how the semantic content of a sentence 
is divided between lexical and grammatical items. The illustration below 
is based on Talmy’s discussion (2000a, p. 33) of the conceptual system. 
In sentence (1), the content is divided between closed ‑class forms listed 
in (A) and lexical items (B).
(1) Spelunkers rappelled down the crevasse. 
(A)  ‑er
 ‑s 
 ‑ed
the
down
(B) spelunker — caver, person exploring natural, non ‑commercial caves;
hobby rather than occupation;
special equipment, training, climbing, crawling involved.
rappel — move down a vertical face using a double rope;
rope secured above and tied around the body;
rope let out gradually during descent.
crevasse — fissure in glacial ice; dozens of meters deep and up to 
several hundred meters long; the fissure is wide enough to hold 
a person.
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The information conveyed by the open class forms is considerably more 
detailed than anything that can be conveyed by function words. In fact, 
they specify the bulk of the propositional content making up the cognitive 
representation (CR) of the scene. On the other hand, closed ‑class forms 
contribute “the main delineations of the scene organization and of the 
communicative setting of the CR evoked by the sentence” (2000a, p. 34).
These lexical ‑grammatical differences can be made more evident by 
manipulating elements of one class and keeping the other constant.
(2) Would the spelunkers rappel down a crevasse?
The general structure is now different, and instead of a report of an 
event, there is a hypothetical scenario. However, the scene depicted is 
still one located on a glacier with the cave exploration enthusiasts facing 
the challenge of descending into a fissure in ice. An additional observa‑
tion is that if the original sentence in past tense (1) were to be illustrated 
with video footage, the scene presented would probably remain the same 
for the question (2)—that is, the elements of the temporal setup and the 
communicative properties of a sentence (namely, is it a declarative or 
a question?) are so abstract that they cannot be unambiguously rendered 
through a visual medium.
The effect is very different if open class forms are changed, the closed‑
 ‑class forms being left intact. For example, take The rioters broke through the 
police cordon. The temporal organization is the same, so the activity could 
take the same amount of time, the number of agents could be the same, 
and essentially all the schematic aspects of the abstract organization of 
the two scenes could be identical. Yet, this time, the depiction shifts away 
from the Arctic wilderness to a city setting, and the activity would look 
entirely different if featured in a video recording.
2.3.5. Generality
Part of the reason why the above differences occur between lexical and 
grammatical items is because function words are precisely dedicated to 
expressing elements of meaning that can recur across multiple situations. 
The wealth of information specified in the open class elements is too great 
and the minutia too rare to figure in all everyday situations or discussions. 
On the other hand, elements such as tense can be applied to any activity. 
As Cruse (1986, p. 5) explains, “[b]ecause grammatical elements typically 
need to have the capacity to combine normally with semantically very 
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various roots, their meanings tend to be of a very general sort: the notion 
of past tense, for instance, can combine without anomaly virtually any 
conceivable verbal notion.” As a result, closed ‑class items occur much 
more frequently than open ‑class items. Among the most frequent words, 
the first ten6 are closed ‑class forms or forms toward the closed ‑class end 
of the continuum.
This semantic characteristic of grammatical forms is consistent with 
common views regarding the direction of grammaticization, which is as‑
sumed to result in the semantic generalization of lexical items evolving into 
grams. One way for a form to become more general in its applicability is 
to undergo “bleaching” (Meillet, 1912; Givón, 1975), a process variously re‑
ferred to as “desemanticization,” “semantic depletion” (Weinreich, 1963) or 
“erosion” (Lehmann, 1982). Meillet described this process as a “loss of ex‑
pressivity” through semantic weakening (“affaiblissement”). In the course 
of this semantic reduction, part of a form’s original meaning contribution 
is devolved to the accompanying sentential context. Heine and Reh define 
grammaticization as “an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in semantic 
complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic sub‑
stance” (Heine & Reh, 1984, p. 15). Thus, as a result of its original content 
being eroded, the interpretation of a gram is dependent on the meaning 
of constructions it attaches to. The flip side of generality, then, is that the 
reduced meaning of a grammatical form is insufficient to appear indepen‑ 
dently. A gram requires other lexical or grammatical material to justify its 
presence, a characteristic related to conceptual autonomy, discussed below.
However, before grammaticization begins, a lexical form has to be 
general enough to even be available for reanalysis as a potential gram. 
Across languages, high frequency verbs like go, have, come, or be are 
known to undergo grammaticization and the accompanying bleaching, 
which are developments not usually shared by verbs like tiptoe, harbor, 
creep up, or subsist. This point is explored in some detail in section 3.8 on 
the grammaticization of past tense grams in Slavic languages.
2.3.6. Conceptual autonomy
The two kinds of language forms also differ in terms of autonomy. Open‑ 
‑class forms are generally conceptually autonomous (Langacker, 2008); 
that is, they convey concepts that can function semantically on their 
6 According to Sinclair (1991, p. 143), these are, starting from the most frequent one, 
the, of, and, to, a, in, that, I, it, and was.
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own (hence they are also described as being autosemantic). By contrast, 
grammatical functors are conceptually dependent or synsemantic—their 
existence is justified insofar as they complement open class forms and 
they do not make much sense without conceptualizing the open‑class 
meanings that they attach to. For example, the category of plurality 
presupposes and obligatorily invokes the conception of concrete units, 
objects or persons. Of course, one can entertain plurality in the abstract, 
but it can only be made sense of when it is manifested in concrete in‑
stances.
2.3.7. Formal reduction
An element whose use depends on the presence of another more inde‑
pendent item also tends to become formally attached to that item. Gram‑
maticization leads to increased phonological dependence on surrounding 
lexical items so that an item may start as a free form, but soon its position 
becomes more fixed until it eventually attaches to a lexical item. The high‑
est stage is a complete disappearance whereby a formerly reduced affix 
becomes a zero morpheme. This unfailing regularity is illustrated by the 
case of the past tense grams in Slavic languages, discussed in section 3.8.
The correlation between the length of a word and its status, where 
the longer words tend to be lexical words, is a reflection of a mechanism 
whereby increased frequency of use results in the shortening of a form 
for reasons of economy. Of course, this does not mean that only gram‑
matical forms will undergo shortening, as lexical words are also among 
the most frequently used words, and they too are therefore subject to the 
same principle of least effort. This insight was pointed out by Zipf (1965) 
and is referred to after his name as Zipf’s Law, which states that the more 
frequent a word is, the shorter it tends to be. However, the fact remains 
that grammatical words are among the shortest forms and Zipf’s statisti‑
cal observation has also been invoked to account for structural changes 
resulting from grammaticalization (Wiemer & Bisang, 2004; Pustet, 2004).
2.3.8. Cognitive dominance vs. linguistic dominance
Gentner and Boroditsky (2001) elaborate on this notion and note that 
the distinction into autonomous and dependent forms is continuous in 
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nature—that is, language forms come in varying degrees of autonomy. 
They argue that the concepts that form the basis of synsemantic forms 
are provided by language, while the content of autosemantic forms is 
largely non ‑linguistic. Meanings of concrete nouns come pre ‑individuated 
and are merely given labels by language; language provides very little 
structuring of these concepts, and there is consequently relatively little 
cross ‑linguistic variation in how languages refer to persons, animals, or 
concrete objects. Languages simply tend to apply denotational labels to 
concepts that are pre ‑carved by the outside world. On the other hand, there 
is rather serious variation in how languages organize spatial relations, 
the specificity of deictic anchoring, definiteness and other information 
conveyed by means of synsemantic elements. One startling consequence 
of departmentalizing language forms as a function of cross ‑linguistic 
variation is that some items traditionally and intuitively accepted as 
open ‑class forms turn out to exhibit properties of synsemantic forms. 
For example, Gentner and Boroditsky note that the meanings of verbs 
exhibit cross ‑linguistic variation. Verbal meanings name event schemas 
and are therefore very schematic. Because elements of experience do not 
come as conveniently pre ‑packaged as concrete objects, languages have 
a say in structuring the relevant concepts, and there are significant differ‑ 
ences in how they demarcate the portions of experience conveyed by 
specific verbs.
For example, the English go refers to general translocation and is 
neutral about the means of motion. By contrast, Polish does not seem 
to have a general ‑purpose verb expressing translocation without speci‑
fying whether it occurs on foot or by mechanized means. One possible 
candidate, (prze ‑)dostać się, does convey the neutrality of the means, but 
it cannot be used as a translational equivalent in all situations where go 
would occur, because it is more telic than go and focuses on the goal of 
motion, not motion itself. It is therefore more like the English reach or 
get. Another well ‑known example is the case of the pair borrow and lend, 
which in some languages are fused into one verb. Thus, in Portuguese, 
the verb emprestar can be used referring to either direction, depending on 
the prepositional phrase that follows it—one can “emprestar” to or from 
someone. The same is true of the Polish pożyczać. One could speculate that 
perhaps most verbs can be shown to emphasize unique configurations of 
features that are not copied exactly by their translational equivalents in 
other languages.7
7 This should not be taken to suggest that languages differ infinitely in how they 
partition experience into verbal portions. To take the case of borrow and lend, there are 
clear cross ‑linguistic patterns involving converse pairs, with languages either separating 
the two concepts as two verbs or collapsing them under one verb. The collapsing itself 
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It is curious to note that this coincides with Kemmerer’s observation, 
outlined in section 2.1.4, about differential processing of two types of spa‑
tial relations. Recall that precise spatial delineations expressed by lexical 
items are handled by areas in the right hemisphere, while topological 
descriptions realized by closed ‑class forms are primarily mediated by the 
left hemisphere. Forms whose meanings are free from the constraints of 
particular languages and those that are dictated by a given language’s 
closed ‑class system are managed differently.
Gentner and Boroditsky’s analysis lends further support to the transi‑
tional nature of the distinction. They conclude that grammatical catego‑
ries form a continuum with verbs being located closer to the synsemantic 
end than do nouns. The view of grammatical categories being located 
on a continuum is reminiscent of Ross’s (1972) squish hierarchy, where 
he too envisions categories as cardinal points, with adjectives being be‑
tween nouns and verbs. However, what should be obvious enough is that 
however fuzzy the middle of the continuum is, its ends are qualitatively 
different. Sufficiently numerous imperceptible differences of degree even‑
tually lead to conspicuous differences of kind.
At this point, it is perhaps necessary to reiterate that I do not con‑
test the continuum view in the sense of denying the fuzzy boundary 
between the two magisteria. The fuzziness is probably an inescapable 
consequence of setting up any dichotomy and of any attempt at categori‑
zation. It is also a reflection of prototypicality, which, as a central feature 
of human cognition, affects the way language organizes its major subsys‑
tems. The fuzziness is also a very real and necessary part of the design 
of language itself—without the possibility of a no man’s land between 
the two extremes, grammaticization could not take place, and therefore 
no closed ‑class forms would exist in the first place. What I am contesting 
is what I think is the non ‑sequitur decision to treat the fuzzy boundary 
as a non ‑existent one. This continuum fallacy causes one to miss the fact 
that quantitative change leads to qualitative change; the two are not mu‑
tually exclusive. It is possible to have two concepts that are separated by 
so many imperceptible differences of degree that they become differences 
of kind.
may be something of a universal pattern: even when a language separates two converse 
concepts, speakers may still collapse them under one verb, as is the case with the verbs 
infer and imply in English, where the former is often used with the meaning of the latter. 
Additionally, there are further crosslinguistic similarities. The presence of a verb expres‑
sing a unidirectional activity that presupposes the active involvement of the recipient 
entails the presence of the opposite direction verb. So if there are verbs like sell, give, or 
teach, they are accompanied by buy, take, and learn.
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2.3.9. Formal characteristics
Closed ‑class elements also tend to be unique in form. One well ‑ 
‑known fact is that in English, closed ‑class elements tend to be un‑ 
stressed and only take contrastive stress. They also differ in terms of 
the repertoire of sounds they select. This was first observed by Jakob‑
son who pointed out that “affixes, particularly inflectional suffixes, in 
the languages where they exist, habitually differ from the other 
morphemes by a restricted and selected use of phonemes and their 
combinations” (Jakobson, 1990, p. 414). This is perhaps a result of pho‑
nological reduction in the course of grammaticization, which simplifies 
the phonological structure of a word, by reducing its length, complexity 
of clusters and eliminating the more marked sounds. Skalička (1979) 
further observed that this is especially true of inflectional languages, 
where closed ‑class forms tend to be more uniform than in agglutinating 
languages.
Unfortunately, these are hypotheses based on anecdotal evidence from 
languages that happen to support the claims but not from languages that 
contradict them. Bybee (2005) questions the universality of these hypoth‑
eses, and her analysis of twenty three maximally unrelated languages 
suggests that languages do employ marked segments in affixes. She con‑
cludes that the hypothesis that “languages use a more restricted number 
of phonemes in affixes than would be expected by chance, is only sup‑
ported in small minority of the languages of the sample” (2005, p. 191). 
However, it should be noted that Bybee considered both inflectional and 
derivational forms. Her samples include forms like the Inuit affixes juma 
(‘want to’) or katag (‘be fed up with’) which are contentful enough to be 
considered toward the lexical end of the continuum.
If one confines the focus to strictly closed ‑class items, the fact remains 
that languages show a preference for recycling the same sounds in many 
affixes and excluding many sounds. In English, the segment /z/ appears 
in the plural, third person singular and genitive. This is quite contrary 
to what one would expect if language were driven solely by the need 
of maximum clarity and disambiguation, as then more diversification 
would occur. Although Polish closed ‑class morphemes feature highly 
marked segments like nasal vowels, some segments like /r/ or /p/ do not 
appear at all.
To take another example, the distribution of the initial dental frica‑
tive th ‑ is organized along the division line, with the voiceless th ‑ being 
reserved for lexical words (thaw, theft, think, thorn, thud) and the voiced 
th ‑ being restricted to function words (than, the, then, there, they, this, etc.) 
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No lexical word in English begins with a voiced th ‑, and there is only one 
exception among function words, namely the voiceless th ‑ in through.
Another interesting formal peculiarity exhibited by closed ‑class forms 
is their behavior in verb phrases in Romance languages. For example, in 
Portuguese, negation triggers object ‑verb inversion:
(3) (Eu) não a vejo.
(I) not her see.
‘I don’t see her.’
But this inversion only affects pronouns. Nouns and proper names re‑
main in their original position following the verb:
(4) (Eu) não vejo a rapariga / Ana.
(I) not see the girl / Ana.
‘I don’t see the girl / Ana.’
In Brazilian Portuguese, this inversion occurs without negation, and here 
too, it only concerns pronouns.
(5) a. Te amo.
You love ‑1SG
‘I love you.’
b. Eu a amo.
I her love ‑1SG
‘I love her.’
The above are therefore not absolute universals, but tendencies, and 
probably not very strong ones. Yet such tendencies can be taken as an 
indication that the two extremes on the lexicon ‑grammar continuum are 
qualitatively different.
2.3.10. Corrigibility
Mistakes in deviant sentences tend to be easy fixes, if the anomaly 
involves the wrong closed ‑class items. This is a straightforward con‑
sequence of low substitutability of closed ‑class forms. In the sentence 
*I want of go to a zoos, the preposition of is used instead of to, which is 
the only possible insertion in its slot, so its absence is rather conspicuous. 
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Similarly, the use of the indefinite article is incompatible with the plural 
suffix. Sentences where function forms are used incorrectly are compre‑
hensible and corrigible (Matthews, 1981, p. 20). Unlike lexically anomalous 
uses, “an ungrammatical utterance, according to this criterion, is one that 
a native speaker can not only recognize as unacceptable, but can also 
correct” (Lyons, 1977, pp. 379—380).
By contrast, if mistakes involve open ‑class items, as in Flavors com‑
plained down to earth, correcting them is so challenging that one does not 
know where to begin. Often it is impossible to diagnose a problem in 
a sentence like this without knowing what the speaker’s intentions were.
2.3.11. Minimal free forms
Another interesting difference is made evident by Bloomfield’s (1926) 
test for what counts as a word, namely his observation that a word is 
a minimal free form capable of standing alone as a complete utterance. 
Although the test is not foolproof (words like my or of cannot stand alone 
as an utterance), when words fail the criterion, it is grammatical markers, 
but rarely lexical words.
This is because grammatical words are synsemantic: the use of the 
preposition of is rendered meaningful and justified by the presence of 
a lexical head that it complements.
2.3.12. Exchange vs. shift errors
Lexical and grammatical items also behave differently in speech errors. 
They differ in their relative likelihoods of occurring in exchange errors 
and shift errors. An exchange error, a special kind of an anticipation 
error, is the replacement of a word by a word intended to appear further 
in a sentence, with the two words swapping places (e.g. many rivers in 
the fish). A shift error is the migration of a word to another position in 
a sentence (e.g. act outed for acted out).
In general, open ‑class items occur often in exchange errors (6a), but 
rarely in shift errors (7b), whereas closed ‑class items occur rarely in 
exchange errors (6b), but often in shift errors (7a). What is particularly 
interesting about example (6a) is that it involves a swapping of lexical 
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items that belong to different categories. It is also important to note 
that inflectional affixes pattern like closed ‑class items. Thus, in (6a) the 
endings are stranded, remaining in their original positions instead of 
moving with their content word hosts (6c).
(6) a. He’s never weeked two works. (Exchange error)
b. NOT: He’s never works two weeked.
c. NOT: He’s never weeks two worked.
(7) a. This was the best act ‑outed scene. (Shift error)
b. NOT: This was scene the best acted out.
2.3.13. Agrammatism
The above makes sense in light of evidence from agrammatic patients. 
Speakers with lesions to the Broca’s area have considerable difficulty 
using function markers, particularly free grammatical morphemes, 
which are typically omitted, but also bound grammatical morphemes, 
which are often misselected (Grodzinsky, 1984). Further, while agram‑
matic patients seem to have unimpaired access to content morphemes, 
their comprehension is evidently disrupted when faced with sentences 
contrasting in terms of the positioning of function morphemes (She
gave her dog the food and She gave her the dog food). Moreover, Geschwind 
(1974) noted that agrammatic patients experience difficulty even repeating 
function words. He used this observation as a basis of a short screening 
task for agrammatism. When agrammatic patients are asked to repeat 
the sentence No ifs, ands, or buts, they are unable to repeat the sentence, 
and also find themselves incapable of using the words included in it cor‑
rectly.
Of course, indications of selective impairment should be taken 
with circumspection. They cannot be taken as direct evidence that 
the components responsible for lexical and function morphemes are 
dissociated in the brain. Segalowitz and Lane (2000, p. 337) warn that 
the currently available technology is too crude to demonstrate that 
the distinction between open and closed class forms is neatly reflected 
in the brain. Also, Grodzinsky himself (1984, p. 112) objects to drawing 
a facile distinction between lexical and grammatical morphemes by 
“‘artificially’ lumping determiners, prepositions and auxiliaries.” 
However, there is still good reason to suspect that “distinct neural struc‑
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tures are involved in the access and use of elements of the two classes” 
(Rizzi, 2004, p. 440).
One problem complicating a simple view of the distinction is that 
a function marker can behave differently depending on its status in 
the sentence. Agrammatic patients are more likely to use the preposi‑
tion for if its use is semantically determined (as in ‘flower for Rita’) than 
if it is subcategorized by the verb, with no semantically motivated 
choice (as in ‘Rita hoped for flowers’), in which case, they will most
likely omit it. This could create the confusing impression that there 
is no single representation of the preposition for or that it is stored in 
multiple locations in the brain. In other words, some uses suggest 
that it is a function word while others place it in the lexical set, 
which seems to put into question the validity of the lexicon ‑grammar 
distinction.
One way to resolve this problem is to assume that an entry in the 
lexicon can have access to both grammatical and semantic information, 
as is illustrated in Figure 1 (p. 63). Then agrammatism would involve the 
obstruction of access to grammatical information. If a given context re‑
quires access to the semantic component, a preposition is used properly, 
but agrammatic patients will have difficulty producing sentences like 
‘Rita hoped for flowers’ which require access to the grammatical compo‑
nent. In agrammatism, function forms are not expunged from memory; 
instead they are cut off from the grammatical component. And the more 
grammatical information a language form contains, the more its use will 
be compromised.
2.3.14. Universal presence
The list of characteristics suggesting qualitative differences between 
open ‑ and closed ‑class forms could be closed with the observation that 
the distinction—which is being dismissed by cognitive linguists—re‑ 
ceives indirect corroboration from crosslinguistic comparison. For exam‑
ple, as Wierzbicka (1996, p. 36) notes, there are no languages free of pro‑
nouns. If the division had no innate biological origin, one could expect 
at least some languages to develop without closed ‑class forms, placing 
the entire conceptual scaffolding of scene organization on the open ‑class 
lexical system.
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2.3.15. Declarative and procedural memory
It has also been argued that the lexicon and syntax differ in terms of 
operation and memory use. Pinker and Ullman (2002) offer experimental 
data to show that the lexicon is dedicated to storage, while syntax is pri‑
marily a computational system involving the generation of forms based 
on rules.
They go on to argue that the two components are separate kinds 
of memory. The lexicon is a subdivision of declarative memory, which 
is involved in the storage of facts, events and arbitrary relations. On 
the other hand, processing grammatical information relies on the 
procedural system, which is associated with learning skills, especially 
those involving sequences and motor control (like playing sports). The 
two systems can be conveniently referred to as the “what” (declarative) 
and the “how” memory (procedural). They have even been shown to 
be located in different sites in the brain. Declarative memory is known 
to be subserved by the medial ‑temporal lobe structures, in particular 
the hippocampus. Procedural memory, by contrast, depends on the 
operation of the basal ganglia, including Broca’s area where they project 
(Ullman, 2006).
What needs to be underscored in this context is that tasks involving 
the processing of grammatical forms (like the generation of past tense 
forms of regular verbs) have been observed to activate regions in the 
brain other than those activated while processing lexical information 
(like retrieving past tense forms of irregular verbs). All this points to 
a different psychological status of the lexicon and syntax, putting into 
question the wholesale rejection of the lexicon ‑syntax division.
2.3.16. Conscious attention
Talmy (2007) argues that closed ‑class forms are backgrounded, and as 
a result less available to conscious report than open ‑class forms. This is 
consistent with the results of a series of experimental studies demon‑
strating that language users do not attend directly to the surface form 
of sentences, involving details of grammatical structures used. Subjects 
were found to retain the gist more than any information about the 
morpho ‑syntactic form of an utterance they have been exposed to (Sachs, 
1967; Bransford & Franks, 1971). The results of the experiments were inter‑
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preted as showing that details of syntax are only retained under special 
circumstances, such as awareness of a subsequent test (Johnson ‑Laird & 
Stevenson, 1970; Johnson ‑Laird et al., 1974) or when something about the 
form of the utterance is highly salient (Murphy & Shapiro, 1994). Although 
these findings refer to both syntactic and lexical information, the latter is 
more likely to be recalled than the former. This does not of course mean 
that these details are ignored completely, but that unlike lexical forms, 
grammatical items are much less likely to be registered consciously.
2.4. A New Model of the Lexicon and Syntax
2.4.1. Why Construction Grammar
The observations reported above suggest that the traditional levels of 
linguistic analysis do seem separate, but at the same time there is a sense 
that the separation is not as neat or definitive as has often been assumed. 
Below a number of findings will be mentioned that will no doubt ag‑
gravate the sense of contradiction, even though the review below is not 
intended to be as exhaustive as the discussion of evidence in favor of 
separability of components. Instead, only a number of facts will be re‑
ported that should make it clear that the traditional view of modularity 
was oversimple.
This apparent contradiction calls for a revised model of the organiza‑
tion of language, which should be able to capture the fact that lexical items 
seem separate from grammatical forms, but at the same time, the bound‑
ary between them does not seem perfectly discontinuous. The revised 
model proposed here is based on the view of the lexicon assumed within 
the framework of Construction Grammar. Therefore, first, a brief charac‑
terization of CxG is in order, which will also serve to highlight reasons 
why traditional modularity has been questioned by cognitive linguists.
Construction Grammar is a model of grammar explaining linguistic 
competence in terms of the knowledge of constructions, that is, pair‑
ings  of form and meaning that are building blocks of sentences. Rather 
than viewing sentences as being products of general rules of grammar 
establishing skeletons to be fleshed out with lexical items, Construction 
Grammar assumes that it is lexical items that come with inbuilt rules 
that define the form of a sentence. The interesting part is that a lexical 
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item can be not only a single word, but also a larger phrasal unit. In 
this new sense, such all ‑size lexical units are referred to as constructions. 
In a fairly controversial move, Goldberg applies the term “construction” 
indiscriminately to all language forms, from traditionally understood 
single lexical morphemes, both bound like un ‑ and  ‑ness and free like 
aardvark and zygote, through partially open phrases like no V ‑ing (e.g. no 
jaywalking, no loitering) to very general rules like transitivity V Obj.
The present study assumes the constructionist framework for the 
same two reasons that prompt construction grammarians to embrace the 
continuum view. Because I adopt both the constructionist framework and 
the lexicon ‑syntax continuum (with the proviso that the continuum view 
does not contradict the lexicon ‑syntax division), the reasons in question 
are discussed below.
First, closed ‑class forms have meanings, and second, open‑class items 
exhibit unique syntactic properties. Thus, apart from the widely acknowl‑
edged symbolic nature of syntactic constructions, constructionists point 
out that many words do not conform to the general rules of syntax and 
instead bring in their own idiosyncratic stipulations. A very compelling 
argumentation can be found in Culicover and Jackendoff (2005), who 
focus on words that tend to appear in “the wrong places.” Their argu‑
ments and reasoning (as well as examples it is illustrated with) are briefly 
summarized here.
While most intensifiers precede adjectives and adverbs, the adverb 
enough behaves in the opposite way—it can only follow adjectives and 
adverbs.
(8) very/somewhat/remarkably/*enough nice.
The same is true of quantifiers galore and aplenty.
(9) many/numerous/*galore/*aplenty balloons galore/aplenty. (Culicover 
& Jackendoff 2005, 27, ex. 14)
If it is assumed that syntax provides frames with pre ‑specified posi‑
tions of most words, and some exceptional words do not follow these 
specifications, then one must stipulate separate rules for such words. If 
it is assumed that these stipulations are made in syntax, this poses an 
economy problem, because there would have to be untold numbers of 
such addenda to syntax, as there are many other words that go in “the 
wrong places.” For example, in place names, the word mountain follows 
the name, while mount precedes it:
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(10) a. Blair, Camelback, Mammoth, Sugarloaf Mountain.
b. Mount Everest, Washington, Athos, Rysy, Diablo.
If they are stipulated in the lexicon, this would represent a major viola‑
tion of the lexicon ‑syntax divide which insists that syntactic rules should 
reside in syntax.
Further, a traditional lexicon with orderly single ‑word units comes at 
a price in the form of unpredictable licensing properties of lexical items. 
For example, verbs like sob are primarily intransitive verbs, and yet 
they can appear in expressions like sob one’s heart out or sob one’s way in.
In such phrases, the verb takes unlicensed arguments; that is, arguments 
that are not featured in the common argument structures associated 
with it and cannot be accounted for by any general rules of syntax. One 
solution has been to postulate secondary licensing properties turning 
such verbs into transitive verbs, but there are two problems with this 
solution. One, this kind of transitivity is severely selective: one can 
“sob one’s heart out,” but not “sob a movie” or “sob a day.” Each such 
secondary licensing appendix would have to be exhaustively detailed and 
suspect in terms of its economy appeal. Two, such additional licensing 
properties would have to be multiplied for each similar verb. This sec‑
ond problem would seriously exacerbate the first: detailed stipulations 
would have to be scattered all over the lexicon. And of course, unlicensed 
arguments do not end at one’s heart out. There also phrases like up a storm, 
as in dance up a storm, or one’s tush off, as in run one’s tush off, and so on, 
each with slightly different collocational properties. To account for each 
such phrase, a new licensing rule would have to be appended to each and 
every verb that can take it. This would mean that a verb would have to 
contain an impracticably long list of unlicensed phrases. To put it another 
way, the burden would be on the verb to predict what phrases, existing 
or potential, can appear in its presence. Such anticipatory powers on the 
part of the verb do not seem very plausible.
The problem here is that there is no good traditional alternative. One 
possibility, placing these rules in the syntax, is also not very satisfactory: 
Just like in the case of rules for positions of words that appear in the 
wrong places, to postulate them in the syntax component would repre‑
sent an economy problem, as it would force syntax to admit a host of 
increasingly less general rules, which in turn obviously makes syntax 
look more like the lexicon.
The constructionist alternative adopted here is to postulate larger con‑
struction entries like V up a storm in the lexicon, where V is an open slot 
to be filled with a verb. This makes it possible to avoid the problem of the 
unlicensed arguments in expressions like cook/talk/sing/dance up a storm. 
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Instead of multiplying additional licensing properties for each individual 
verb, one can include a construction that is instructed to take activity 
verbs. Postulating a multi ‑word construction entry with an empty slot for 
a verb has an intuitive advantage over granting extra licensing powers 
to countless verbs so as to allow them to take phrases like up a storm. It 
is an obvious improvement over what simply feels like putting the cart 
before the horse: in examples like talk up a storm, it is the verb cook that 
is incorporated into the construction; it is certainly not the case that the 
phrase up a storm complements the verb talk.8
The above observations do cast the lexicon in a new, less attractive 
light, because in lieu of a traditional elegant store of single lexical items, 
a profuse motley collection is proposed, containing items that seem to 
have nothing in common, all dumped together in one place. Still, hav‑
ing a lexicon composed of such apparently multifarious all ‑size items 
seems like a fair price for a model of language organization with entirely 
predictable licensing properties. Better yet, this all ‑inclusive lexicon does 
not have to mean a disorderly lexicon without a lexical ‑syntactic divide. 
Below an alternative account is given of how such a lexicon could be 
organized while preserving the lexicon ‑grammar distinction. Because 
the present model of the lexicon draws upon constructionist views of the 
lexicon, the discussion will begin with a summary of how the lexicon is 
envisaged by constructionists.
In the constructionist model of the organization of linguistic knowl‑
edge, the lexicon is not separate from the syntax component, but the two 
interlock, as is illustrated in the following diagram, taken from Croft 
(2001, p. 15).
8 Incidentally, one could reasonably argue at this point that each time a verb appears 
with strange unlicensed arguments can be a signal that we are dealing with a multi‑
word construction. Similarly, whenever words are used in ways that violate general 
rules of grammar, that too is a sign that a separate construction is at work. For exam‑
ple, the familiar use of by prepositional phrases followed by nouns without an article
as in by car, by plane, or by boat, seems to be a manifestation of an idiomatic construction 
dedicated to expressing means of transport, quite distinct from regular prepositional 
phrases like by a car. The two constructions (regular form and the specific means con‑
struction) are distinct enough and are not synonymous: one cannot say *go by a car, or 
*be hit by car.
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Figure 1. The lexicon cross ‑cutting the three traditional 
components
This diagram does not represent a very radical departure from the 
traditional componential model, according to which the lexicon equips 
words with their syntactic properties. For example, the theory of Govern‑ 
ment and Binding held that the lexicon specified the θ ‑roles of those 
lexical items that act as heads of constructions (Chomsky, 1982). In other 
words, the lexicon specified argument structures of some lexical items, 
and under the Projection Principle, this in turn affected the syntactic 
form of the derived phrases. Still, under this view, the syntactic proper‑
ties permitted in the lexicon were quite spare and all they were supposed 
to do was to ensure that the word would conform with the general rules 
of syntax.
The constructionist view goes further in terms of the amount of gram‑
matical information the lexicon can specify. Words come pre ‑equipped 
with information about where they can appear in the sentence (e.g. galore, 
mount, mountain above). Further, apart from single orthographic words 
and compounds, the lexicon also embraces items larger than words. Also 
included in the lexicon are idiomatic expressions of varying degrees of 
schematicity, ranging from fully specific idioms such as walk the plank 
(with all its positions filled with lexical material) through partially filled 
expressions like up a storm or V with one’s eyes closed to highly schematic 
patterns such as the resultative construction. (This inclusion of items 
going far beyond traditional lexical items is reflected in Goldberg’s 
portmanteau “constructicon,” a term she uses to refer to the store of 
all linguistic constructions or in Kay’s “phrasicon”). Also included in 
the lexicon are very general syntactic patterns that would normally be 
considered as elements belonging to the syntactic component. Such an 
enlarged all ‑embracing constructicon (Figure 2) could be represented by 
the following diagram.
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Figure 2. An all ‑embracing constructicon
I do not argue against a broad constructicon. A speaker must learn (rather 
than compute) all existing language forms. All aforementioned items, 
whether smaller or larger than a word, have to be stored in the lexicon—
if they are too arbitrary to be interpreted by combining their component 
parts, they must therefore be learned and stored somewhere. Relegating 
them to some extralexical periphery makes little sense, because there are 
simply too many of them. They may number in the thousands or tens of 
thousands if one admits that a speaker knows at least a part of phrasal 
idioms listed in an average ‑sized dictionary of idioms, is also familiar 
with collocations like sleep tight or answer the phone, and can recognize 
names like New York, The Marriott Hotel or The Sex Pistols. There should 
be little doubt that the lexicon is larger and more heterogeneous than has 
traditionally been supposed.
This model also manages to sidestep a paradox posed by modularity. 
One unwelcome inconsistency pointed out by Jackendoff (1997a, p. 48) is 
that theoretically, syntax should be kept separate from semantics. In real‑
ity though, lexical items (traditionally semantic beings) contain syntactic 
information and syntactic rules also deal with semantics. In other words, 
semantics is duplicated by syntax and syntax is duplicated by semantics. 
This problem subsides in a model where lexical items cross ‑cut the mod‑
ules and rely on them for different kinds of information. The modules 
remain separate and they no longer encroach on each other’s domains.
However, I take issue with the idea that the qualitative differences 
between the contents of the constructicon should be glossed over so non‑
chalantly. To call, as Goldberg does, all forms of language “constructions” 
and to assume that they are all equally capable of conveying meaning is 
to ignore dozens of observations of striking differences between closed‑ 
and open‑class forms. This would moreover be tantamount to settling for 
a large lexicon as a vapid shopping ‑list collection of items with no clear 
internal structure. There should be no denying that the diverse regions of 
the lexicon behave differently and their differences should somehow be 
accounted for in the structure of the hyper ‑lexicon.
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2.5. Pragmatic Strengthening
Before I proceed to demonstrate that the case for enriched semantic con‑
tent has been exaggerated in the constructionist literature, it is necessary 
to mention that there is theoretically one possible source of such fortified 
meanings in closed ‑class forms, but one that, upon closer reflection, fails 
to yield the kinds of rich meanings that are postulated by construction 
grammarians.
Specifically, in studies on grammaticization, it has been pointed out 
that before bleaching sets in, the first stages of a lexical item’s transition 
to gram status are marked by a process that has been argued to be the 
opposite of desemanticization—“pragmatic strengthening” (Hopper & 
Traugott, 2003; Traugott, 1988). As a result of this process, conversational 
implicatures that accompany uses of grammaticizing items eventually 
turn into entailments. For example, the adverb hwilum ‘at times’ became 
the temporal connective while, which subsequently acquired the conces‑
sive function (Traugott, 1988, p. 407). This was possible when the con‑
nective while was used to juxtapose two events standing in some logical 
opposition to each other. When enough such uses occur, the logical 
contrast goes from being a tentative accompanying conjecture to a fairly 
stable association, indeed part of the sense of the conjunction.
The most likely scenario entertained by many researchers is that of 
reinterpretations occurring in so called bridging contexts. According to 
Heine and Kuteva (2005, p. 58) “a use pattern can emerge with its own 
context ‑induced meaning” where an implicature becomes permanently 
associated with the use in question under favorable contextual condi‑
tions. More strikingly, “a contextual sense may become lexicalized to the 
point where it need no longer be supported by a given context” (Evans 
& Wilkins, 2000). This is in line with Grice’s views on the relationship 
between pragmatics and semantics, Grice (1989, p. 39) himself admitted 
that “it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a con‑
versational implicature to become conventionalized.”
Because pragmatic strengthening seems to provide an open door to 
the theoretically impossible meanings becoming in fact possible at some 
future point, any claim that rules out excessive semantic capabilities in 
schematic constructions should contend with this challenge. However, 
pragmatic strengthening does not provide a means for endowing syntac‑
tic constructions with overly expansive meanings. Studies on pragmatic 
strengthening report only two kinds of meanings that can emerge as 
a result of pragmatic strengthening. First, an item can acquire meanings 
that are otherwise familiar examples of grammatical meanings, such as 
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tense reference. It has been pointed out that volitional verbs tend to take 
on future tense meanings. This is the case of the English wyllan (‘want/
wish’) becoming the future tense auxiliary will (Bybee et al., 1994) or 
the Serbian and Croatian hteti/htjeti (‘want’) becoming the future tense 
marker (Corbett & Browne, 2009), as in the following example, where the 
verb clearly expresses future rather than intention.
(12) Hoću  li dugo  čekati?
Want1SG if long  wait?
‘Will I wait a long time?’
Second, an item may acquire non ‑truth ‑conditional functions involved 
in construal operations, as is the case of the concessive while (Traugott, 
1988), causal since (Molencki, 2007), concessive albeit (Sorva, 2007), or the 
scalar even expressing a ‘reversal of expectations’ (Traugott, 1988). These 
are markers that convey the speaker’s attitude or perception of the propo‑
sition. Traugott sums up the tendency by observing that “[m]eanings tend 
to become increasingly situated in the speaker’s subjective belief ‑state/
attitude toward the situation.” They can include “the speaker belief in the 
truth or probability of the proposition” or “some surprise factor on the 
speaker’s part” (1988, p. 410).
Recall that these two kinds of meanings are precisely those that are 
commonly found in grammatical forms. In other words, the effects of 
pragmatic strengthening are hardly surprising. They represent meanings 
that can be predicted based on what we already know about the semantic 
content of grams discussed in section 2.3.4. The sense of predictability 
is further enhanced by the cross ‑linguistic recurrence of the same 
pragmatic ‑strengthening motifs, whose range is by no means unlimited. 
As Bybee (2010, p. 171) notes, “inferences that are preferred in context are 
often very similar across cultures.” For example, the evolution of future 
tense forms mentioned above is found to have occurred in other non‑
 ‑related languages too. Future tense originating from lexical items with 
volitional meanings has also evolved in Syrian Arabic, where the verbal 
noun bi ‑wuddi (‘I want/desire’) has developed into the b ‑prefix marking 
the future (Jarad, 2013).
What the studies on pragmatic strengthening do not report are rich 
truth ‑conditional (non ‑construal) meanings like the ‘difficulty’ read‑
ing proposed for the way construction (questioned in Chapter 5) or the 
‘manipulation/mental coercion’ reading ascribed to the into ‑gerund 
construction (see Chapter 3), much less their cross ‑linguistic attestations. 
Indeed, authors who champion pragmatic strengthening confine its 
scope to grammatical meanings. For example, Brinton and Traugott (2005, 
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p. 68) state that “content is not enriched, but is ‘bleached’ (it gradually 
becomes backgrounded as grammatical meanings are enriched).” Thus, 
if pragmatic strengthening is incapable of infusing grammatical forms 
with richer meanings, there do not seem to exist any theoretical reasons 
to suppose that such meanings are in fact possible.
2.6. Persistence
Another theoretical source of rich meaning in grams is what Hopper 
refers to as persistence. This is the ability of a gram to retain a trace of the 
original meaning, despite the bleaching it has undergone. In Hopper’s 
words:
When a form undergoes grammaticalization from a lexical to a gram‑
matical function, some traces of its original lexical meanings tend to 
adhere to it, and details of its lexical history may be reflected in constraints 
on its grammatical distribution. (Hopper, 1991, p. 22)
For example, while both shall and will have become future markers, they 
are not exactly interchangeable: will is more appropriate where the future 
action is volitional and shall where it is a result of an obligation. Bybee 
and Pagliuca (1987) argue that these meanings are semantic remainders 
left behind by the original forms, and one could assume that grams can 
retain a memory of those original meanings:
We claim that the contemporary modal nuances of shall and will are 
direct continuations of their lexical meanings—those of shall are related 
to obligation and those of will are related to desire. (Bybee & Pagliuca, 
1987, p. 115)
The question of exactly how a gram retains a hidden trace of the original 
meaning remains unclear. One possibility is that persistence is a matter 
of a gram’s collocational preferences. This possibility is suggested by 
Hilpert (2008) who says:
If an auxiliary has grammaticalized out of a verb of obligation, we 
expect it to co ‑occur with main verbs that semantically relate to this 
lexical source, even several centuries after the initiation of the gramma‑
ticalization process. (p. 5)
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However, whatever its exact nature, a gram’s semantic memory is 
probably not capable of retaining the kinds of contentful meanings at‑
tributed to grammatical constructions for two reasons. First, as in the 
case of pragmatic strengthening, the meanings observed to survive 
bleaching are precisely those that are normally found in closed ‑class 
forms. Second, meanings proposed in the constructionist literature are 
not found in the original forms of the constructions. Take the ‘mental 
manipulation’ sense attributed to the into ‑gerund construction (Jill’s mom 
talked her out of marrying Billy Bob). There is no element in the pattern
[V OBJ into/out of V ‑ing] that could originally have served to express the 
idea of manipulation, let alone dishonesty or coercion. The same holds 
for other meanings analyzed in the following chapters.
2.7. Concluding Remarks
The lexicon ‑grammar distinction, however fuzzy, should not be dismis‑
sed as irrelevant to Construction Grammar analysis. The old ‑fashioned 
principle remains that closed ‑class forms are severely constrained in 
terms of the kinds of meanings they are allowed to convey. While fully 
specified open ‑class forms carry rich fine ‑grained meanings, closed ‑class 
forms and variables that have to be filled by lexical items cannot go 
beyond the spare structural categories provided by the grammatically 
specifiable inventory.
The decision to disregard the regularity may have seemed like a con‑
venient and reasonable move in the study of grammatical constructions 
which, after all, clearly can be shown to convey various types of meaning. 
While the distinction has not been challenged in the case of classic exam‑
ples of open ‑ and closed ‑class forms—no one would seriously argue that 
the meanings of articles are just as contentful as the meanings of nouns—
these classic cases represent only two extremes of a long continuum. The 
territory between the two extremes harbors interesting phenomena that 
defy the conventional binary understanding of words and rules. This has 
been especially true in Construction Grammar, where many examples of 
grammatical constructions are partially filled idioms and lie between the 
two extremes. In fact, continued insistence on a strict separation between 
open ‑ and closed ‑class forms may strike one as stubborn and reactionary, 
especially in light of unequivocal evidence that closed class forms are 
capable of sustaining semantic content. Expecting closed ‑class forms to 
be devoid of meaning seemed to stand in the way of understanding and 
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analyzing form ‑meaning pairings freely. Suspending the distinction has 
made it possible to ascribe meanings to grammatical constructions.
But in the long run, this decision, however commonsensical or defen‑
sible, may turn out to be an expedience of the moment. It is interesting to 
note that the suspension of the divide seems conveniently vague. On the 
one hand, the continuum view does away with the issue of a strict divide, 
but authors retain the right to invoke the qualitative differences associ‑
ated with the two poles. For example, Langacker (2008, p. 263) positions 
grounding elements “toward the grammatical pole of the lexicon/gram‑
mar continuum,” and Goldberg (1995, p. 29) appeals to it when she ob‑
serves that “constructions are closed ‑class elements so they are predicted 
to have the semantics of closed ‑class elements.” This much may seem like 
a reasonable compromise position proposing a smooth transition between 
formerly distinct components but also upholding differences between 
them. In reality, the continuum view is rather inconsistent and hard to 
pin down. On some occasions the two poles are treated differently, while 
on others the blurry divide is extended all along the continuum in order 
to deemphasize the differences between the extremes. While construc‑
tion grammarians are reluctant to admit to an all ‑out rejection of the 
division, claiming as they do, that there is a qualitative distinction, in 
reality they operate in complete disregard of its consequences. Levinson 
(2003, pp. 30—31) takes issue with Landau & Jackendoff’s (1993) observa‑
tion that closed ‑class spatial expressions should refer only to “the very 
gross geometry of the coarsest level of representation” (1993, p. 227) and 
quotes spatial relators from Native American languages exemplifying fine 
distinctions that are quite unusual for closed ‑class elements (about which 
more in the opening section of the next chapter). Similarly, Goldberg ar‑
gues that “English has some dramatic instances in which basic argument 
structure constructions convey contentful meaning” (2006, p. 7). Upon 
closer inspection, it turns out that Levinson’s relators are not typical 
closed ‑class forms and are more reminiscent of derivational morphemes, 
and the meanings of Goldberg’s constructions are not as contentful as 
they first seem, which will be demonstrated in the following parts of this 
study.
There are thus two problems with the continuum view. First, in 
practice deemphasizing the distinction is de facto tantamount to equating 
the two extremes on the grounds that they are connected by impercep‑
tibly small intermediate differences, a conclusion evident in attributing 
contentful semantics to closed ‑class forms. This reasoning is a familiar 
logical error known as the fallacy of the continuum, under which one 
may make the mistake of concluding that there is no distinction between 
opposites like rich/poor or cold/hot, because no strict division between 
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the two poles can ever be pointed out. Second, applying a classless all‑
 ‑encompassing label “construction” to all language forms while at the 
same time making a token concession to the lexicon ‑syntax distinction is 
nothing but attempting to have it both ways.
Additionally, the distinction can actually prove to be a useful tool, 
when it is appreciated that the swathe of the continuum between the 
extremes cannot conceivably be an autonomous region of language gov‑
erned by its own requirements. Grammatical constructions located in the 
middle of the continuum are combinations of items of both lexical and 
grammatical forms, and it should come as no surprise that they evince 
qualities of both too.
It stands to reason to expect that meaning is contributed by the con‑
struction’s lexical portion (it is unlikely to originate from the construction’s 
variables). What this means in practice is that when an open ‑class ‑style 
meaning is observed in a construction, it should be possible to trace that 
meaning to a specific lexical portion of the construction, whether as its 
literal or metaphorical interpretation. Incidentally, this would be one way 
of ensuring that the meaning is in fact paired with the form in question, 
and is not merely a semantic illusion. In situations where two competing 
meanings are postulated for a construction, priority should be given to 
the one that is clearly motivated by the construction’s form.
In the following chapter, we will examine a number of grammatical 
constructions and show that they carry less semantic or pragmatic con‑
tent than is claimed in the constructionist literature. In sum, the follow‑
ing chapters will seek to demonstrate that the lexicon ‑syntax division is 
real and the meanings with which language forms are paired depend on 
which side of the division a given form happens to be.
3. Oversemanticized Constructions
3.1. Implausible Meanings
In what follows, a number of closed ‑class constructions will be analyzed 
and shown to be less descriptive than they are made out to look in the 
literature. The general theme recurring throughout the discussion will 
be the insistence that closed ‑class items do not in reality behave any 
differently or any more astoundingly than they have been recognized 
traditionally, despite recent observations to the contrary.
Of course, it is rather easy to understand the excitement behind the dis‑
covery (or perhaps the acknowledgement) that many schematic construc‑
tions have interesting effects. After years of generative transformational 
denial of any semantic activity in syntax, it is very refreshing to be able 
to openly point out that constructions do in fact serve to convey certain 
meanings. The freedom to look closely at the meanings of constructions 
made it possible to uncover some truly non ‑banal effects, an unexpected 
and stirring development comparable to the possibility entertained in the 
1960s and 1970s that chimpanzees can talk (!).
Here, we will look in some detail at a range of closed ‑class forms 
to show that the excitement surrounding the semantic capabilities of 
grammar is probably as premature as in the case of the hype generated 
by observations of the exploits courtesy of talking chimpanzees. We will 
review the closed ‑class range starting from so called small words: single 
bound morphemes and prepositions.
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3.2. Spatial Prepositions
Traditionally, such elements have been considered to be devoid of detailed 
meaning. When they do inevitably convey content, as in the case of spa‑
tial prepositions, their meanings are believed to be sketchy delineations 
of geographic directions or relations. For example, Talmy (2000a, p. 25) 
shows that closed ‑class items serve to describe the location or motion of 
objects in terms of topological, but not Euclidean reference. Descriptions 
conveyed by means of grammatical elements are magnitude neutral, so 
that prepositions from and to are indifferent to the actual sizes of the 
referents named in a sentence (1a—b).
(1) a. Small molecules can pass from cell to cell.
b. Cosmic rays propagate from galaxy to galaxy.
Similarly, Landau and Jackendoff (1993) studied spatial prepositions 
used in descriptions of figures within grounds. They focused on scenes, 
where a ground (so called geon) has specific 2 ‑D or 3 ‑D geometry. For 
example, in Water flows through pipes, the ground pipes is a geon with 
a specified three ‑dimensional geometry, distinct from amorphous 
grounds such as air or water. As they note, “what proves surprising is 
how sparsely both the figure and the reference objects appear to be 
represented.” The preposition through is neutral as to the form of the 
ground; it is equally appropriate in phrases like through the air (unspeci‑
fied shape ground), through the meadow (2 ‑D plane ground), and through 
pipes (3 ‑D ground). They point out the absence of prepositions “with 
a figure or reference object that must be analyzed in terms of a particular 
geon.” There seem to be no prepositions that require grounds with spe‑
cific spatial configurations.1 Thus, there exist no prepositions like betwaft, 
only to be used with reference objects featuring a protruding part, as in 
(2a) and being ungrammatical in (2b), making sentences like (b) below 
anomalous.
1 Talmy concedes that some prepositions have certain specifications as to the inter‑
nal composition of a 3 ‑D ground. For example, he claims (2000a, pp. 194—195) that unlike 
in, inside cannot convey “liquid immersion” locations, because inside requires referent 
grounds with hollow interiors. Thus, it is natural to say The ball is in the water, but not 
*The ball is inside the water. However, even this observed effect is probably too rigid. Uses 
of inside with non ‑hollow interior grounds are easy to find in examples like nuts inside 
jelly, particles inside the brick, or sun’s rays inside the water. 
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(2) a. The bug crawled betwaft my face.
“The bug crawled down the junction between my nose and the 
main body of my face” (Landau & Jackendoff, ex. 5a).
b. *The bug crawled betwaft the thread.
Landau and Jackendoff give a number of other prepositions impossible 
due to the degree of their specificity, but their predictions are questioned 
by Levinson (2004). He observes that one of their hypothetical examples, 
sprough (‘through a cigar ‑shaped object’) is actually found in the North‑
western California language Karuk, where the spatial affix  ‑vara has 
precisely this meaning (‘in through a tubular space’). Levinson concludes 
that “[t]he whole set of claims is based on woeful ignorance of the cross‑
 ‑linguistic facts” (2003, p. 63).
Although Levinson’s observation seems to invalidate the whole line of 
reasoning behind Landau and Jackendoff’s prediction, there are some weak 
points in the counterexample he provides. First of all, the Karuk word does 
not have “precisely” the same meaning as sprough.  ‑Vara means ‘in through 
a tubular space,’ while sprough ‘through a cigar shaped object.’ Tapering 
toward the ends, a cigar is more like a spindle, and not a tube. Therefore, 
the Karuk directional affix  ‑vara is slightly less specific than sprough. Sec‑
ondly, even if one admits, as one should, that the meaning of  ‑vara is rather 
detailed, a look at the system of directional morphemes in Karuk reveals 
that the forms used to describe motion through space are not exactly 
typical closed ‑class items. Karuk has a much larger number of directional 
morphemes than are found in English (Macaulay, 2005). For  ‑vara to really 
be a problem, it would have to be part of a relatively small set of forms, 
most of which conveying rather general configurations. Of course, the more 
detailed specifications linguistic forms convey, the more such forms must 
be present, which per force makes them less and less closed ‑class.
It is necessary to admit, at this point, that prepositions represent 
a group of forms whose meanings are considerably more complex than 
would be typical of strictly closed ‑class forms. After all, they do convey 
information going beyond simple grammatical functions. Also, as many 
studies demonstrate, their meanings form large systems of multiple 
meanings, as in the case of the preposition over (Lakoff, 1987). The specif‑
ics of prepositional semantics are also evident from contrasts like over vs. 
above (Tyler & Evans, 2003). However, prepositions are not strictly closed‑
 ‑class forms. They are transitional forms, and as was noted in section 
1.2, they are variously considered open ‑class forms by some scholars and 
closed ‑class by others. It is no wonder then that they will demonstrate 
properties of both classes and their meanings will not be limited to the 
barest minimum.
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(Incidentally, the mere fact of a group of words belonging to preposi‑
tions, particles or any category considered closed ‑class in English, does 
not necessarily make these words closed ‑class in some other language 
any more than being a verb in some language makes a word an open‑
 ‑class item just because verbs are open ‑class in English. In some lan‑
guages, there are very few verbs and new ones cannot be added, which 
shows that in these languages, verbs are closed ‑class forms. One of the 
most remarkable examples is the Australian Aboriginal language Jingulu 
with only three verbs (Pensalfini, 2014), which are bound light verbs with 
meanings ‘do,’ ‘come,’ and ‘go’).
3.3. Diminutive Morphology
Also open to the idea that small closed ‑class morphemes can carry ex‑
otic meanings is Wierzbicka, who gives the example of Russian with its 
“extremely rich and elaborate system of expressive derivation applicable 
to proper names (names of persons)” (2006, p. 171). She observes that the 
English system is limited, allowing only derivations such as Johnny for 
John, while in Russian Ivan has a large number of derivations including 
Vanja, Vanečka, Vanjuša, Vanjuška, or Vanjušečka. Again, at first blush, the 
news is rather sensational. Here are fine shades of endearment conveyed 
by not only one but a series of morphemes which seem to be very close to 
the closed ‑class end of the continuum—they are conceptually dependent 
grams, they are not minimal free forms, and most obviously they are not 
open to additions. These examples are adduced in support of the notion 
that there are “[l]inks between culture and grammar” and that “gram‑
matical categories of a language also encode meaning” (p. 171). What 
Wierzbicka does not mention is that the elaborate system that generates 
a series of diminutive names in Russian is not limited to names of persons. 
Diminutive morphology is a rather commonplace phenomenon found in 
language after language (and those languages that have elaborate sets of 
diminutive morphemes also tend to apply them to names). In Russian, the 
suffixes  ‑uša and  ‑uška ( ‑уша,  ‑ушка, in Wierzbicka’s examples Vanjuša and 
Vanjuška) are found equally easily in general nominal word formation, in 
words like izbuša and izbuška (избуша, избушка), both diminutive forms 
of izba (избa ‘hut’). It is natural for many nouns in Russian to come with 
a series of diminutives like реченька, for reka (река ‘river’), which also 
features a form containing the suffix  ‑uška (речушка), or the suffix  ‑čka 
( ‑чка) in rečka (речка) found in Wierzbicka’s example Vanječka. Also, com‑
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binations of diminutive suffixes like uš ‑ečka (уш ‑ечка) (as in Wierzbicka’s 
example Vanjušečka) can be found in nouns like starušečka (старушечка) 
or babušečka (бабушечка) both meaning ‘old woman,’ derived from stara 
(старa ‘old’) and baba (бабa ‘grandmother’), respectively.
Thus, the above advantage of Russian over English is not because 
affectionate forms of names are somehow incompatible with Anglo tradi‑
tion, but simply because English has a modest diminutive morphology. 
English does have quite a few diminutive suffixes ( ‑en in kitten,  ‑let in 
starlet,  ‑ock in bullock,  ‑ling in duckling), however, they are far from being 
fully productive.2
In this connection, one could also cite the case of Portuguese as an 
example of a system of diminutives with strange meanings. In Portu‑
guese, diminutives are applied to participles, as in cansadinho for cansado 
(tired). But  ‑inho is not an exotic participle ‑specific suffix; Portuguese is 
merely an example of a language allowing a general suffix to be applied 
to a category other than noun, which is typical for most languages.
Incidentally, one should admit that diminutives in themselves are 
something of a minor challenge to semantic austerity of grammatical 
forms. Although the endearment uses listed above may be derivative 
from more general diminution ‘smaller size’ readings, it is undeniable 
that the notion of a smaller size is a fairly graphic meaning for a gram to 
begin with. Two points should be mentioned here. First, perception and 
framing of size is, to some degree at least, a matter of non ‑propositional 
meaning, which is perfectly consistent with the description of the seman‑
tic content of grammatical forms. Second, diminutive morphemes are not 
completely non ‑lexical. They are derivational morphemes, and hence their 
semantic contribution can by all means be greater than in the case of 
desinence grams. What also brings diminutive morphemes closer to the 
fuzzy boundary between the lexicon and syntax is their substitutability 
(see section 2.3.2), typical of lexical items. The fact that one can practically 
freely choose between Vanja, Vanečka, Vanjuša, Vanjuška, and Vanjušečka 
suggests the morphemes in question retain strong lexical features.
Thus, it is worth questioning the very choice of the examples used by 
Wierzbicka. The case of Russian diminutives is supposed to demonstrate 
the ability of grammar to contribute meaning, but it is debatable whether 
diminutive suffixes are strictly grammatical closed ‑class forms. Unlike 
2 The number of words in which  ‑ling appears is small enough to list here: chan‑
ge — changeling, dear — darling, duck — duckling, earth — earthling, find — foundling,
goose — gosling, gray — grayling, hire — hireling, prince — princeling, sap — sapling,
suck — suckling, under — underling, weak — weakling. The suffix is probably no longer 
productive. It cannot be added to nouns to create diminutive forms *dogling, *carling, 
*houseling.
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plurals or past tense forms (products of clearly closed ‑class processes), 
many forms obtained through diminutive suffixation are listed in dic‑
tionaries as independent entries, and although they are related to their 
source words, they intuitively seem to be independent lexical items, 
whether they are established units or potential creations.
More generally, derivational morphology should be considered an area 
located toward the lexical end of the continuum. Derivational morphemes 
show nuanced effects, which become especially evident when two closely 
synonymous morphemes are contrasted. An interesting example of such 
fine distinctions is analyzed by Górska (2001), who focuses on pairs of 
 ‑less/ ‑free privative adjectives (eg. sugarless, sugar ‑free). She shows that the 
contrasts produced follow fairly consistent schemas. Briefly, one effect is 
that the meanings of derivations convey presupposed expectations, such 
that sugarless suggests a negative situation (that is, sugar is absent when 
sugar would be desirable), while sugar ‑free modifying nouns like chewing 
gum indicates a welcome property. Such effects in open ‑class forms are, 
of course, natural and they are not questioned here. However, because 
this study focuses mainly on meanings in closed ‑class forms, semantic 
effects obtained by means of open ‑class forms will not be pursued here 
further.
3.4. The Into ‑Gerund Construction
According to Wierzbicka (1998, p. 125), this construction expresses causa‑
tive activities where an agent (the causer) exerts mental manipulation of 
another participant (the causee), as in example (3).
(3) a. Joe sweet ‑talked her into coming back.
b. That jerk swindled them into working for him for peanuts.
c. Government officials bully them into paying bribes.
In each sentence (3a—c), the subject is the causer and the object of the 
verb is the causee performing an activity specified by the root verb in 
gerund form. Wierzbicka argues that the causee is not in full control of 
what he or she is manipulated into doing. Similarly, Baicchi (2011) views 
the semantic contribution of the construction as being consistent with 
a scenario of a ‘mental manipulative act.’ Still more detailed is a charac‑
terization offered by Hunston and Francis (2000), who observe that “verbs 
that occur with this pattern usually indicate some kind of forcefulness or 
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even coercion.” Wierzbicka represents the meaning of the construction 
by means of the following formula (Wierzbicka, 2006, p. 179).
Person X verb ‑ed person Y into doing Z. =
a. X wanted Y to do Z.
b. Y didn’t want to do Z.
c. X didn’t say to Y: “I want you to do Z.”
d. X thought about it like this: “if I say this, Y will not do Z.”
e. Because of this X did something else.
f.  Because of this after this Y did Z.
g. Y didn’t do it because Y wanted to do it.
h. Y did it because X wanted Y to do it.
Detailed analyses of corpus data seem to corroborate the coercive mani‑
pulation view. Gries and Stefanowitsch (2004, p. 229) point out that verbs 
used in the into ‑gerund causative pattern form groups “based on frame‑
 ‑semantic knowledge of varying degrees of culture ‑specificity,” such as 
commercial transaction verbs associated with “the trickery frame.” They 
provide examples like mislead into buying, lure into purchasing, dupe into 
paying or con into paying. From examples like these, “a cultural model 
emerges of the buyer as a passive participant in the commercial tran‑
saction, exploited (and relatively easily so) by others for their own gain” 
(Gries & Stefanowitsch, 2004, p. 232).
Implicit in the manipulation scenario is a sense of duplicity or at least 
mischief. Wierzbicka explains this effect in terms of “the causee’s action 
[being] ‘triggered’ by the causer’s will, not by the causee’s own will” 
(p. 179). In other words, the causee does what the causer says, but is 
in conflict with his or her own intentions. Also, as is evident from 
points (c—e) above, the causer strives to keep his or her motives secret. 
This characterization of the into ‑gerund construction leads Wierzbicka to 
conclude that one cannot use this construction in sentences like *I’ll talk 
you into signing this (p. 180) because letting the causee in on one’s plans 
defeats the purpose of using the construction, which serves to suggest 
that the causer’s wishes should be concealed. Indeed, a review of many 
available uses of this construction confirms this impression and may 
lead one to conclude that the meaning of the into ‑gerund construction 
is exceptionally contentful for a closed ‑class form. However, uses of the 
construction abound, where no sense of contrivance is present.
(4) a. Something happened recently that scared me into rethinking my 
stand on life. http://www.tumblr.com/tagged/be ‑careful?before= 
1328860926 (accessed September 11, 2012).
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b. The album should excite and intrigue me into wondering how 
awesome a live performance of the songs would be. http://papalre 
views.wordpress.com/tag/of ‑montreal/ (accessed June 2, 2012).
c. The legend spooked me into seeing and hearing things. http://www.
yourghoststories.com/real ‑ghost ‑story.php?story=13467 (accessed 
September 11, 2012).
d. Our sense of adventure lulled us into taking these trips. http://
www.gothamcenter.org/discussions/viewtopic.php?id=8963 (acces‑
sed September 11, 2012).
While the above examples could be dismissed as sloppy usage typical 
of non ‑standard varieties of English, such uses are also present in 
standard English, as the following quotations from published authors 
illustrate.
(5) a. … a challenge that provoked her into rethinking some fundamental 
assumptions (Allan Douglass Coleman, The Digital Evolution, 171).
b. Turner hypothesized that the sacred objects and experiences to 
which the initiates were subjected provoked them into reconsidering 
the world, its nature, and relations (Nigel Rapport, Social and Cultu‑
ral Anthropology: The Key Concepts, 232).
c. For example, a poor person who sells a kidney to a rich patient 
may argue that poverty coerced him into selling. The rich patient may 
equally argue that kidney failure coerced him into purchasing (Mark 
J. Cherry, Kidney For Sale By Owner, 31).
d. Indeed, a meeting of “the wise men” (as they were named then) 
toward the end of Lyndon Johnson’s time was one of the factors 
which shocked him into changing course in the war.
In these examples, it would be difficult to entertain a sense of manipu‑
lation, because the external causes of the actions are not animate, and 
therefore their actions are not intentional to begin with. These cases put 
into question the characterization contained in at least points (a) and (d) 
of Wierzbicka’s formula referring to the causer’s intentions and secrecy. 
Even if the causer is understood metaphorically (by personification, 
where inanimate forces are imagined to possess attributes of animate 
causers), it would still be an exaggeration to suppose that there was any 
secrecy going on in any of the situations presented in examples (4a—d) 
or (5a—d).
Instead, what these sentences show is that the construction makes 
it possible to express causative events, where the causation is in some 
way not very typical. This itself is probably not an entailment of the 
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construction, but an inference drawn based on Levinson’s (2000) Manner 
Heuristic “What is said in an abnormal way isn’t normal.” That is, be‑
cause normal causation can be expressed in more default ways, the use of 
the into ‑gerund construction suggests that there is something abnormal 
about causation here. Further, the unusual causation may but does not 
have to trigger readings of dishonest manipulation.
To return to Wierzbicka’s example of an impossible use of the con‑
struction (*I’ll talk you into signing this), one can question the validity of 
her rather stark judgment that the sentence is odd. Even if the construc‑
tion did serve to signal secrecy of the causer’s intentions, it would still 
be possible for that causer to warn someone that one way or another, it 
is possible to talk him or her into signing something, and one’s meth‑
ods are so stealthily effective that they can be advertised ahead of time 
without the risk of compromising them. In fact, a quick online search 
yields great numbers of uses of this sentence type with various verbs like 
I’ll talk you into switching from Windows to Apple or I’ll talk you into buying 
good beer.
3.5. The Incredulity Response Construction
Another closed ‑class form which has been credited with considerable 
semantic content by constructionist grammarians is the incredulity 
construction first described by Akmajian (1984). It is exemplified in the 
following sentences:
(6) a. Her be a socialist?
b. What, me worry? (Lambrecht, 1990, ex. 1a)
c. Him, a flame thrower?
d. Them understand stock trading?
This construction has been claimed to exhibit very idiosyncratic struc‑ 
ture and meaning, which, according to the advocates of the construc‑
tionist approach to syntax, is ideal evidence of the fuzziness of the 
lexicon—grammar divide. Lambrecht argues that “it is impossible to 
draw a dividing line on principled grounds between ‘highly marked’ (or 
‘idiomatic’) patterns and ‘unmarked’ (or ‘regular’) patterns. The existence 
and structure of MMs (mad magazine sentences—my note) constitute 
good evidence in favor of a ‘constructionist’ approach to syntax …” 
(Lambrecht, 1990, p. 226).
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True, it should be admitted that the incredulity construction is a fully 
schematic pattern. It comes with no pre ‑embedded lexical inclusions, and 
it merely specifies slots for a subject followed by a predicate. It usually 
takes the form of a question or exclamation with a rather peculiar syntax, 
where the subject is in the accusative case and the verb is in non ‑finite 
form. Some authors (e.g. Goldberg, 2006; Huhmann, 2008) adduce the 
example of this construction as evidence of unusual semantic content 
expressed by grammatical constructions. Kay (1995, p. 124) states that 
“pragmatic forces or effects resulting from utterances of such expres‑
sions are conveyed according to conventions of language rather than by 
a process of conversational reasoning and so must be accounted for by 
the grammar.”
At first blush, the incredulity construction does appear to live up 
to its name. Its fairly unusual content involves an emphatic emotional 
reaction to the proposition conveyed by the predicate. In the examples 
above, the speaker can easily be imagined being skeptical of the notion 
that a female mentioned in the conversation (6a) may be a socialist or 
that some persons should turn out to be stock traders (6d). Without much 
doubt, a schematic construction indicating, through its form alone, the 
speaker’s emotional stance does strike one as a very contentful closed‑
 ‑class item. However, a moment’s reflection on other uses of this con‑
struction should make it clear that its semantic or pragmatic import is 
not as clear as it might seem at first, and Kay’s claims notwithstanding, 
the effects in question do in fact follow from a process of conversational 
reasoning.
Claims about incredulity being the construction’s meaning contribu‑
tion should appear less convincing if one considers other possible func‑
tions it might have. Quite simply, the incredulity reading cannot be the 
construction’s content if it gives way to other interpretations. One of such 
alternate uses of the construction can be the expression of amusement, as 
in example (7) below.
(7) Her be a weight ‑lifter?
Unlike incredulity, amusement does not have to involve a rejection 
of the proposition. Additionally, the scenario is rather different in that 
amusement is more detached and cool, while incredulity much more 
invested.
While I should admit the possibility that the two readings might turn 
out to be variations on the same theme, there are more serious devia‑
tions from the classic incredulity reading. In the examples (8a and 8b), 
the speaker cannot conceal surprise or even awe, which is an effect much 
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more distinct from incredulity, because awe presupposes an admission of 
the proposition.3 The speaker does not question the facts, but expresses 
admiration.
(8) a. Him be a doctor? I’ll be damned! Gee…
b. Joan wash the dishes? (I’m impressed!)
Then there is yet another way of using the construction, namely to ex‑
press protest, as in (9a—b).
(9) a. Me steal your money! (How dare you?!)
b. My father knock over a gas station?!
What makes these examples distinct from more typical incredulity in‑
terpretations discussed in the literature is that in protest ‑type sentences 
like (9a), it would be hard to argue that the speaker expresses skepti‑
cism. In this case, there does occur a rejection of the proposition, but it is 
certainly not the case that the speaker makes a self ‑discovery and reacts 
with disbelief. If at all, the disbelief could be directed at the thought 
that someone could even entertain the proposition presupposed in the 
sentence. But this kind of disbelief would not be a common element in 
all possible instances of the construction either. It would certainly not be 
present in situations where a speaker betrays curiosity, as in Her know 
Obama? How do you know? Here, the speaker could be imagined as being 
open ‑minded, amenable to both options, therefore there is rather little 
room for disbelief.
To sum up, apart from the incredulity reading, we have observed 
that the construction seems capable of expressing other quite distinct 
readings, which include amusement, awe, protest, and a hint of curios‑
ity. What should be clear from the above discussion is that while the 
proposed readings could be accepted as plausible reactions to the facts 
mentioned in each case, in reality, the interpretations could almost as 
freely be swapped among the sentences, so that (7) could be taken to con‑
vey awe and (9), instead of voicing protest, could also be an expression of 
3 This difference between awe and incredulity could in theory be played down 
by arguing that awe may involve initial incredulity or a potential for incredulity at an 
apparently implausible proposition, but this reasoning would lead to the suspect 
conclusion that incredulity should be present in all instances where a surprising 
proposition is conveyed, even in declarative sentences. For example, in the sentences 
He really is a doctor and They really do sing arias, there is emphasis on the veracity of
the facts mentioned, but it would be awkward to argue that something about these 
sentences serves to entail incredulity.
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amused sarcasm. It seems that the exact reading depends on things like 
intonation, background knowledge and the like. Further, the reading of 
incredulity, or any other reading suggested above for that matter, is too 
fine ‑grained. If these distinct effects can occur in different contexts, they 
are rather unlikely to be each specified in such exact detail by the con‑
struction; it is more likely that they are epiphenomena of a more general 
semantic property of the construction.
An alternative account of the construction’s meaning contribution 
would be to hypothesize that its function is to highlight the incon‑
gruousness of two pieces of information (e.g. the person in the subject 
and the worrying in Me worry?) embedded in the proposition. By 
focusing on the apparent or actual conflict between such two facts, 
the construction allows the speaker to express incredulity, awe, amuse‑
ment, surprise, and probably a number of other emotional states (such 
as Schadenfreude: Him end up in prison. Who would have thought!), each of 
which could be inferred based on the propositional content of the utter‑
ance, the speaker’s intonation, facial expression and perhaps situational 
context.
What arguments can be offered in favor of postulating such sparer 
meaning contribution? A review of the construction’s form in languages 
other than English shows a number of striking similarities, which consist 
in a general tendency to overtly separate the subject from the predicate. 
As was shown above, in English, this is done by putting the subject in the 
accusative case and the verb in infinitive form. This could be interpreted 
as an iconic device that signals a degree of incongruousness between the 
contents conveyed by the subject and the predicate.
In German, the construction either dispenses of a verb (if the verb 
is be) or takes the infinitive, which parallels the English preference for 
a non ‑finite verb. Although the German counterpart of the construction 
takes the subject in the nominative case, unlike the English accusative, it 
separates the predicate from the subject by means of the conjunction und 
as it is illustrated below.
(10) a. Du und Arzt?
You and doctor?
‘You be a doctor?’
b. Ich und arbeiten?
I and work?
‘Me work?’
The same form is used in Polish and Estonian, where a nominative sub‑
ject is separated from the predicate by means of a conjunction.
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(11) a. Ty i lekarz? (Polish)
You and doctor?
‘You be a doctor?’
b. Tema ja arst? (Estonian)
He and doctor?
‘Him be a doctor?’
It should also be noted that a similar pattern is available in English, where 
a verb other than be can be omitted and the subject can be joined with 
the object complement by means of the conjunction and, as in My father … 
and a shikse? (Philip Roth, Portnoy’s Complaint).
In still other languages, the verb is either absent (12a) or is in infinitive 
form (12b—c), but unlike in German or Polish, a conjunction is not inser‑
ted between the subject and the predicate.
(12) a. Sen, doktor? (Turkish)
He, doctor?
‘Him be a doctor?’
b. Lui, un astronauta? (Italian)
He, an astronaut?
‘Him be an astronaut?’
c. Ela acordar cedo? (Portuguese)
She wake up early?
‘Her wake up early?’
What all these examples have in common is that by disrupting the 
flow from the subject to the predicate, the form of the construction hints 
at an unusual relationship between the information contained in these 
two parts. This serves to indicate that there is a sense of processing con‑
flict between the two parts of the proposition, and this can be taken as 
a starting point for the pragmatic calculation of the speaker’s intention, 
which apart from the alleged incredulity and skepticism, can also be 
a number of other quite unrelated reactions.
Another way to look at it is that the construction involves the use of 
grammatical forms used in ways other than expected. Recall from section 
2.3.3 that grammatical markers used in all contexts become obligatory, 
and even if they are redundant, their absence is interpreted as signal‑
ing a special meaning. This makes it obligatory for sentences to feature 
finite verbs signaling tense, and when a non ‑finite verb is used where 
a specific tense is expected (inferable from context), it can be interpreted 
that something about the use of the tense in question is problematic. For 
example, if a statement in past tense like Clare gave birth to a baby triggers 
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an incredulity form utterance like Her have a baby? (She’s a feminist!), here, 
this tenseless reaction can be interpreted as an expression of the judg‑
ment that for Clare to give birth in recent past seems unusual.
3.6. The Moral Evaluation Construction
At first blush, the construction to which we turn now also appears to be 
an example of a schematic construction with an unusually colorful mean‑
ing. The construction, which we could refer to as the moral evaluation 
construction, appears to serve to express subjective moral judgment of 
people’s behavior. The following examples (13a—g) show that it is used to 
convey fairly strong opinions of the actions expressed in the subordinate 
clause.
(13) a. It’s so kind and considerate of you to worry about me.
b. It was crass of her to offer her boyfriend’s mother to pay for dinner.
c. At that particular moment I thought it was foul of him to come 
around bothering me just as I was starting to build up a cosy bit 
of self ‑indulgence (Louis‑Ferdinand Celine & Ralph Manheim, 
Journey to the End of the Night, p. 384).
d. She told herself, that it was very naughty and very wicked of her, to 
have forgotten the words uttered by Marius (Victor Hugo, transla‑
ted by Isabel F. Hapgood, Les Miserables).
e. Forgive me, Colonel, it was thoughtless of me to interrupt you, but it 
is a matter of grave importance (Steven Griffiths, Nimrod Rising).
f.  I told him flatly that I was against it, that it was horrible of him to 
even consider it (David Handler, The Man Who Died Laughing).
g. Jessie thought that it was evil of her to rub in his face constantly 
the reasons why she had decided to break off their engagement 
to become engaged to another (Torrance Stephens, Fast and 
Gamin’).
Compounding the impression that the construction deals with moral 
judgments is the fact that the evaluation of the behavior in question must 
be either clearly negative or positive. It is rather hard to find uses of the 
construction describing morally neutral behavior:
(14) ? It was allowed of him to leave the house.
853.6. The Moral Evaluation Construction
Further, it is not enough for sentences built around this construction 
to convey positive or negative statements; the evaluative statements 
seem to have to be of a moral nature. It is interesting to note that the 
construction’s resistance to non ‑judgmental adjectives also holds for 
other languages. Thus, translations of (16a) are unacceptable in French, 
Portuguese and Polish (16b—d).
(15) *It was quick of him to arrive on time.
(16) a. *It was unqualified of Rita to butcher the pronunciation so badly.
b. *C’était inadequat de la part de Rita de massacrer la prononciation 
comme ça.
c. Foi bem inábil da parte da Rita que ela massacrou a pronúncia 
assim tão mal.
d. *(To) nieumiejętne ze strony Rity, że tak bardzo kaleczyła wy‑
mowę.
Similarly, in German, the construction seems to be constrained in 
terms of similar semantic requirements—the adjective used should de‑
scribe a personal opinion about the decency of an action. Any other kind 
of evaluation is odd, as in these examples suggested by Gabriele Knappe 
(p.c.):
(17) a. *Es war schnell von ihm rechtzeitig anzukommen.
‘It was quick of him to arrive on time.’
b. *Es war sehr preiswert vom Architekten, Fertigteile einzuplanen.
‘It was inexpensive of the architects to plan for ready ‑made parts.’
However, there is an important difference between the construction 
in English and its counterparts in Polish and French. In English, the 
construction is an almost fully general pattern, with the expletive “it,” 
the copula and the preposition “of” (all of them function forms) being 
the only elements pre ‑specified in the construction, while the French and 
Polish equivalents contain the lexical material “de la part de” and “ze 
strony” (‘on the part of’) respectively. It appears that this has interest‑
ing consequences in that being partially lexically filled makes the Polish 
and French constructions more contentful than the English construction. 
Although there is a clear tendency for the English construction to convey 
moral judgments, there also remains some room for non ‑moral evalua‑
tions.
(18) a. It was strange of him to lock the door.
b. It was necessary of him to win the game.
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c. It was unbelievable of her to miss the Paris trip just because
her mom was bugging her. http://babysittersclub.proboards.com 
(accessed September 12, 2012)
d. It was extraordinary of her to allow grief to numb her this way, 
but then she grieved for a rather extraordinary man. (Deborah 
Nicholas, Silent Sonata, p. 12)
e. The very last person in the world he wanted to see at this mo‑
ment was Emma, and indeed it was extraordinary of her to call at 
such a time in the morning. (Charity Blackstock, Miss Philadelphia 
Smith, p. 239)
f.  I don’t think it was hasty of you to decide to get married. (Margaret 
Pearce, Cindy Jones)
g. It was rare—not unheard of, but rare—of him to burn a pot or let 
a dish go cold … . (Nora Roberts, Tears of the Moon, p. 20)
Although it is quite clear that the construction is not entirely flexible 
as to the kind of judgment it serves to convey, it is not confined to moral 
evaluations as it seemed at first glance. Thus, it is rather safe to conclude 
that the construction does not come with content too rich for a closed‑
 ‑class form.
Still, the choice of adjectives is constrained in English. While some 
non ‑judgmental adjectives are possible, many other theoretically at‑
tractive ones (like unskilled or quick) are not. The constraint, however, 
seems to have less to do with syntax than with common sense reading 
of sentences built on the construction. That is, the adjective is followed 
by an of ‑prepositional phrase with a specific person referent, a phrase 
whose form suggests a particular enough interpretation: the person is 
construed as a source of the property named in the adjective. It is to be 
expected that the adjective should describe an attribute of the action that 
is somehow within that referent’s control or one that is closely associ‑
ated with that person’s character. Assessments like “quick,” “stressful,” 
and “unacquainted” are neither intrinsically connected with control or 
intentionality nor do they say much about the person’s character. On the 
other hand, non ‑judgmental adjectives that do appear in the construction 
(surprising, rare, etc.) have to do with a person’s behavior viewed as an ex‑
tension of his or her character. From this perspective, quick and unskilled 
seem rather accidental, more pertinent to the result of the action than to 
the person’s character and behavior.
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3.7. Instrumental NP Construction
Another example of a schematic construction that seems to convey a fairly 
specific and detailed kind of content is what might initially be called the 
phrase of means of transportation construction. Its form can be described 
by means of the following formula:
by NP (means of transportation)
It is commonly found in comitative specifications of means of transpor‑
tation, as in (19):
(19) travel by car/bike/boat/plane/taxi/train/foot, etc.
Apart from these now familiar examples, the construction can also 
accommodate many somewhat archaic conceptions of transport.
(20) a. The couple traveled by horse.
b. Mormon pioneers came by wagon.
c. Go west by handcart.
d. Cicero was traveling by litter.
e. … the military victor who paraded by chariot in a great proces‑
sion. (Jasiah Osgood, Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early 
Roman Empire)
f.  Mary traveled by donkey to Bethlehem. 
g. See Scotland by steam train.
The preposition by is followed by a noun in the singular expressing 
a means of transportation—an instrumental noun phrase. It is important 
to point out that the noun phrase lacks an article. It is thus a construction 
containing familiar pieces unfamiliarly arranged (Makkai, 1972), a tell‑
tale sign that we are dealing with a grammatical construction governed 
by special constraints.
First, the omission of the article is only possible when the comitative 
transportation meaning is involved, not just when any cause of an event 
is mentioned. One cannot use this zero ‑article construction in sentences 
such as *He got hit by bus or *The farmer got rich by horse. Schlesinger (2006, 
p. 82) goes further and claims that the construction does not serve to 
express just any means of transport. He argues that the “by ‑phrase is 
limited to a small number of commonly used means of transport,” and 
therefore one cannot say *She came home by parachute. This would suggest 
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that the construction is indeed dedicated to specifically typical transport‑
 ‑related means, not accidental means that only happened to be used by 
an unrepresentative sample of individuals.
This, however, is not exactly accurate, as it turns out that the phrase 
by parachute is actually used in precisely such contexts. For example, 
the phrase is used in collocations such as land by parachute or descend 
by parachute. Indeed, a quick look at Google Books yields thousands of 
instances of the phrase by parachute used in contexts describing transpor‑
tation. There is even a book titled By Parachute to Warsaw. Similarly, one 
can easily find uses ranging from not very common but familiar means 
of transport like The ambassador was whisked by helicopter to the base camp 
through more unusual ones, for example travel by hot ‑air balloon to rather 
bizarre cases, such as commute to work by skateboard. Thus, it is fairly safe 
to say that the construction can express any means of transport, common 
or otherwise.
The NP does not necessarily need to name a vehicle, but the environ‑
ment where the transportation is taking place:
(21) travel by sea/by air/by land/by road.
Further, the phrase does not only serve to express means of transportation, 
but is also regularly found in descriptions of means of communication:
(22) communication by e ‑mail/letter/telex/(regular) mail/fax/satellite/phone 
/radio, etc.
A related pattern serves to express the means of causing death. Do the 
following instances in (23) exemplify the same comitative construction or 
are they merely examples of a construction that is similar to the comita‑
tive means of transport construction? The absence of the article and the 
singular form of the noun suggest that the examples below are part of 
a larger family of constructions that specify an instrument associated 
with the direct causation or enablement of the activity. In the collocations 
below, all the nouns are either countable (and therefore require an article) 
or, like poison or fire, are at least capable of taking an article. 
(23) be killed/executed/put to death by bullet/knife/duel/poison/electric 
chair/firing squad/gallows/lethal injection/dagger/guillotine/fire/shark 
bite.
What the three patterns (transport, communication and death colloca‑
tions) share is their relative openness to new additions, regardless of how 
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atypical (e.g. by skateboard or by shark bite). Why should these three patterns 
not be considered three distinct constructions? It seems any activity that 
can be performed by means of a range of different methods can also be 
expressed by the same by ‑zero ‑article ‑singular pattern. The following are 
additional groups of collocations that have to do with feeding (usually 
patients or babies) (24), giving birth, farming and washing. It is simply 
quite beyond belief that a language should have separate dedicated con‑
structions for such activities, each one identical in form to the next.
(24) feed by spoon/bottle/breast/drip/cup/D ‑tube.
(25) born by caesarean section/vaginal delivery/breech delivery/vacuum 
extraction.
(26) far/sow/reap/harvest by tractor/hand/combine/horse.
(27) wash by hand/machine/soap.
One is therefore left with a fairly large, schematic construction with 
a general semantic contribution, rather than a group of high ‑precision 
dedicated constructions with specific semantic content.
3.8. The Time Away Construction
The time away construction has attracted considerable attention from 
various researchers interested in the semantics, syntax and selectional 
properties of this pattern (Jackendoff, 1997b; 2002b; Verhagen, 2002b; 
2002; McIntyre, 2003). What they all agree with is the following charac‑
terization:
This construction shares many general properties with the resultative 
construction … and the way ‑construction, … however, … it is a distinct 
member of a family of constructions to which all three belong. (Jacken‑
doff, 1997b, p. 534)
Indeed, most uses of the construction confirm this impression. 
(28) a. I feel like a rude houseguest, sleeping half the morning away. 
(Nancy Kay, Deadly Triad)
b. I relax the whole day away in a hammock and at the buffet. 
(Taylor Cole, Take It Off)
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c. She was determined to party the night away regardless of the 
consequences. (Frank Lafountaine, The Omak Lake Monster)
These examples follow a pattern captured in the following formulae:
(29) a. [VP V NP [Prt away]]
b. ‘waste [Time NP] heedlessly V ‑ing’
At this point, the construction looks as though it is dedicated to the ex‑
pression of a rather narrow semantic contribution: that of losing posses‑
sion of entire time intervals. Whereas these two elements—the deep verb 
LOSE and the notion of time—are familiar semantic elements known to 
be carried by grams, and therefore non ‑problematic to the hypothesis 
that meanings of constructions should not be too contentful, the semantic 
contribution is probably broader than is claimed in the constructionist 
literature. The V OBJ away frame can accommodate a wide range of non‑
 ‑temporal themes, as in kiss the sorrow away or sleep your wrinkles away, 
which would suggest that the semantics of the construction is more 
general than it appears at first blush.4
There do not seem to hold any syntactic properties that would set 
these two patterns apart. For example, Jackendoff (2002a, p. 82) notes that 
the time away construction exhibits the peculiarity of allowing the NP to 
undergo tough ‑movement (30a), whereas this would be impossible for NP 
time adjuncts.
(30) a. A morning like this is hard for even me to sleep away.
b. *A morning like this is hard for even me to sleep.
This is also possible in the case of non ‑temporal uses of the pattern:
(31) A fortune like that would be hard to drink away.
Similarly, both patterns (temporal and non ‑temporal) allow movement of 
the particle before the NP:
(32) The men danced away the whole evening with elegant ladies.
I tried very hard to drink away the pain.
4 However, as Bogusław Bierwiaczonek noted in his review, the construction does 
not allow sentences like I jumped my purse away or I talked my girlfriend away. Concre‑
te themes are probably avoided in abstract readings, and possible reasons behind this 
dispreference are specified in section 5.9 on the way construction.
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In conclusion, the time away construction seems to be at best a special 
case of a more general construction with a semantic contribution along 
the lines of ‘lose possession of [NP] by V ‑ing.’
3.9. Past Tense Markers in Slavic Languages
As was signaled in section 1.2, questions of impoverished meanings 
and the blurred division between the lexicon and syntax are inextrica‑
bly associated with grammaticization. Semantic reduction is a simple 
result of grammaticization, a process that would be impossible without 
a blurred division, as the only viable way for lexical items to be eased 
into syntax is through a gradual transition, not across a sharp on ‑off 
divide. Whatever the exact neurolinguistic modular reality of such 
a blurred borderline, it seems that a precondition for grammaticiza‑
tion to take place is the existence of a tolerant midway store capable of 
accommodating forms that evince both half ‑lexical and half ‑syntactic 
characteristics. However, as the discussion below should clarify, this 
midway store may not have to be excessively flexible or tolerant. One 
point that should be clear throughout the discussion here is that the 
meaning undergoes bleaching fairly early on in the grammaticization 
process, and the subsequent solidification of a form’s gram status may 
progress well after the semantic reduction has taken place. In other 
words, bleaching is not contingent on a gram’s reaching the apogee of 
the grammaticization process. On their way to becoming grams, forms 
show early signs of reduced semantic typical of syntax. There may be 
little conflict for the blurred division to handle, contrary to claims by 
cognitive linguists who argue that constructions, whether those located 
near the extreme or the middle of the continuum, convey strikingly rich 
meanings.
One clear example illustrating this early bleaching is the case of can in 
English. Long before it became a modal verb, complete with a weak form 
/kən/, it had acquired general ability meanings. Bybee (2010, pp. 168—169) 
shows its evolution from being a lexical verb cunnan meaning ‘know,’ 
through gradually more general meanings ‘have sufficient knowledge 
(to say),’ ‘know how to,’ ‘have inherent ability’ all the way to the “root 
possibility” meaning expressing favorable conditions outside the agent. 
At least the first few of these meanings were present in uses of the verb 
when it was still a lexical verb. It was the generality of meaning that 
propelled grammaticization.
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What follows is an analysis serving to illustrate how grammaticiza‑
tion inescapably results in the simplification of the semantic content of 
lexical forms that enter the domain of syntax. This can be observed in the 
evolution of the past tense constructions in Slavic languages. In many of 
them, past tense involves the use of participial verb stems accompanied 
by function markers. For example in Polish, the participial stem robił/
robili (‘done’) is followed by a closed ‑class suffix corresponding to the 
person:
(33) robił ‑em/robił ‑eś/robili ‑śmy.
dopart ‑1SG /dopart ‑2SG /dopart ‑1PL
‘I did’/‘you did’/‘we did.’
Characterized by bleached semantic content that does not go beyond 
a purely syntactic function, this closed ‑class form derives from the 
verb meaning ‘to be’ (biti, být, and być in Croatian, Czech, and Polish, 
respectively), an originally free lexical morpheme associated with ex‑
pression of identity, existence, and position. The case of Slavic past tense 
constructions is thus a quintessential demonstration of how grammati‑
cization erodes lexical meaning. What is particularly interesting in our 
present considerations is that this particular demonstration is replicated 
in more than one language, as the evolution of the copula ‑turned ‑gram 
progresses in the same way in the three languages in question. Al‑
though the languages are related, and the grammaticization of the past 
tense construction may have been set in motion before the languages 
split apart, the process has continued until present time, which is well 
after the split. This means that the changes described below have been 
occurring, for all intents and purposes, independently of each other. In 
each case though, the developments and results are predictably consis‑ 
tent with the spirit of the modular division of the lexicon and syntax: 
the grams undergo gradual phonological as well as semantic reduction, 
and they depend more and more on the accompanying material for 
interpretation and use.
The present comparison of Croatian, Czech, and Polish reveals that 
the past tense marker is in transit, with each language being found at 
different stages of evolution. In Croatian, biti is, from the grammatical 
point of view, the main verb, it is inflected by person and tense (here, sam 
is the first person singular, present tense form), and it accompanies the 
lexical verb, which is in non ‑finite form:
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(34) Dosao sam, vidio sam, osvojio sam.5
Come be1SG, seen be1SG, conquered be1SG
‘I came, I saw, I conquered.’
The past tense gram biti (‘to be’) seems to be at relatively early stages 
of fusion with the lexical verb. Just like the English perfective have is
formally equivalent to the possessive have, the Croatian past tense
gram biti is completely identical with the identity expressing lexical biti 
(Table 4):
Table 4. The Croatian copula in grammatical and lexical use
Past tense gram biti Lexical verb biti
1sg Vidio sam. ‘I saw.’ Student sam. ‘I am a student.’
2sg Vidio si. ‘You saw.’ Hrvat si. ‘You are Croatian.’
3sg Vidio je. ‘He saw.’ Sretna je. ‘She is happy.’
1pl Vidjeli smo. ‘We saw.’ Studenti smo. ‘We are students.’
2pl Vidjeli ste. ‘You saw.’ Hrvati ste. ‘You are Croatians.’
3pl Vidjeli su. ‘They saw.’ Sretni su. ‘They are happy.’
As the above examples illustrate, the gram is separate from the lexical 
verb, and depending on the construction, it can follow (35a) or precede 
it (35b):
(35) a. Vidio sam film.
Seen be1SG film.
‘I saw the movie.’
b. Ja sam vidio film.
I be1SG seen film.
‘I saw the movie.’
In Croatian, the gram biti retains a relatively high degree of autonomy, 
evident not only in its word order freedom, but also in the fact that nega‑
tion is marked on the gram (sam, ‘I am’), as in (36). This means that biti is 
still visible as a verb, not a dependent suffix:
(36) Nisam vidio ovaj film.
Neg ‑be1SG seen this film.
‘I didn’t see the movie.’
5 Caesar’s famous line is traditionally translated into Croatian by means of an older 
past tense construction dođoh, vidjeh, pobijedih.
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In Czech, the evolution is visibly more advanced, and negation is marked 
on the lexical verb, not on the gram ‘to be’ (jsem). So, unlike in Croatian, 
here it is actually perceived as a dependent, partly incorporated mor‑
pheme (or on its way to becoming one), although it is spelled separately 
from the lexical verb.
(37) Neviděl jsem tento film.
Neg ‑seen be1SG this film.
‘I didn’t see the movie.’
Still more advanced is the grammaticization in Polish, where the gram is 
well on its way to complete univerbation, as it is fused with the lexical 
material almost entirely. In the following example, the first person singu‑
lar form of być is reduced to a mere  ‑em, a considerable reduction relative 
to the form of the lexical verb jestem.
(38) Widziałem ten film.
Seen ‑be1SG this film.
‘I saw the movie.’
The reduction is evident in the paradigm for the verb być, and it is espe‑
cially obvious when Polish is compared to Croatian and Czech (Table 5). 
The left side of each column shows the tonic forms of lexical uses and 
on the right are the corresponding past ‑tense suffixes. The column for 
Croatian shows that the forms are identical. Similarly in Czech, the forms 
are the same, except that in the third person for both singular and plural, 
there is no corresponding clitic form. Polish represents the least recogniz‑
able correspondences. Although the correspondences are clear enough 
when the forms are juxtaposed, they are entirely obscure to speakers 
unacquainted with the history of the past tense suffixes.
Table 5. Copula correspondences in Croatian, Czech, and Polish
Croatian Czech Polish
tonic clitic tonic clitic tonic suffix
1sg sam sam jsem jsem jestem  ‑(e)m
2sg si si jsi jsi jesteś  ‑(e)ś
3sg je je je Ø jest Ø
1pl smo smo jsme jsme jesteśmy  ‑(i)śmy
2pl ste ste jste jste jesteście  ‑(i)ście
3pl su su jsou Ø są Ø
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It should be mentioned here that the fusion with the verb may not be 
complete, as the gram is also free to attach to other words in a sentence. 
In the sentences below, it attaches to a pronoun (39a), to an adverb (39b), 
or even a conjunction (39c).
(39) a. Jam nie wiedział.
I ‑be1SG not known.
‘I didn’t know.’
b. Zawszem to wiedział.
Always ‑be1SG it known.
‘I always knew it.’
c. …bom to wiedział.
because ‑be1SG it known.
‘…because I knew it.’
Uses where the suffix attaches to elements other than the verb are reveal‑
ing. They represent a transitional stage, where the suffix is not likely to 
fuse with them permanently, a prediction that can be deduced from their 
stress. Non ‑verb hosts to the suffix do not accommodate it in their stress 
pattern. In (40), the adverbs nigdy and wczoraj retain their original stress 
on the first syllable; stress does not move onto the subsequent syllable, 
which would be required if nigdyśmy or wczorajem were perceived as sin‑
gle words, in accordance with the Polish stress pattern. Put another way, 
the gram  ‑em is not fully part of this adverb ‑suffix fusion. By contrast, 
verbal stems adjust their stress to the suffix in standard Polish (wiedz’ieli 
> wiedziel’iśmy).
(40) a. N’igdy ‑śmy tego nie myśleli.
Never ‑be1PL that not thought.
‘We never thought that.’ (Andersen, 1987, p. 31)
b. Wcz’oraj ‑em prz’yszedł.
Yesterday ‑be1SG arrived.
‘I arrived yesterday.’ (Andersen, 1987, p. 33)
However, one could venture that these adverb ‑copula fusions represent 
a former stage of the gram’s evolution. Although forms (39a—c) can still 
be heard in Modern Polish, they are rather rare and they have a distinctly 
archaic ring about them. It is clear that the evolution is directed toward 
the gram blending fully with the verbal stem.
Another indication of a more advanced stage in the gram’s evolution 
in Polish and Czech is that in these two languages the morph has disap‑
peared in the third person (41a—b), while it is still visible in Croatian (41c). 
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This is consistent with the general tendency of grams being reduced at 
the end of the grammaticization process.
(41)  a. Petr viděl Ø film. (Czech)
Peter seen film.
‘Peter saw the movie.’
b. Piotr widział ‑Ø film. (Polish)
Peter seen film.
‘Peter saw the movie.’
c.  Petar je vidio film. (Croatian)
Peter be3SG seen film.
‘Peter saw the movie.’
Of course, although it is absent today, it was historically present in the 
third person. In the following examples from 15th ‑century Czech, the 
gram být is present in the archaic Czech forms jest for the singular and sú 
for the plural (Bohdana Najderová, p.c.):
(42) a. Abraham umřel jest.
‘Abraham died.’ (Jan Hus, Česká nedělní postila)
b. … řekli sú, že jest ukraden.
‘They said that it was stolen.’ (Jan Hus, Sebrané spisy české)
Similarly, in Polish the third person gram used to accompany participial 
verbs. In the following example, the form jest is the same as in Old Czech.
(43) Zszedł jest w boleniu żywot moj.
‘My life passed in pain.’ (Klemensiewicz et al., 1966, p. 17) 
One possible reason why this happens is that the meaning of the gram is 
so diffused that it is implicit when absent. As was mentioned in section 
2.3.5, due to its semantic generality, a gram relies on other lexical or 
grammatical material to be interpretable. Put another way, a gram farms 
out more and more of its meaning to the neighboring material so that at 
some point the imbalance of semantic division of labor is such that the 
gram is no longer necessary.
In the case of the third person marker, it is recoverable by reference 
to the verb’s subject and the verbal tense marking evident in its past par‑
ticipial form. It is not only in the third person that the gram is omitted. 
Such an option is available in more colloquial registers of Polish, where 
the gram can be dropped for any person, as in (44), where it is recover‑
able based on the use of the pronoun.
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(44) Józiu, a Londyn ty widział?
Joe, and London you seen ‑Ø?
‘Joe, and have you seen London?’
This option has been available in Polish for a long time. In older variants, 
the copula auxiliary was often omitted, as in the following sentence.
(45) Jako ja przy tem był.
As I at it been Ø.
‘As I witnessed it.’ (Klemensiewicz et al., 1966, p. 37)
This erosion has taken place in other Slavic languages. In Russian, the 
copula has disappeared, and where the auxiliary be was used with the 
past participle, it is now entirely absent, so that the verbal stem lacks 
reference to person:
(46) a. Jazъ esmь čitalъ. (Old Russian)
I be1SG read.
‘I have read’.
b. Ja čitál. (Modern Russian)
I Ø read.
‘I have read.’ (Comrie, 2009, p. 284)
A very similar development was responsible for the emergence of the 
impersonal verb forms in Polish like skradziono (‘stolen’) or pokazano 
(‘shown’). These differ from passive participles (in that they do not agree 
in gender or number with the passive object), but they are historically 
derived from passive participles. Originally, these were accompanied by 
a copula (było in 47a), which then dropped out of use in Modern Polish 
(Tabakowska, 2003).
(47) a. Projektów było gwałt narzucono. (Middle Polish)
Plans ‑gen ‑pl. be ‑past ‑3sg ‑neut great many impose ‑past ‑3sg ‑neut
‘Great many projects were imposed.’
b. Zbudowano szkołę. (Modern Polish)
Build ‑past ‑3sg ‑neut school ‑acc
‘The school was/has been built.’ (Tabakowska 2003, p. 386)
Like in the case of past tense forms, the copula contributed so little 
content to the proposition that when it disappeared, perhaps through 
phonological reduction or because of unstressed pronunciation, its 
absence was not felt to be conspicuous. However, it is clear that none 
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of the above omissions would have been possible if the gram conveyed 
detailed meanings whose contribution to context could not be dispensed 
with. Radical generalization exhibited by the gram’s meaning, paral‑
leled by the phonological reduction and dependence on the accompany‑
ing material are all typical of closed ‑class forms near the grammatical 
extreme of the continuum. The example of the past tense gram in Slavic 
languages is special in this regard, because it illustrates that grams 
caught at different stages of grammaticization do not pose a challenge 
to the lexicon ‑syntax division. Varying degrees of grammaticization do 
not contradict the traditional notion of a separation between the two 
systems: grams found “shortly after” they separated from their lexical 
source do not exhibit strikingly rich meanings. More generally, their 
behavior during their passage is consistent with the characteristics 
outlined in section 2.3.
The following table (6) sums up the characteristics of the copula‑
 ‑derived gram in Croatian, Czech, and Polish, indicating differing 
degrees of its grammaticization and univerbation in these languages. 
Where a characteristic is indicative of progressing univerbation it is 
marked with an asterisk (*). As can be seen, Polish displays a definite 
tendency on every count, with Croatian being closer to the lexical source, 
and Czech somewhere in between.
Table 6. Comparison of degrees of univerbation in Croatian, Czech, and Polish
Degrees of 
univerbation
Croatian Czech Polish
Form of the gram clitic clitic suffix*
Correspondence 
gram: source
full (identical) full partial*
Negation on the gram on the verb* on the verb*
Reduction to Ø no in the 3rd person* in the 3rd person*
The purpose of this analysis was to trace the development of a gram from 
its lexical origins, through cliticization to an all but complete incorpora‑
tion. As examples from Slavic languages show, the more advanced the 
development, the more likely the gram is to exhibit features typical of 
a closed ‑class form. Semantic reduction triggered by the form’s generality 
is accompanied by progressing phonological erosion and dependence on 
the neighboring lexical material, all features associated with elements 
separated from the lexicon by the disputed blurred border. In light of 
this evidence, it is truly difficult to argue that the distinction between the 
lexicon and syntax is a misguided ideal.
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The above reviews of constructions aimed to demonstrate that schematic 
constructions cannot and do not have very contentful meanings if only 
because whatever meanings they may have at first, they undergo bleach‑
ing quite early on in the process of grammaticization, as was shown in 
section 3.8. Any such dismissive review of constructions could continue 
indefinitely, taking on dozens of more examples one by one. I am going 
to conclude this section with one last brief description of a pattern whose 
semantics may at first glance seem strikingly contentful for a schematic 
pattern.
The give ‑gerund composite predicate (CP) patterns are a subtype of 
the fairly large group of light verb constructions, which are characterized 
by a broad semantic common denominator. However, unlike the super‑
 ‑category they belong to, give ‑gerund patterns seem to have a specialized 
semantic contribution. In her study of light verbs, Kearns (2002) gives 
a number of examples of give ‑gerund predicates (give John a beating/flog‑
ging/whipping/thrashing) and suggests that the verbs in gerund form denote 
actions involving ‘bodily harm.’ This observation seems consistent with 
a considerable number of examples like the following:
(48) a. The patrol officer tried to pin down his arms so that his comrade 
could give him a good battering.
b. We go in there and give them a kicking.
c. Give him a serious hiding for that kind of attitude.
d. I have a good mind to walk out there and give you a sound
licking.
A quick search through uses of the construction reveals that the con‑
struction allows practically any native root with the meaning of ‘beat’ 
(spank, belt, smack, cane). This could give the impression that the construc‑
tion is indeed dedicated to the expression of causing harm. However, 
Trousdale (2008) notes that the range of verbs allowed in the construction 
is much broader. First, he points out that “there is a considerable subset of 
give ‑gerund CPs which involve not physical harm, but verbal castigation, 
as in he gave him a dressing down” (Trousdale, 2008, p. 41). Examples of this 
subset are attested frequently:
(49) a. She gave me a severe tongue lashing.
b. I’m going to give him a good chewing out when I get home!
c. The police gave the child a stern talking to.
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Trousdale also shows that some uses can be ambiguous, as in the follow‑
ing example, where seeing to can mean either ‘beating’ or ‘having sex’:
(50) I’ll give her a seeing to. (Trousdale, 2008, p. 35)
Further, there are examples, where the object is subjected to an action 
involving physical effort or a procedure:
(51) a. Throw the potatoes in the pan, put the lid on and give them
a vigorous shaking.
b. I offered to give the tree a pruning.
c. … gave himself a brushing down in front of the mirror (Norman 
Collins, Love in Our Time).
d. Give the lawn a thorough soaking.
e. She gave the shirt a quick ironing.
If there is anything these uses have in common, it is the sense that the 
object is affected by the action, which is a fairly general semantic element, 
one that is perfectly natural and typical of grammatical forms. Being 
subjected to an action and becoming affected as a result is a pervasive 
recurring theme that is the main semantic contribution of grammatical 
categories such as the accusative case (Dowty, 1991; Levin & Rappaport 
Hovav, 1993), resultative construction (Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 1993) 
or to take a less obvious case, the malefactive dative (Janda, 1993; Wierz‑
bicka, 1988): 
(52) a. Matka mi umarła. (Polish)
Mother to.me died.
‘Mother to ‑me died.’ ‘My mother died on me.’ (Wierzbicka 1988, 
p. 212)
b. Ditě nam v noci plače. (Czech)
Child.nom we.dat in night.loc cries.
‘The child cries at night (and we are affected by this).’ (Janda 1993, 
p. 85)
A similar construction is found in Portuguese, where the verb dar 
(‘give’) can be followed by a feminine noun taking the indefinite article 
uma and the suffix  ‑da. In the following examples, the nouns denote 
actions involving ‘bodily harm’ too.
(X) dar uma pancada (‘to give a beating’), dar uma bofetada (‘to slap in 
the face’), dar uma bordoada (‘give a thrashing’), dar uma cabeçada (‘to 
head ‑butt’), dar uma topada (‘to stub one’s toe’), dar (uma) porrada (‘to 
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give a hiding’), dar uma palmada (‘to slap’), dar uma cajadada (‘to give 
a blow’), dar uma cotovelada (‘to hit with the elbow’), dar uma facada 
(‘to knife’), dar uma tacada (‘to strike gently’), dar uma chicotada (‘to 
give a whipping’), dar uma chinelada (‘to slap with a slipper’), dar uma 
navalhada (‘to stab’), dar uma joelhada (‘to strike with the knee’), etc.
This is by no means a complete list, but the number of the above expres‑
sions makes it look like this is a construction with a special preference for 
‘bodily harm’ nouns. However, the meaning associated with this pattern 
is more general, as the nouns allowed here form a larger group:
(53) dar uma arrancada (‘to accelerate’), dar uma olhada (‘to take a look’), dar 
uma parada (‘to stop over’), dar uma passada (‘stop by, show up’), dar 
uma pensada (‘think, reflect’), dar uma tossida (‘to cough’), etc.
While instances of the give ‑gerund construction may at first strike one 
as being remarkably dedicated to a narrow kind of semantic content, 
a closer look at more instances reveals that the construction does not in 
fact specialize in dedicated meanings after all.
3.11. Conclusion
It is possible to place a wager that no rich semantic or pragmatic effects 
proposed in constructionist analyses are true contributions of schematic 
grammatical constructions. As closed ‑class forms, schematic construc‑
tions are simply unable to convey more than what constructions have 
been traditionally known to convey. In this respect, little has changed, 
and although the construction grammar framework deserves the credit 
for drawing attention to the semantics of constructions, numerous seman‑
tic characterizations proposed within the framework are rather beyond 
belief, precisely because they are at odds with the implications of the 
lexicon ‑syntax distinction. The distinction, which has been de facto con‑
signed to history, may still be very relevant to constructionist analyses.

4. How Constructions Are Really Constructed: 
Manner of Obtainment
4.1. Rich Meanings in Construction Grammar
The main recurring theme of the present work, the question of meanings 
of (especially schematic) constructions is considered in this study of the 
Manner of Obtainment Construction. As can be predicted from the tone 
of the previous sections, here too it will be argued that the meaning of 
this construction must carefully be double ‑checked against the pattern of 
meanings normally found in closed ‑class forms. This way, one can guard 
against proposing overly ornate meanings that may be too far ‑fetched as 
contents of closed ‑class forms.
Why should such a cautious approach to meanings be necessary? 
It certainly makes sense to take observed meaning effects for what they 
are rather than dismiss them simply because they run counter to the 
modular approach insisting on the sterile transparency of syntax. But 
although one should dispassionately examine each instance of an inter‑
esting meaning observed in a construction, no matter how jarringly at 
odds that meaning may be with the traditional (pre ‑cognitive linguistic) 
views of what is possible in a closed‑class form, one should also approach 
such meanings with some circumspection; after all the traditional views 
on the austerity of closed ‑class form, meanings cannot be entirely wrong, 
if only because they were accepted by so many for so long. While this 
is an argument by consensus, a fallacy I am aware of, there are over‑
whelming numbers of function forms that do corroborate the traditional 
view, whereas exceptions can be examined and dismissed upon closer 
inspection. For these reasons alone then, it seems judicious to hedge one’s 
bets while proposing rich meanings as possible contents of closed ‑class 
forms.
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One should also note that to embrace the semantic superpowers of 
closed ‑class forms while contesting the traditional views of the limita‑
tions of closed ‑class forms is to apply double standards. That is, the flat 
rejection of the traditional distinction between the lexicon and grammar 
involves levels of skepticism unmatched in cognitive linguistic analyses 
of the contentfulness of constructions. It seems good practice to retain an 
open mind toward both the lexicon ‑syntax division and the accuracy of 
the proposed semantic constitution of constructions. That is, for the sake 
of consistency and fairness, rather than unquestioningly accept them as 
part of the meaning, it is first necessary to rule out other sources of such 
meanings.
The following analysis of grammatical constructions should show that 
it is possible to reconcile the ambition of CxG to analyze constructions as 
links between form and meaning with the retention of the traditional 
properties of closed‑class items. It is possible to attribute meaning to 
function forms without overdoing the content.
Additionally, it will be argued that the meanings that the gram‑
matical constructions do have, are constrained by their form. That is, 
the meaning of a construction should follow from the elements present 
in the form of the construction, a point that will figure in the analyses 
presented here. This study will further attempt to demonstrate that the 
constraints on schematic closed ‑class constructions reflect universal 
principles which govern how complex event schemas can be blended 
out of simpler schemas in linguistic constructions. In the Manner of 
Obtainment Construction, to which we turn next, the blending of event 
schemas will be shown to trigger obtainment readings. Then, in the way 
construction, it will be argued that while motion events can involve dis‑
parate sub ‑events blended together, paths do not allow any integration 
of incongruous elements.
This section focuses on a peculiar resultative construction with a con‑
ventional meaning. The meanings of sentences based on that construc‑
tion cannot be accounted for as a sum of the contributions of individual 
words found in such sentences. Further, it will be shown that although 
the meaning associated with the construction is conventional, it is not 
arbitrary. The meaning of the construction is a product of complex cog‑
nitive computations along a pattern which is found in many unrelated 
languages which allow secondary predication. The pattern involves meta‑
phor, manner ‑motion conflation, conceptual integration of frames based 
on diverse event schemas, and the activation of gapped counterfactual 
scenarios.
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4.2. The Anatomy of the Construction
In this study, I will analyze the properties of a grammatical construc‑
tion which I will refer to as the Manner of Obtainment Construction 
(MOC), described in previous studies (Szcześniak, 2008; Szcześniak 
& Callies, 2008). It is the main claim of the present contribution that 
the meaning of the construction under consideration is a product of 
complex cognitive computation. Before I offer a detailed analysis of 
how such meaning is compiled, it is first necessary to demonstrate that 
the meaning attributed to the construction cannot be explained away 
as an ordinary sum of the meanings of the individual words found 
in MOC sentences. The following description of the structure and use 
of the Manner of Obtainment Construction will show that sentences 
containing it cannot be interpreted through straightforward semantic 
composition, but require recourse to the semantic contribution by the 
construction.
Below is a description of the semantics of the construction. Examples 
(1—3) below are Polish and German sentences built around what I call 
the Manner of Obtainment Construction. MOC sentences contain mor‑
phologically complex verbs composed of a root and a prefix, which are 
otherwise common forms in both languages. Although most examples 
here come from Polish and some from German, similar constructions 
exist in other languages (here, I only mention—but do not analyze in 
great detail—examples from Czech, Slovak, Slovene, and Estonian), and 
although these may be governed by slightly different constraints, there 
are striking similarities in the form of this construction in unrelated lan‑
guages. The similarities are especially striking when German and Polish 
are compared to English, whose closest equivalent is x’s way, a construc‑
tion built differently and governed by a different logic. The similarities 
(between German and Polish) will be analyzed later in the study as hints 
of common underlying mechanisms revelatory of not only the nature of 
this construction, but also the expression of possession and obtainment 
in general.
(1) a. Sługa wybłagał listość.
b. Servant wy ‑begged mercy.
c. ‘The servant was given mercy after he begged for it.’
(2) a. Chłopak wymantrował (sobie) miłość.
b. Boy wy ‑mantra’d (himself) love.
c. ‘The boy found love by chanting mantras.’
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(3) a. Natürliche Autorität kann man sich nicht erschreien.
b. Natural authority can one oneself not er ‑scream.
c. ‘One can’t win natural authority by bluster.’
(The purpose of this chapter is not to claim that languages like Polish, 
German or Estonian can have the same construction, but to describe the 
meaning of the construction in Polish and German, whatever the simi‑
larities or differences).
4.3. Obtainment
The above sentences share the meaning ‘Subject obtains Object by V ‑ing,’ 
in examples (1—2), the subjects are seen as securing mercy and love, and 
in (3), there is talk about securing authority. The fact of obtainment needs 
to be emphasized, because it is a central element of meaning carried not 
by the verb (or any words used in the sentence), but by the construction 
itself. The verb conveys the manner in which the object is obtained, but 
not the notion of obtaining itself. Further, the construction entails the 
interpretation of obtainment; it does not merely implicate it. In (1), the 
servant does not just beg for mercy, but actually succeeds in securing it.
It is generally assumed that “any linguistic pattern is recognized as 
a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly 
predictable from its component parts or from other constructions recog‑
nized to exist” (Goldberg, 2006, p. 5). Although it may seem transparent 
and predictable to speakers of Polish and German, the Manner of Obtain‑
ment Construction is precisely an example of a conventionalized pairing 
of form and meaning.
As will be argued later in this study, the pairing is motivated by 
strong cognitive dynamics which shaped the construction throughout 
history, but those dynamics are long lost facts on a par with prehistoric 
etymologies of words normally unavailable to most speakers. Thus, the 
construction under consideration is an unusual pattern which must be 
learned by speakers of languages where it is found, rather than emerging 
spontaneously as a consequence of abstract principles of grammatical 
transformations.
It is necessary here to dispel potential doubts about the above claim. 
Specifically, the construction could theoretically be dismissed as a trivial 
case, if the obtainment meaning could be pinned down on the verb, thus 
taking the spell off the construction itself. Verbs used in the construction 
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take a prefix (er ‑ in German and wy ‑ in Polish), and at first glance, it might 
be the impression of German and Polish speakers that verbs thus modi‑
fied actually do express both manner and the idea of obtainment. This 
impression is no doubt reinforced by the existence of lexicalized prefixed 
er ‑ and wy ‑ verbs that are listed in dictionaries. Verbs like erkämpfen or 
wywalczyć are entries in German and Polish dictionaries where they are 
both defined as ‘win by fighting’. This is also how most speakers would 
define the meanings of such lexicalized verbs and nothing about it would 
strike anyone as unusual or controversial. However, other forms yielded 
by the same pattern, like erschreien (‘obtain by screaming’) or wymantrować, 
(‘obtain by chanting mantras’) are not as transparent as their lexicalized 
counterparts may seem. Such novel forms require special context to be 
interpretable at all, and when presented with these verbs out of context, 
speakers are usually nonplussed and cannot provide an effortless defini‑
tion along the lines of ‘to obtain by V ‑ing.’ Clearly, the semantic element 
‘obtain’ does not come from the verb alone.
4.4. Manner
Apart from the meaning component of obtainment, the construction 
serves to specify the manner in which the prospective possessor acquires 
an object. The manner is encoded by the verb root, and in principle, any 
activity verb can serve to convey a manner of obtainment. Some verbs 
are common and lexicalized, and others are novel creative derivations 
which may elicit varying reactions from native speakers. However, in 
a supportive context, they are barely noticed, unlike malformed expres‑
sions which normally stand out even amid engaging prose. Sentences 
(4—5) contain examples of attested MOC verbs which convey the man‑
ners ‘by dating,’ ‘chatting,’ and ‘by flirting.’ Admittedly, these are quite 
unusual instrumentalities for achieving any ends, and to be interpreted 
as manners of obtainment, they require generous conceptual effort, but 
that is precisely the whole point of the MOC. The construction forces the 
listener to build a complex scenario in which the verbalized activity is 
conceived of as a way leading to a goal. Further, the listener must infer 
all other conditions not mentioned, but which must hold for that goal to 
be realized.
Thus, the behavior of the couple in sentence (4) is described euphe‑
mistically, because dating alone does not normally end in pregnancy. The 
listener must fill in the facts left unsaid, and this omission is perceived 
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as a surprising and humorous way of framing the events leading to the 
birth of a baby.
(4) a. Adam i Ewa chodzili ze sobą tak wytrwale, że wy ‑chodzili dziecko.
b. Adam and Eve dated with each other so persistently that (they) 
wy ‑dated child.
c. ‘Adam and Eve dated so persistently that they ended up having 
a baby.’
(5) a. Er hat Bilder, die er sich erchattet oder erflirtet hat.
b. He has pictures which he himself er ‑chatted or er ‑flirted has.
c. ‘He has pictures which he gotten hold of by chatting or flirting.’
Not all verbs qualify to be used in the construction. This question will 
be addressed more extensively in section (4.10.5), but as a first approxi‑
mation it can be proposed that manner cannot be conveyed by verbs 
which encode the notion of a goal (only atelic activity verbs can be used). 
If a verb expressing an accomplishment or an achievement is used in 
the construction, despite being semantically intelligible, the resulting 
sentence is ill ‑formed both in Polish and German (6—7). This is because 
telic verbs already entail a goal, and a goal cannot serve as a means of 
achieving another goal expressed in the same clause.
(6) a. *Anna wyopalała sobie oparzenia na skórze.
b. Anna wy ‑tanned herself sunburns on skin.
c. ‘Anna got sunburned from tanning.’
(7) a. *Anna ersonnte sich Sonnenbrände auf der Haut.
b. Anna er ‑tanned herself sunburns on the skin.
c. ‘Anna got sunburned from tanning.’
Further, not only is it important to acknowledge the fact that the con‑
struction contributes meaning, but it is also instructive to appreciate 
what kind of meaning it is. It is not simply another semantic element 
on a par with what the words introduce to the sentence, like another 
bead strung next to others of its kind. Instead, the construction is seen 
as imposing a larger meaning frame which accommodates and orga‑ 
nizes the remaining meanings in the sentence. Recall from section (2.3.4) 
that this is a general property of function forms (of which, I believe, the 
MOC is a representative). Unlike proposition ‑bearing lexical items, func‑
tion forms impose the conceptual delineations of the scene scaffolding. 
Here too, the MOC sets up a general scenario of a participant coming 
into possession of a theme. The particulars regarding the participant, 
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method of obtainment and the theme being obtained are provided by 
lexical items.
4.5. Conflation
Examples of the MOC have found their way into the literature, but to 
the best of my knowledge, they have never been claimed to be instances 
of a separate construction. For example, Talmy (2000b, p. 242) presents 
them as a variation on the theme of the conflation of manner and motion. 
Conflating manner and motion is a special capacity found in so called 
satellite ‑framed languages. Specifically, the operation involves represent‑
ing motion events where the manner of motion is expressed by means 
of a verb and the path of motion is conveyed through a prepositional 
phrase. For example, in the following sentence, the manner of motion is 
expressed by the verb ‘bounced’, and the direction of motion is conveyed 
by means of the phrase ‘into the kitchen’.
(8) The ball bounced into the kitchen.
[The ball MOVED into the kitchen] WITH ‑THE ‑MANNER ‑OF [it 
bounced].
The special character of conflation is evident in its restricted avail‑
ability. Languages use various patterns of representing manner (for a full 
account on the typology of verb ‑framed and satellite ‑framed languages, 
see Talmy, 2000b or Slobin, 2003), but as is clear from Talmy’s famous 
typology of satellite ‑framed and verb ‑framed languages, only the former 
can conflate manner and motion using one verb only. In verb ‑framed 
languages like Spanish, if manner is relevant enough to be mentioned, 
an additional verb in the gerundive form must be employed to specify 
it. In the following example, manner is conveyed by the verb rebotar (‘to 
bounce’):
(9) a. El balón entró en la cochina rebotando.
b. The ball entered in the kitchen bouncing.
c. ‘The ball bounced into the kitchen.’
To account for the conflated reading of sentences like (8), Talmy postu‑
lates the deep verb MOVE which is not realized overtly, but which must 
be invoked to properly interpret the event as consisting in a directional 
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motion with a specified manner (‘the ball bouncing into a location’) rather 
than the motion occurring in the same spot (‘the ball bouncing in place’). 
Talmy notes that a similar pattern of conflating manner with another 
semantic component is found in sentences like (10), which happens to be 
an example of a classic MOC sentence:
(10) Die Armee hat (sich) die Halbinsel erkämpft.
The Army has (itself) the peninsula er ‑fought.
‘The army gained the peninsula by battling.’ As if ‘The army battled 
the peninsula into its possession.’ (2000b, p. 242, ex. 10)
Talmy argues that the semantic component ‘gaining the peninsula’ is un‑
derstood metaphorically as the peninsula being ‘moved into possession.’ 
In other words, according to Talmy, although disguised in a slightly dif‑
ferent syntactic form, such sentences are also examples of the conflation 
of manner and motion.
However, it is important to single out the MOC as an autonomous syn‑
tactic entity related to but separate from the conflation patterns discussed 
by Talmy. As will be demonstrated below, the semantic constitution of 
the construction is more intricate than in manner ‑motion conflations. 
Further, the syntax is also slightly different in each case. Also, not all 
satellite ‑frame languages have the MOC. If each language that can con‑
flate manner with the deep verb MOVE could also automatically conflate 
manner with the deep verb OBTAIN, there would be reason to assume 
that the MOC is simply a natural extension of conflation patterns. But 
because the construction appears only in some satellite ‑frame languages, 
it must be more of a special extra rather than a standard feature of the 
conflation package.
4.6. Obtainment as Motion
In all of the above examples, the construction conveys a combination 
of two main meaning components: obtainment and a specific manner 
whereby that obtainment is achieved. While the semantic component of 
manner is coded by the verb, the obtainment part must be postulated as 
a deep verb which conflates with manner under the form of the verb. An 
important question is how the deep verb OBTAIN is induced. Unlike in 
classic manner ‑motion conflation sentences, where the deep verb MOVE 
is suggested by prepositional phrases (into or out of a location), in this con‑
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struction there is less overt material in the form of MOC sentences that 
would hint at the obtainment reading. That is, there is no prepositional 
phrase like from x that would suggest a source of obtainment. One obvi‑
ous possibility would be that the pairing of the form of the construction 
and its reading is simply arbitrary. However, the fact that the construction 
is found in many languages in a similar form suggests that the pairing 
must be motivated.
In Polish, the manner verb is preceded by a directional movement 
prefix wy ‑ which means roughly ‘out (of).’ This suggests that the mean‑
ing of obtainment is conjured up metaphorically by visualizing a given 
object being retrieved out of a container. Talmy (2000a, p. 241) analyzes 
the semantics of this construction in German also in terms of obtain‑
ment being a result of metaphoric movement into one’s possession (10). 
In his account, however, the theme is not retrieved out of a container, 
but instead possession is conceived of as a sort of the possessor’s con‑
tainer into which the object being obtained is inserted. The difference 
between Talmy’s analysis and the explanation offered here is perhaps 
not very important, as far as it can be agreed that in both cases, ob‑
tainment is thought of as arising from a metaphoric motion event, but 
there are reasons to believe that the German prefix er ‑ functions simi‑
larly to its Polish counterpart and it too conveys the meaning ‘out (of).’ 
Historically, the prefix comes from the Old German ur ‑ which also
yielded uz ‑ whose present ‑day form aus ‑ conveys precisely the meaning 
‘out (of).’1
If the aforemoentioned treatment of obtainment as retrieval is ac‑
curate, then conflating the deep element OBTAIN with manner should 
be a procedure similar to Talmy’s event integration of manner and mo‑
tion. In both cases of manner conflation, an extra meaning component 
is understood to be part of the reading of the sentence despite not being 
coded by an overt verb. In fact, in the MOC, the deep verb OBTAIN is 
not merely a counterpart of MOVE, but is really its consequence by meta‑
phorical derivation, as signalled by the prefixes wy ‑ and er ‑.
Thus the MOC does seem to be a special autonomous realization of 
the manner—motion integration. This impression is justified by the strik‑
ing similarity between the form of the construction (11) and the form of 
descriptions of ordinary physical retrieval events (12—13). In Polish, the 
1 Similar examples are found in other languages. Some, like Czech, use the exact 
same prefix (vy ‑). But similarities can be found in unrelated languages too. In Estonian, 
an equivalent construction uses the adverbial välja, which can be translated as ‘out.’ 
A slightly different take on the same theme can be found in Slavic languages. In Slovene, 
verbs are preceded by pri ‑, with the meaning of ‘to oneself,’ suggesting the construction 
profiles the end point of the trajectory.
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prefix wy ‑ is used in both cases, and in German, although the prefixes 
used do not match identically, they are related historically.
(11) a. Sie erkämpften ihre Freiheit. (German)
b. Oni wywalczyli swoja wolność. (Polish)
c. ‘They won their freedom with a fight.’
[They OBTAINED their freedom] WITH ‑THE ‑MANNER ‑OF [they 
fought]. As if [they MOVED their freedom out of a container] 
WITH ‑THE‑MANNER ‑OF [they fought].
(12) a. I pried the cork out (of the bottle).
b. Ich zog den Korken aus (der Flasche). (German)
c. Wydostałem korek (z butelki). (Polish)
[I MOVED the cork out (of the bottle)] WITH ‑THE ‑MANNER ‑OF 
[I pried it].
(13) a. twist the bulb out.
b. die Glühbirne herausdrehen.
c. wykręcić żarówkę.
The most conspicuous difference is that in manner ‑motion conflation 
sentences the source and goal phrases are optional, whereas in the MOC, 
they are gapped. This may seem counterintuitive, given the construction’s 
reliance on the container metaphor. The reason this happens may be that 
the container is a metaphoric imaginary location, and thus its precise 
identification is a challenge. However, as was signaled in the previous 
section, in the conflation of manner and motion, the motion element can 
be worked out based on the satellite prepositions into or out of which sug‑
gest motion straightforwardly enough. But in the case of the conflation 
of manner and obtainment, the interpretation path from wy ‑ or er ‑ (‘out 
(of)’) to OBTAIN is not as obvious or direct. It involves a number of cog‑
nitive operations, which include the metaphoric association of location 
with possession and the manipulation of a number of schemas. These 
points will be discussed in sections (4.11—4.16).
4.7. History
I do not know when the construction was first used, and I will not attempt 
a historical analysis here, but it is obvious that the construction is neither 
a recent acquisition for Polish or German nor a marginal colloquialism. 
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Despite its exotic ring and peculiar structure, the MOC is an established 
and fairly productive grammatical instrument. Examples of MOC uses 
can be found in the literature, like the following excerpt from Friedrich 
Hebbel’s nineteenth ‑century poem Der Brahmine:
(14) a. Wollte ich den letzten hindern.
b. Sich Vergebung zu erweinen.
c. I wanted to stop the past.
d. Cry my way to forgiveness.
Concerning the age of the construction in Polish, at least some forerun‑
ner form of the MOC must have been present before Polish split from 
the other West Slavic languages, Czech and Slovak. Hypothesizing 
such a remote origin is based on the presence of equivalent forms in 
Czech and Slovak. The Polish form of the construction with its prefix 
wy ‑ has an identical equivalent in Czech, where the same prefix (spelled
vy ‑) is attached to verbs: vyžebrat slitování (Pol. wyżebrać litość, ‘get mercy 
by begging’), vyskákat (si) medaili (Pol. wyskakać medal, ‘win a medal by 
skijumping’) vybojovat svobodu (Pol. wywalczyć wolność, ‘win freedom by 
fighting’). The same is true of Slovak, whose MOC differs from the Czech 
counterpart only in spelling: cf. vyskákat (si) medaili (Czech) and vyskákať 
(si) medaili (Slovak). It is natural to assume that the similarities between 
the three languages owe to the construction’s common origin before the 
split within the West Slavic group, rather than to a later independent 
emergence in the three languages.
An equivalent relative in English is the way construction, to be 
analyzed in the next chapter. Its structure is different and the ranges 
of meanings it can convey also differ, but there are reasons to believe 
that the English construction and those in Polish and German represent 
examples of similar patterns.
4.8. Possession and Location
Because possession figures in the form and meaning of the MOC, it is 
helpful to first consider how this conceptual category is expressed apart 
from the usual possessive verb have.
Possession is an elusive abstract concept. It cannot be observed directly 
the way motion or location can. A stolen apple does not look any different 
from any other apple (Snare, 1972, p. 200). It is therefore not surprising 
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to find that to express possession, various unrelated languages exapt 
constructional formulae which serve to convey more tangible concepts 
such as location, goal or companion (Heine, 2001, p. 316). The association 
between location and possession is of two kinds. In many languages, 
possessive constructions were grammaticalized out of locative construc‑
tions, as in Russian, where the possessum and the possessor are subject 
and oblique object respectively, and the possessive relation between the 
two is conceptualized as the location of the possessum (figure) relative to 
the possessor (ground).
(15) a. U menya brat.
b. At me brother.
c. ‘I have a brother.’
In English, the picture is slightly more complicated and the locative nature 
of possession is not as readily obvious as in Russian. Like other Germanic 
languages, English uses its dedicated verb have whose meaning is first of 
all that of possession, not location. However, the etymology of have from 
the PIE root *kap ‑ (‘grasp’) shows that here too, possession was originally 
an implicature of proximity, an element later desemanticized (Łęcki, 
2010), which in this particular case resulted from catching and holding; 
it was conceptualized in a purely spatial sense. Actually, the verb have 
still retains its original ‘hold’ sense, as in He has a gun! To account for 
this semantic change, Radden (2003, p. 100) suggests that the metaphor 
POSSESSION IS HOLDING is at work, which is also responsible for the 
same change that is affecting the verb hold, as in to hold a position, to hold 
a passport, or slaveholder.
English, with its spatial etymology of possessive verbs but without 
Russian ‑style locative constructions to express possession, still retains 
a conceptual apparatus for understanding possession in terms of loca‑
tion and vice versa. There is an automatic association between the two 
concepts such that even those relations that are not of the ownership or 
kinship type can be talked about in possessive terms. Whenever some‑
thing can be thought of as a figure located within or near a ground, it can 
automatically be represented as a possessum, as in (16).
(16) a. This apartment has three occupants.
b. The driver has three cars in front of him.
c. They have asthma.
This is also true of abstract entities like time or love. These can be 
conceptualized as possessa, but for this to be possible, they must first 
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undergo reification and transubstantiate into objects with a specific 
location relative to their possessor. Literally, (17 a—b) are neither typi‑
cal cases of possession nor of location, but because they materialize as 
concrete objects with specific locations, they become locata relative to 
a ground, and hence, they can naturally be thought of as being subject 
to possession. Further, the location of a possessum does not have to 
be expressed overtly, as it can still be assumed to be relative to the 
possessor. In (17c), the kiss is, almost by default, taken to be an entity 
within a person’s grasp, one that can be handed from one participant to 
another just like anything that is subject to transfer of possession. From 
the linguistic point of view, possession is an inevitable consequence of 
location.
(17) a. Some people have too much time on their hands.
b. Jill has no love in her heart.
c. Give me a kiss.
The picture presented here may seem oversimplied in light of how pos‑
session is approached in the literature. Heine’s (1997) review of possessive 
construction types may give the impression that there may be little by 
way of a universal pattern, as the types he lists seem to form a collec‑
tion of unlimited diversity. There are constructions where possession is 
expressed via action verbs, as in Nama (Central Khoisan), where the En‑ 
glish sentence The man has the car is conveyed literally ‘The man has taken 
the car’ (p. 92). There are languages that employ goal ‑focus constructions, 
like the Bolivian variety of Quechua that would render I have a rope as 
‘A rope exists for me’ (p. 94). There are also so called companion schemas 
like the Luo (Western ‑Nilotic) construction that would render The Luo 
people have good customs as ‘The Luo are with good customs’ (p. 93). Then 
there are genitive constructions, source ‑focus constructions, topic and 
equation constructions.
The types presented by Heine make it clear that the familiar patterns 
found in European languages represent a minority on the cross ‑linguistic 
scene. All this diversity illustrates the point that the category of posses‑
sion is a universe of its own, and it is not possible to treat it extensively 
here, attempting to do justice to all its nuanced complexity. Instead, 
I would like to point out that for all its richness, the impressive display 
of constructions has some things in common. First, the abstractness of 
possession is conveyed in concrete spatial terms. It is noteworthy that 
the constructions found in language after language represent the posses‑
sor and the possessum as being located near each other. Whatever the 
exact form or original meaning of the constructions in question, they all 
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ultimately involve some type of location where both these arguments are 
situated and it is their proximity that serves as an indication of a pos‑
sessive relationship between them. The logic underlying the association 
of possession and proximity is that since possession is not a directly 
observable property, some other visible property must be used to express 
the relationship between two participants, and the best candidate for that 
property is proximity. The grammaticization of such forms can be imag‑
ined as being driven by the pragmatic inference from ‘A is seen near B’ 
to ‘A and B are likely to be in the relationship of possession’. If speakers 
using spatial expressions rely on their hearers to infer that implicature, 
and if communication succeeds sufficiently often, that spatial ‑possessive 
implicature should turn into a true entailment through pragmatic 
strengthening as envisaged by Traugott (1988).
The equal sign between location and possession is an important com‑
ponent in the argumentation presented further in this study. It will be 
argued that the grammatical construction under consideration activates 
a locative scenario as a prerequisite of the possessive reading that it 
serves to convey.
4.9. Reference Point Relations
Langacker (2008) offers a slightly different analysis of the possessive 
construction in English. He views possession as a linguistic phenomenon 
that can be accounted for in terms of reference point relations. He argues 
that since possessive expressions are used for a vast array of relation‑
ships (the car of the year, today’s top songs, your problem, etc.), “a general 
characterization can hardly be based on specific conceptual content” 
(p. 505). He goes on to suggest that what all the different uses of possessive 
expressions have in common is that the possessor serves as a reference 
point for the identification of a less salient object. It is not a linguistic, but 
a more general conceptual mechanism motivated by the fact that there 
are fewer possessors than possessa, possessors are more salient, and are 
thus a logical choice as anchoring devices.
However, this analysis does not deal with the origins of the possessive 
construction in various languages. Langacker’s reference point account 
explains why possessive expressions have been extended for uses that go 
beyond relations of possession, and as such, it is not an alternative to the 
POSSESSION IS HOLDING metaphor as an account of why possessive 
expressions have the form that they have in English.
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Still, despite their different foci, the two accounts are both spatial in 
nature, which provides additional rationale for why possessive expres‑
sions lend themselves so naturally to conveying reference point relations. 
Consider the following examples from Langacker:
(18) a. Do you see that boat out there in the lake? There’s a duck swim‑
ming right next to it.
b. Do you remember that surgeon we met at the party? His wife just 
filed for divorce. (Langacker, 2008, p. 83, ex. 25a—b)
The above (18a) is a prototypical example of reference point identifica‑
tion, where the object being identified is in physical proximity to its 
reference point. This way of referencing serves as a model for other less 
concrete instances of proximity, such as the one in (18b), where the two 
participants are visualized as being placed side by side. If one source of 
possessive constructions is the description of spatial proximity, and if 
spatial proximity is also a model for reference point relations, it is rather 
to be expected that reference point descriptions will make use of posses‑
sive expressions.
4.10. Schemas
The reading of the MOC is a typical closed ‑class meaning for two reasons. 
Obtainment and, more generally, possession are concepts represented by 
a range of grams. Furthermore, the meaning is assembled out of patterns, 
more specifically event schemas, which themselves are associated with 
closed ‑class items.
Interpreting MOC sentences requires recourse to a number of what 
has come to be called event schemas. These are defined as configura‑
tions of thematic roles participating in basic situation types (Radden & 
Dirven, 2007, p. 270). Accounts of event schemas have been developed as 
extensions of Fillmore’s Case (1968) and later work on thematic roles of 
verbal arguments. The term was first used by Talmy (1991; 2000b, p. 217) 
in his analysis of patterns in which simple unitary events form complex 
events. Dirven’s (1999) work on event schemas has emerged as part of his 
analysis of metonymic regularities in noun ‑verb conversion, and a simi‑
lar inventory of schemas was proposed by Heine (1993), whose main 
focus was on how events are captured in sentences. Rappaport Hovav 
and Levin (1998) approach event schemas from yet another angle, their 
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interest being in argument selection properties of predicates. Despite 
the different theoretical starting points represented by these accounts, 
they share a number of fundamental assumptions. One of them is the 
recognition that not only do participants in an event represent a limited 
number of thematic roles, but the event itself too will be framed as one 
out of a handful of existing schemas. These are defined as conceptual 
schemas of an event which combine a type of action or state with its most 
salient participants of different roles in the action or state (Heine, 2004, 
p. 78). An event schema will also signal a specific relationship between the 
participants, and thus guide the interpretation of a sentence as expressing 
an example of a having situation, a giving situation, etc. A given event 
schema will be activated for a large number of verbs. All languages have 
an inventory of schemas, each dedicated to a given meaning pattern. This 
makes the schemas universal. Schemas also form larger combinations 
which allow speakers to express more complex meaning patterns. The 
combinations require certain metaphoric interpretations mechanisms 
and syntactic properties (packing manner and result in one clause).
4.10.1. Image schemas vs. event schemas
It is now a good opportunity to address the question of the relationship 
between event schemas and the more familiar image schemas introduced 
by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987). Although the two terms are some‑
times used interchangeably (Choi & McDonough, 2007), it is important 
to point out differences between image and event schemas. First of all, 
image schemas are pre ‑linguistic cognitive patterns, and while they are 
reflected in language, they are a matter of thought rather than of verbal 
frames. On the other hand, event schemas are linguistic constructs which 
closely parallel argument structures. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2008) 
define an event schema as a structural component of meaning represent‑
ing an event type; drawn from a limited inventory consisting of the 
event types encodable in language. From the above distinction between 
pre ‑linguistic image schemas and linguistic event schemas there follow 
a number of consequences. Image schemas are more detailed and specific, 
and the inventory of known image schemas has been hypothesized to be 
substantial and diverse, including instances of physical phenomena and 
their typical characteristics.
For example, the concept of HORIZON and the reasoning patterns as‑
sociated with it can be taken to form an image schema (Johnson, 2005, p. 33). 
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Indeed, any recurrent conceptual representation that provides the basis 
for abstract thought is an image schema. Event schemas, on the other 
hand, are situation types, which capture a given relationship between 
participants.
Yet, with all the differences between the two, one important similarity 
must also be indicated. Lakoff (1987) observed that image schemas form 
larger structures; indeed an idea will normally be based on a number 
of image schemas combined into a unitary image schematic gestalt. The 
basic logic of image schemas is due to their configurations as gestalts, 
structured wholes which are more than mere collections of parts. Their 
basic logic is a consequence of their configurations (p. 272). The pos‑
sibility of combining schemas is implicit in much work on the subject. 
Some image schemas are implicit in closed ‑class forms. For example, 
Lakoff and Núñez (2000) argue that meanings expressed by means of 
the prepositions into/out of involve a combination of the path schema 
with the container schema. The same is almost certainly true for event 
schemas. Although these are predicate ‑sized, and so one clause will be 
built around a whole event schema, that schema can in itself be a sum 
of smaller events. Such a macro ‑event, as Talmy (1991) calls it, is concep‑
tualized as a unitary amalgam, but is made up of two smaller events 
and the relationship between them (Talmy, 2000b, p. 213). Not only do 
both image and event schemas share the tendency to fuse into schema 
complexes, but the two interbreed to form hybrid schemas. There is good 
reason to believe that event schemas contain image schemas, especially if 
these can be fitted into slots for verbal arguments. Specifically, it will be 
argued that the event schemas in MOC sentences involve the concept of 
CONTAINER which has been widely recognized to be an image schema.
4.10.2. Event schemas
I will now review examples of event schemas identified in the literature, 
drawing on the work by Dirven (1999) and Heine (2004). Dirven’s and 
Heine’s accounts differ in terms of their exact inventories of event sche‑
mas. The statuses of some schemas in the two accounts are approached 
differently in that one schema in Dirven’s inventory is subsumed under 
a more general schema in Heine’s inventory. (Specifically, the authors 
differ on the question of the schemas involved in being, location, and 
movement). Here I will not be concerned with hierarchy issues or the 
relative importance of schemas. Instead, in what follows, I will draw from 
120 4. How Constructions Are Really Constructed…
both accounts and enumerate those event schemas that are present in the 
interpretation of MOC sentences. Later, I will show how these schemas 
interact forming complex event schema systems to produce possessive 
readings.
4.10.3. I action schema (the doing schema)
In the doing schema, the main participant is portrayed as the source of 
the energy that instigates an action. The action in question is normally 
understood as deliberate and controllable, initiated by an animate voli‑
tional agent; the event is not a process or incident which the participant 
merely undergoes. Thus, normally unergative rather than unaccusative 
verbs will be found in action schema sentences. Typical examples of ac‑
tion schema sentences are The girls are singing or The children were hopping 
around. Apart from the agent, the action schema can also include a patient 
involved in the action, which is expressed as the object as in The workers 
chiseled wooden blocks. The patient participant can be omitted if it is not 
a focal element of the schema, as in The workers chiseled for hours. Nar‑
ratives conveyed by action schema sentences are built around a general 
situational skeleton where an agent generates the energy that is behind 
the action, and the energy can be directed at a patient if one is present 
in the action.
4.10.4. II essive schema (the being schema)
This is a very amorphous schema which groups together a number of 
loosely related schema types. Generally, its function is to relate a charac‑
teristic or any other conceptual category to a given entity (Heine, 2004, 
p. 79). What makes the essive schema so hard to circumscribe is that the 
conceptual categories in question can really be of any kind. The schema 
is found in descriptions of class membership (He is an athlete), attribu‑
tion (He is crazy), company (He is with me), or location (He is at school), 
among other possibilities. In fact, so many different uses of this schema 
are identified that it is tempting to classify them as examples of differ‑
ent schemas. For example, while Heine considers location as a use of the 
being schema, Dirven (1999) combines it with motion as the location or 
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motion schema. In my discussion of MOC sentences, I will follow Heine’s 
analysis of location as an example of the being schema, distinct from the 
motion schema. First, the two are different in that the motion schema is 
dynamic and the location schema is static and thus more similar to the 
other essive uses. Secondly, although motion involves location, this does 
not entail that the two should be treated as equal components within 
the same schema. Rather, motion should be treated as a complex schema 
which includes the simple location schema.
4.10.5. III process schema (the happening schema)
At first glance, this schema seems similar to the doing schema in that 
both schemas emphasize a potentially continuous action unfolding in 
time and involving a participant at the heart of the event. Like in the 
doing schema, in the happening schema too, there is an action where 
usually one entity is involved, and the verb used is intransitive.
(19) a. Her earring fell down the drain.
b. The hikers got lost.
One crucial difference is that in the process schema, the entity in ques‑
tion is not the source of energy involved in the action, so it is not an 
agent, but instead a patient that undergoes whatever process is described 
by the verb. In other words, the process schema involves unaccusative 
verbs which take the participant as an underlying object. This schema 
does not enter into the MOC schema complex. It is discussed here as 
an example of what does not meet the specification of the MOC schema 
complex. However, the process schema is present in the x’s way construc‑
tion, which will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
The constraints governing the MOC require the entity involved to be 
an agent for two reasons. First, the participant of the action must be a po‑
tential possessor, and many patients possible in unaccusative processes 
are not capable of possession. Second, more importantly, the happening 
schema’s incompatibility with the construction is a consequence of how 
we normally visualize possessors ‑to ‑be gaining possession. Obtainment 
is conceptualized metaphorically as retrieving the possessum from 
a container, a development where the requisite energy originates from the 
agent and is directed at the possessum. The happening schema violates 
this expectation of energy flow by having unknown ‑provenance energy 
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directed both at the possessum and at the possessor. Such a surreal 
scenario would place unfeasible requirements on the argument structure 
by forcing both participants into the underlying object position, while 
leaving the subject position empty.
4.10.6. IV motion schema (the moving schema)
This schema is present in descriptions of a participant changing location 
from a source, through a path to a goal. According to Talmy (1985; 1996), 
the conceptualization of a motion event necessarily contains a source, 
path (which he terms the medial portion), and a goal, but these three stages 
are not normally mentioned in each motion schema narrative. Instead, 
they form a presupposed conceptual base in which one stage is usually 
profiled: The campers came out of the tents, The car sped through the tunnel, and 
Mallory reached Mount Everest. Stages that are not encoded (or windowed 
for attention) are said to be backgrounded or gapped. The motion schema 
is typically assumed to serve to express the movement of either agentive 
participants that move of their own volition (walking, crawling) or themes 
that undergo a change of place (falling, sliding). As a result, this schema 
is theorized to be a higher ‑level structure combining the being schema 
with either the doing schema or the happening schema. Talking about 
entities may additionally require mention of an extra participant that 
causes some entity to change location (The barmaid slid the glass). From the 
syntactic point of view, such schemas are complex predicate structures 
involving more sub ‑events. Conceptually, they involve a triple combina‑
tion of the doing, happening and being schemas. The motion schema is 
characterized by a goal bias in that the goal is profiled more often than 
the source. This characteristic has been termed as the goal ‑over ‑source 
principle (Ikegami, 1987). Put simply, what this principle means is that the 
goal is often more salient and more likely to be asserted than the source. 
It is more natural to say The situation changed for the better rather than *The 
situation changed from the worse. The source and the goal have unequal 
statuses in that the source is always a presupposed inevitable part of any 
motion narrative, whereas the goal is more of an unknown, as it may or 
may not be reached. This makes the goal a more natural point of interest 
and inherently more salient than the source. Of course, it is the degree of 
discourse salience that is taken into account when a particular part of the 
source ‑path ‑goal trajectory is selected for profiling. Unless the source in 
a particular description is in some way special or unpredictable, it is not 
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likely to be selected over the goal for profiling. As Talmy argues, atten‑
tion is a limited resource, so windowing will be on truly essential aspects 
of a situation. “(T)he gapping of certain portions of a conceptual complex 
permits certain conceptual areas that are assessed as less relevant, more 
redundant, or more obvious (i.e. capable of being filled in by the hearer) 
to continue on unenhanced at their usual background level of process‑
ing” (Talmy, 2000a, p. 305).
4.11. Combining Schemas
The above discussion focuses on a small number of basic schemas identi‑
fied in the literature. The list is not exhaustive; there are other schemas 
that are combinations of smaller basic ones. The possibility of combining 
schemas into more complex configurations is of course not a new idea. 
In his original account of event expression, Talmy (1991) introduces the 
notion of event integration, a process in which simple events that can be 
expressed in a separate clause each (20a) get fused into a unitary macro‑
event conveyed by a single clause (20b):
(20) a. The glass slid down the counter because I pushed it.
b. I slid the glass down the counter.
Combining schemas makes it possible to produce more complex confi‑
gurations that are the basis of a number of constructions discussed here. 
One such experiential scenario is obtainment. Below, its semantics and 
underlying logic is discussed.
4.12. Obtainment and Loss
The obtainment schema is a separate species of a schema, which, to the 
best of my knowledge, has not been analyzed in the literature. It is not to 
be considered on a par with the examples of simple schemas presented in 
section 4.2, because it is a combination of two simpler schemas, namely 
the motion schema and the doing schema. The mechanism of the two 
schemas joining together is described below in section 5; here, a semantic 
analysis is provided.
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In an obtainment event, a participant is portrayed as coming into 
possession of a theme, where possession is viewed metaphorically as the 
possessor being in close proximity with the object, as was demonstrated 
in section 4.6. Thus, possession is probably not an independent schema, 
as it relies on the metaphoric reinterpretation of the essive schema. This 
analysis differs from Dirven and Verspoor (2004, p. 82), who identify 
“having” as an independent schema. One downside of singling out 
a having schema is that this does not reflect its formal behavior suggest‑
ing a strong affinity with the essive schema. This affinity in turn has its 
consequences in how possession is realized in more complex schemas. 
That is, if possession is understood in terms of location in the proximity 
of a theme, then obtainment can be expected as motion to that location. 
Indeed, in the MOC construction, a theme is brought into contact with 
the prospective possessor. In the x’s way construction (next chapter), it is 
the possessor that moves in the direction of the theme.
In this context, it is worth mentioning a related concept, that of loss. 
There are reasons to postulate a LOSE predicate as a reverse or simple 
negation of a HAVE/OBTAIN predicate, which is found in a range of 
grammatical forms, where often both LOSE and OBTAIN predicates are 
possible. In terms of its schema manifestation, loss is conceptualized as 
a possessor or prospective possessor moving away from a theme. For 
example, the x’s way construction is used to convey ‘lose’ senses, as in 
He drank his way out of his football scholarship. Further, Mondorf (2011) com‑
pares the x’s way to another construction, where the reflexive self conveys 
both ‘obtain’ (21a) and ‘lose’ (21b—d) senses: 
(21) a. Max married himself into big money. (Mondorf, 2011, p. 399, 
ex. 4b)
b. Howard Dean screeched himself out of the race.
c. He has doped himself out of the job.
d. Mike’s own family has swindled him out of his fortune.
Bogusław Bierwiaczonek pointed out to me that there are examples of 
reverse obtainment constructions in Polish, such as Szef wybił mi z głowy 
wyjazd (lit. ‘The boss bludgeoned the trip out of my head.’ ≈ ‘The boss 
bullied me out of the trip’). These conceptualize loss as a theme (here the 
trip) being removed out of the possessor, a process opposite to obtain‑
ment, where a theme is retrieved out of a container and brought into con‑
tact with the possessor. More generally, it seems justified to propose that 
schemas conveying loss contain an underlying ‘use up/lose’ predicate as 
a closed ‑class element. It represents a fairly common meaning recurring 
across various grammatical forms including (21b—d) and the following 
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examples. The ‘lose/finish’ predicate could also be postulated behind the 
augmentative function of the particle up in (22a—e). This is most probably 
an extension of the completion sense (Hampe, 2002; Tyler & Evans, 2003).2
(22) a. When he had eaten up the whole lamprey… . (The works of Fran‑
cis Rabelais)
b. Drink up before it spills!
c. Time is up.
d. We’ve used up all our savings.
e. My membership is up.
There also seems to be an associative link between the OBTAIN and 
LOSE predicates, as is clear from the possibility that the dative (double 
object) construction, apart from typical ‘give—obtain’ uses (23a), also 
allows ‘take away—lose’ uses:
(23) a. His voice won him popularity.
b. His drinking cost him the job.
c. It took them 10 years to build the house.
d. The police officer fined us $10 for jaywalking.
e. The new law denied them equal rights.
f.  … and forbid them entrance into God’s house. (John Milton, The 
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates)
4.13. Conceptual Integration
What is particularly important to stress is that examples like (20) above 
are not merely incidental instances of simple events forming larger events, 
but that there are recurrent patterns in which specific types of events tend 
to merge into larger wholes. The challenge is to point out regularities 
in schema combinations, and such patterns have been identified in the 
literature. For example, Dirven and Verspoor (2004, p. 83) suggest that the 
moving schema is a combination of a “happening” schema or a “doing” 
schema with the “source ‑path ‑goal” schema. If their view is correct, and 
2 Tyler and Evans single out the uses of up that convey ‘finish/to the end’ readings—
referring to them as “depletion” senses—and contend with the fact that they seem to 
represent a contradiction of the completion sense (Tyler & Evans, 2003, p. 141). However, 
they argue that the senses are in fact compatible, because the depletion of the theme 
correlates with the completion of the activity.
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if even a basic schema can itself be a combination of more basic schemas, 
there should be no reason why they could not combine systematically 
to form higher ‑order schemas. One major conclusion following from my 
analysis of the MOC construction is that it itself represents such a pattern, 
where a complex macro ‑event schema is assembled out of a number of 
small schemas, and the pattern in question is quite intricate. The reading 
of MOC sentences requires reference to a number of event schemas listed 
in section 4.10.
One possible way of combining schemas in MOC sentences is cap‑
tured in the framework of Fauconnier and Turner’s (1996; 2008) theory 
of conceptual integration. An important tenet of the theory is that daily 
cognition involves effortless and automatic manipulation of mental 
content coming from disparate sources. People ordinarily blend inputs 
from two or more domains and form new mental spaces, nonce creations 
used not only in language, but also in imagination, hypothetical and 
counterfactual thought. For example, novel one ‑off operations include 
forming conditional if ‑then scenarios or imagining a debate between 
two philosophers each living in different eras, and thus unable to meet 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 1996). Other blends are fixed phrases or institu‑
tionalized concepts like the Grim Reaper (Fauconnier & Turner, 2006, 
p. 336), whose interpretation requires the parallel analysis of elements 
coming from different regions of our knowledge, such as the PEOPLE 
ARE PLANTS metaphor, a space of harvest, the image of a cloaked skeleton, 
etc., each of which contributes part of the logic of the blend. The image of 
the Grim Reaper has been an established concept for centuries and it is 
probably the compelling logic stemming from the associative blend that 
is responsible for its success in taking root in European culture.
The functioning of conceptual blends can be briefly summarized based 
on the simple example of imagining alternative pasts. People sometimes 
ponder questions such as what the past would have been like if telephones 
existed centuries before their invention. Entertaining such scenarios in‑
volves conceptual integration as illustrated in Figure 3. The picture of 
medieval people being offered a mobile phone is a blend of elements of 
our knowledge about the life in the Middle Ages (Input 1) with elements 
coming from the mental space about modern life and technology (Input 2). 
The Generic Space contains elements that are common to both Input 
spaces, including people, relationships between them, towns they live in, 
etc. The resulting picture (Blend) offers a scenario that would be impos‑
sible in either of the contributing spaces separately. In the “Middle Ages 
space,” it is impossible to use phones, while in the “modern life space” 
it is possible, but it would be hard to imagine present ‑day people being 
surprised at the sight of a phone.
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And of course, the whole point of the blend is to hypothesize how peo‑
ple unacquainted with electricity or radio waves would react to a voice 
from a phone speaker. The model of the conceptual blend operation also 
involves a generic space containing elements that the input spaces share, 
such as people and the possibility of using tools. This generic space 
contains the abstract structure applying to both input spaces, and is 
therefore a foundation that makes the blend possible. Theoretically, if the 
contributing input spaces shared no relevant details, the resulting blend 
would be obscure.
Elements 
in common
GENERIC 
SPACE
Elements 
found in 
another 
domain
INPUT 2
Elements 
found in 
one domain
INPUT 1
Imagined 
combination of 
elements from 
INPUT 1 and 2
BLEND
Figure 3. Conceptual blend
Conceptual blends are a pervasive feature of human cognition and 
are present in both linguistic and non ‑linguistic behavior. Conceptual 
Metaphor is one of its most studied instances. Blends can be performed 
without the mediation of language, as in the example of visualizing alter‑
nate realities. They have also been shown to be a promising explanatory 
framework to account for the semantics of compounds (Benczes, 2006, p. 
58). Also, authors like Grygiel (2005), and Kleparski and Kopecka (2008) 
use Fauconnier and Turner’s theory of conceptual integration to account 
for semantic change. Another obvious example of the motivating power 
of conceptual integration is morphological blending, where forms and 
meanings of words like motel result from the combination of inputs com‑
ing from two mental spaces. Grammatical constructions too rely on con‑
ceptual blending; Fauconnier and Turner (1996) offer a blending analysis 
of the Caused Motion Construction.
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Most metaphoric blends encapsulated in fixed expressions are readily 
understandable, but those utilized by grammatical constructions are less 
obvious or accessible to attention. Most speakers are not aware of the meta‑
phoric nature of the main semantic elements present in the construction, but 
those elements must, at some unconscious level, play a role in the interpre‑
tation, given their recurrence in the constructions of obtainment found in 
various languages. The following section will discuss how these metaphoric 
elements account for the form of the constructions of obtainment.
4.14. Blending Spaces in the MOC
The form of the MOC and similar constructions in many languages sug‑
gests that obtainment, as expressed by this construction, is viewed as the 
coming into contact of the possessor and possessee. In English, the x’s 
way construction (discussed in detail in the section following the present 
study of MOC), one of whose functions is the expression of obtainment, 
frames the possessor as a theme moving toward a location, which is the 
possessee, as in Bill Clinton talks his way to fortune. In Polish and German, 
it is the possessee that is realized as a theme in motion toward the pos‑
sessor, but despite a different organization of the scene, in each of these 
languages, the process results in the two participants being in proximity 
to each other. The movement that brings the possessor and possessee 
into contact is instigated by the agent’s specific activity. In the x’s way 
construction (Szcześniak, 2013), the prospective possessor sets oneself 
in motion by performing an activity specified by the verb. In the Polish 
and German construction, the possessor moves the theme to oneself by 
retrieving it out of its original location. In Figure 4, this is illustrated as 
the agent removing a theme out of a container in Input 2 and that agent 
performing an activity (such crying, cheating, etc.) in Input 1. In the 
Blend, the activity is viewed as a manner that causes the removal of the 
theme out of a container.
Other languages have constructions that are variations on the scenario 
of the possessor and possessee coming together. For example, in Slovene, 
obtainment is also viewed as movement of the possessee toward the 
possessor, but the Slovene construction focuses on the final part of the 
possessee’s trajectory, where it is brought to the possessor. In Slovene, the 
sentence Janez won a medal in ski ‑jumping could be expressed “Janez si je 
prismučal pokal,” literally ‘Janez has to ‑oneself ‑jumped himself a medal,’ 
as if Janez pulled the medal to himself by jumping.
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Agent involved 
in an activity
GENERIC 
SPACE
Agent 
Motion 
(removing across 
a boundary)
INPUT 2
Agent 
Activity 
(running, 
flirting, etc.)
INPUT 1
Agent 
retrieval out of 
a container 
by running, flirting, 
etc.
BLEND
Figure 4. Blending of the two disparate inputs
In all these examples, movement is caused by activities that do not 
typically have the potential of setting things in motion. To imagine di‑
rectional motion that results from talking or smiling one must engage in 
conceptual blending. In one space, the theme is viewed as being retrieved 
out of an unspecified container. The movement of the theme is caused by 
the agent’s action and these two events are viewed as being integrated 
into one larger event. In the other space, there is an unintegrated sequence 
in which an agent performs an activity and the theme moves toward the 
agent. These two spaces combine into a blend in which the agent’s activ‑
ity, whatever it is, causes the theme to materialize as if out of a container. 
The two input spaces share a generic space in which the agent and the 
theme not only appear, but find themselves in a relationship of posses‑
sion understood as a result of proximity (Figure 5).
Possession interpreted metaphorically as a spatial relationship is what 
motivates the choice of the integrated event input space that frames ob‑
tainment as a retrieval event and provides the syntactic form found in 
retrieval event sentences.
Theoretically, the form of the construction could be very different. For 
example, the construction could inherit a double ‑object syntactic frame 
associated with transfer of possession, if obtainment were associated 
with showing off what one has come to possess. Although transferring 
is directly associated with the concept of possession and would thus be 
a more natural candidate, it is more accurate to postulate the involvement 
of the moving schema. One reason is that the transfer schema presup‑
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poses the participation of a donor and a recipient, where the former 
actively causes a recipient to have a theme. In the case of MOC scenarios, 
it is the recipient that initiates the event. Also, another indication that 
a transferring schema is not involved is that although there is a source, it 
is not animate and it is implicit.
The ‘doing’
schema
[co-event]
The ‘moving’
schema
[motion]
The ‘being’
schema
[result]
Manner
[co-event]
Possession
[result]
Obtainment
[frame 
event]
Target domainSource domain
Figure 5. Cross ‑domain mapping of schemas yielding a pos‑
sessive reading
Finally, another motivating factor that contributes to the naturalness 
of this blend is the metaphor that it incorporates, namely causation is 
emergence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 74). Lakoff and Johnson argue that 
creation is conceptualized metaphorically as an act of emergence out of 
a container. Their view of the rationale behind the container view dif‑
fers from mine, but what needs to be stressed is the role of the container 
image in metaphoric processing. This point will be elaborated on in sec‑
tion (4.18) on the emergence of metaphoric mappings.
4.15. The Interaction of the Schemas Within the Construction
The interpretation of MOC sentences is a function of the interplay of 
a number of schemas that make up the form of the construction. The 
doing schema is the starting point; it is expressed overtly by the verb, 
which is invariably an activity verb. The doing schema sets the rest in 
motion: The activity initiated by the agentive subject of the sentence is 
followed by the moving schema, a motion in which the activity verb 
serves as a manner. The moving schema is expressed by elements such 
as additional morphemes, particles or adverbials signaling direction of 
motion. In this schema, the theme is conceptualized as changing loca‑
tion from an unspecified source to the location associated with the agent. 
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Finally, because the final location is associated with the agent, the being 
schema is activated, which is understood metaphorically as a possession 
scenario. This chain of events, dissected into separate schemas here, is 
conceptualized as one large event, which in the minds of speakers is 
not analyzable into the above component schemas. Rather it is a general 
scenario in which an agent obtains a theme in a particular manner.
What should be emphasized here is that in the ultimate aspectual 
calculus, the derived event schema is what one would expect to result 
from the component parts given their aspectual properties. That is, from 
the point of view of Aktionsart, the event expressed in a MOC sentence is 
an accomplishment, a category made up of an activity and a telic comple‑
tion of a goal (or more generally, change of state) that follows the activity. 
These two components, activity and change of state, are present in the 
event structure, where the former is conveyed by the verb root and the 
latter is signaled by the prefix associated with the resultative change of 
location. This complex composition is accommodated by the syntactic 
shape of the construction.
4.16. Sources of MOC Blending
A blending analysis of MOC sentences has to contend with the challenge 
of explaining how the blending in question arose. In the example,
(24) a. Zespół wypogował sobie tytuł mistrza.
b. Band wy ‑pogo’ed itself title champion ‑GEN
c. ‘The band won the chamion title by dancing pogo.’
the interpretation that the band has won the champion title by perform‑
ing a pogo dance is a result of a metaphoric computation operating on 
two conceptual spaces activated by the construction. In one of the two 
spaces, there is directional motion out of a container, and the other space 
contains an event expressed by an activity verb. These two input spaces 
are blended into a space in which the activity is viewed as a manner 
of motion which leads to the successful retrieval of the theme in ques‑
tion. This blending of activity and motion is most likely an extension of 
a more concrete scenario in which objects are retrieved out of containers 
in specific physical manners, as in The mechanic wiggled the hose out of the 
tank. Here, the hose is pulled out of the tank by quick irregular move‑
ments from side to side. However, this prototype of MOC sentences is 
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problematic for a blending analysis in that at first glance, it may not seem 
an example of blending, because wiggling something out of a place does 
not seem to involve combining two scenarios in the mind. After all, only 
one visual scene is involved, and the movement out of the tank appar‑
ently does not require reference to other scenes for analogy. If that is the 
case, how can one account for the blending in most MOC sentences?
However, there is good reason to suspect that in seemingly unitary 
scenes, there is also division into two subspaces. This division is what 
allows the schema to be extended to express situations involving larger‑
 ‑scale retrieval, as in (25).
(25) His stooges whisked the ringleader out of the country.
The meaning of the verb whisk is “to move with a swift light stroke”
and it is primarily a local small ‑scale movement that can be captured 
completely in a single visual field. Now, whisking a person out of the 
country is an operation that takes place over a longer while, normally 
requires a means of transportation, involves covering a great distance, all 
of which resist being apprehended in a single glance the way one can see 
a scene involving whisking a tablecloth from underneath a dish. What 
makes it possible to extend the use of the verb to larger scenes is the 
separability of the manner, abstracting away from the physical dimen‑
sions involved.
While whisking a person out of the country is still a description of 
physical, non ‑metaphorical movement, situations pictured in most MOC 
sentences are those of imaginary motion. The co ‑existence of two separate 
spaces which blend into an imaginary scene is more conspicuous than in 
the wiggling or even the whisking scenario. More physical attributes are 
suspended; not only the scale or dimension are disregarded, but also the 
fact that activities like flirting are not manners of retrieval at all.
4.17. Online Understanding
At this point, I wish to indulge in a slightly speculative excursus on 
the presence and influence of metaphoric thinking in ordinary use of 
figurative language. The above would be more convincing if it could be 
demonstrated that interpreting descriptions of obtainment involves an 
online understanding of the metaphoric elements present in the blend. 
Do speakers and hearers evoke, consciously or unconsciously, metaphori‑
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cal mappings while processing MOC sentences? This question is part of 
a more general debate about whether conventionalized metaphors induce 
metaphoric imagery. The issue is addressed by the following four main 
hypotheses representing various degrees of the interaction between 
metaphoric thought and language processing (Gibbs, 1994).
H1. Metaphoric thought plays some role in the historical evolution of 
what words and expressions mean.
H2. Metaphoric thought motivates the linguistic meanings that have 
currency within linguistic communities, or is presumed to have some 
role in people’s understanding of language.
H3. Metaphoric thought motivates an individual speaker’s use and un‑
derstanding of why various words and expressions mean what they do.
H4. Metaphoric thought functions in people’s immediate on ‑line use 
and understanding of linguistic everyday speech and literature that 
refer to love meaning.
Of the four, Hypothesis (1) is almost certainly the least controversial, 
while Hypothesis (4) is the strongest and most contentious one. It would 
seem that routinized uses of even transparently graphic expressions may 
bypass reliance on metaphoric links. That this might be the case is sug‑
gested by pre ‑Lakoffian intuitions about stale metaphoric expressions, 
intuitions easily inferable from the label “dead metaphors.” Although 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) contended with this the traditional view, 
claiming that “dead metaphor” is a misleading name, it is quite possible 
that people do limit themselves to associating an expression directly with 
its most frequent meaning and use, rather than its deeper metaphoric 
logic. If conventionalized metaphoric expressions such as wind down do 
not have the potential to surprise as strongly as novel expressions, there 
should be no reason to maintain that their metaphoric logic is attended to 
consciously any more than we should insist that speakers keep track of 
etymologies of the words they use.
Furthermore, it is a well ‑known fact that speakers often do not really 
understand the logic of metaphoric expressions, as is clear from many 
awkward uses like We stood over an abyss, but we took a great step forward.3 
Here, the expression take a step forward is taken to mean simply ‘do some‑
thing decisive and positive,’ with little reflection given to its metaphoric 
details that clash with those of stand over an abyss. Finally, some skepti‑
cism should be justified on plausibility grounds: if hearers were to focus 
on all details suggested by the form of an expression, they would miss 
3 Attributed to a Polish communist leader Władysław Gomułka.
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the content. Some information must be filtered out. However, it would 
be naive and exaggerated to insist that metaphoric mappings be exposed 
fully to conscious experience for metaphor to have any significance in 
the interpretation of metaphoric expressions. It would still be perfectly 
justified to postulate the participation of metaphoric thought in decod‑
ing conventional expressions even if metaphor processing is opaque to 
awareness most of the time. To use an analogy from outside semantics, 
processing the exact frequencies of phonemes is most certainly never 
a conscious operation, but this is hardly a problem for phonologists talk‑
ing about the role of phonemes in the phonology of a language and their 
contrastive behavior in speech perception. The possibility of unconscious 
reference to metaphoric mappings is given support by experimental data, 
such as the results of a psycholinguistic study by Gibbs and others (1997).4 
But the authors of this study caution that their results do “not mean that 
pre ‑existing metaphorical concepts are automatically accessed each time 
an idiom is encountered in discourse” (original emphasis). The authors 
suggest that despite there being an option of quick access to conceptual 
metaphor during the processing of idioms, people do not necessarily rely 
on conceptual metaphor for the comprehension of familiar idioms.
If these reflections can be related to MOC sentences, it might be con‑
cluded that in the cases of lexicalized verbs like the German erkämpfen and 
Polish wyczytać (‘find out by reading’), access to metaphor is not necessary 
and is perhaps skipped most of the time. But the construction provides 
a mold for the uses of new verbs in surprising metaphoric configurations, 
comparable to collocational pairings as in The poet fornicated his way into 
an early grave or E.T. BMX’d his way into our hearts. New combinations of 
the meaning of retrieval with a peculiar manner thus almost guarantees 
the element of surprise which is helpful in attracting hearers’ attention 
and directing it at the underlying metaphoric logic. The same is true of 
similar constructions in English, such as the x’s way construction.
One problem with the metaphor in this grammatical construction is 
that it is not as transparent as metaphoric expressions like blow a fuse, 
4 In the experiment, subjects were asked to read short narratives containing me‑
taphoric expressions. After the reading task, a lexical decision task followed, where the 
subjects were shown letter strings and had to to decide whether or not these strings 
were real words. The assumption was that if interpreting an idiomatic expression 
activated its metaphoric mapping, then the activation of the metaphor should leave 
traces in the form of priming those words whose meanings are associated with the 
main topic of the metaphor. Thus, if the expression blow one’s stack activates the AN‑
GER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, then words like heat should be
recognized faster than non ‑related words like lead, which is what the authors of the 
study observed.
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come to fruition, or wind down. If at all, online understanding takes place 
unconsciously at best.
4.18. Emergence of the Mappings
The psychological literature of the past few decades has been concerned 
with theorizing about how concepts emerge in a child’s mind. A common 
trend has been to assume that formation of abstract concepts is based on 
the bodily interaction with and perception of physical phenomena. For 
example, Michotte (1963) focused on the development of the concept of 
caused motion in children and argued that infants understand caused 
motion as “ampliation of motion,” where the term “ampliation” refers 
to the transfer of motion from one moving object to another one that it 
sets in motion. Later, Leslie (1982) speculated that the concept of causa‑
tion originates from the perception of caused motion, and pointed out 
that children can tell causal from non ‑causal events and are sensitive to 
reversals of agency in causal events.
The concepts of obtainment and creation should be derivable in 
a similar fashion. They are metaphoric extensions of the concept of 
caused motion, and as such they should be grounded in experiences 
that take place early in child development. Lakoff and Johnson’s analy‑
sis of the concept of creation as being grounded in the experience of 
birth is an attempt to identify a possible origin of this concept. Part of 
the appeal of birth as the grounding of the MAKING metaphor is that, 
according to Lakoff and Johnson, birth is as fundamental a human 
experience as it is humanly possible. “In birth, an object (the baby) 
comes out of a container (the mother). At the same time, the mother’s 
substance (her flesh and blood) are in the baby (the container object)” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 74). Thus, this experience serves as a model 
for framing instances of creation as acts of retrieval of objects out of 
a container.
While birth as the source of the metaphor of creation is a compel‑
ling proposal, it is not an entirely adequate account. The experience of 
birth is not a plausible model for the abstract concept of creation because 
birth is not consciously witnessed or grasped by children until well after 
the concept of creation has developed. Further, birth is no doubt a very 
fundamental human experience, but conceptually, it is not a simple event. 
Finally, to aid consolidation of the concept under formation, birth would 
need to be a repeated event.
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In light of the inadequacy of the birth ‑grounding view, it seems 
justified to embark on a slightly speculative excursus to develop an al‑
ternate account of how the concept of obtainment might be grounded in 
experience. It is much more likely that the concept of creation emerges 
in the first few days or weeks of life. We can assume that the first stages 
of concept formation must begin as soon as the baby begins to interact 
with the surroundings, as it is rather difficult to entertain the alternative 
view that the baby postpones the sorting out of perceptual input, while 
the first few weeks of life are marked by a complete indifference to the 
incoming stimuli. The child almost certainly attempts to recognize and 
make sense of observed images as soon as it catches sight of them. 
This process occurs under special visual conditions. One important 
factor that surely must affect concept formation is the fact that neonates 
are very shortsighted. In the first days of life, they can only see objects 
within 12—17 centimeters of the face (Blythe, 2005, p. 565). This radius 
extends with time, but the fact remains that during the formative period, 
the child finds its visual field enclosed within a small area. Objects ap‑
pearing in front of a baby are seen as entering from the outside, crossing 
a boundary between a child’s visual field and the invisible sphere. This is 
probably the first time when the child associates visibility with existence, 
coming into the visual field with appearance (cf. come into existence). It 
should be noted that newborns are capable of holding objects and bring‑
ing them close to themselves,5 which makes it possible for them to bring 
objects from outside their visual field, and causing something to appear 
is conceptualized as creating it. Put another way, coming close to the ob‑
tainer is for all practical purposes tantamount to coming into existence. 
This is reflected in the syntactic pattern for obtainment found in Slovene 
(“Janez si je prismučal pokal” from section 4.14). Recall also from section 
(4.8) that in some languages this pattern is a primary way of expressing 
possession. In Nama (Central Khoisan), the English sentence The man has 
the car would be conveyed literally as ‘The man has taken the car.’
The pattern found in the MOC may develop when a child’s visual 
field extends enough to perceive many objects at once, and the boundary 
between the visible and invisible is no longer defined by its sight scope, 
but the boundaries of objects. Thus, the invisible is now inside objects—
containers with their contents hidden inside. Observing objects emerge 
from inside containers is nothing short of witnessing those previously 
invisible objects come into existence in front of a child, within the sphere 
of her attention and maneuverability. Without doubt, such a situation is 
5 This is possible thanks to the palmar grasp reflex, which is in place within hours 
or days of birth (Gramsbergen, 2005).
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arresting enough for the child to recognize it as a major event type worth 
filing away and making available for processing and associating with 
other concepts. The association in question would be equating proxim‑
ity with possession. This might seem dubious, as there is a huge leap 
between seeing an object nearby and having it, but children are known 
to have a tendency to claim and dispute the possession of newly found 
things like toys, puppies or candy. This might be seen as an instance of 
a not yet fully developed understanding of possession, but it is similar 
to how possession is asserted: possessive pronouns are used with words 
whose referents do not necessarily have to belong to the person by the 
possessive pronoun (my seat, your pencil). This is the first step toward 
what seems like a significant event for a child, sufficiently significant to 
structure that child’s understanding.
There are further syntactic clues lending credence to the above view. 
Szabolcsi (1986) views creation/coming into being verbs as having an 
‘exist’ component in their meanings; that is, the event schema associated 
with creation contains within it a more basic schema associated with 
being. Kiss (2007) adds verbs of obtainment to this class and shows that 
all these verbs take what she calls an ‘incremental theme’, characterized 
by the change from non ‑existence to existence. From the syntactic point of 
view of telicity, emergence is appearance, because the predicate CREATE 
has the event structure of CAUSE to APPEAR:
[CREATE [y]] [[ x ACT] CAUSE [APPEAR [y]]]
The concepts (and consequently the event schemas) of appearance and 
creation are thus closely related and are among the most basic concepts 
that have to develop early on in life, when sensorimotor constraints 
determine their metaphoric nature and grounding such that creation is 
understood as bringing something close to self or pulling it out of a con‑
tainer. Further, it could be ventured that children probably develop them 
either in parallel or in close succession.
A potential criticism of the above view could be that it is implausi‑
ble that the formation of such concepts could occur so soon in infancy. 
However, although there is some disagreement as to when and what 
kind of concepts are formed first, some researchers argue that a lot 
more conceptualization occurs in infancy than is generally assumed. For 
example, Mandler (1999, p. 365) claims that “the first year of life is far 
from being an exclusively sensorimotor stage.” Before language starts, 
concepts such as “action,” “location,” “agent,” or “possession” must be in 
place (Maratsos, 1983).
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4.19. The “Common Sense” Misconception
The interaction of the schemas should not be taken for granted. The inter‑
pretation of the construction requires a fairly improbable pairing of the 
moving schema with the doing schema which in tandem are understood 
to lead to a resulting conceptualization of a locational schema.
There is no inherent logical connection between the schemas of 
moving and doing. These are not associated as closely as moving and 
manner, as in I zigzagged out of the bar. Even in a literal reading of physical 
movement, there is no way in which crying can promote movement; it is 
at best a coincidental co ‑event. Within Talmy’s classification of co ‑event 
types (Figure 6), the case at hand is an example of the concomitance rela‑
tion similar to uses such as The car screeched by, where the screeching is 
a characteristic of secondary relevance to motion. Such patterns are not 
unheard of, but not as ordinary as they might appear. And it is certainly 
not the case that their pairing is a matter of extra ‑linguistic logical neces‑
sity. Such strange bedfellow schemas are paired only in languages that 
provide special ‑purpose patterns.
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Figure 6. Path conflated in the motion verb (adapted from Talmy 2000b, p. 28)
As Talmy notes, to a speaker of a language like English, such sentences 
may seem so straightforward that they offer little to ponder. How else 
might such propositions be colloquially expressed? But, of course, there 
are languages (e.g. Romance languages) with very different patterns of 
expression (Talmy, 2000b, p. 29), where conflation does not occur even 
between related sub ‑events, let alone incongruous ones.
It is easy to argue that common sense dictates the interpretation 
carried by MOC sentences. For example, it can be claimed that the pray‑
ing farmers scenario is easily understood thanks to our understanding 
of how the world works. In other words, common sense is brought into 
play when selecting the most plausible interpretation of a sentence based 
on an unusual construction. Under this view, when faced with a sentence 
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like [praying farmers], most users will probably follow relevance theoretic‑
 ‑style reasoning and conclude that the sentence must mean something 
like ‘the farmers prayed for the rain, so they got it.’ This is an illusion of 
ease made possible by the conventionality of the construction. In real‑
ity, the construction does not yield itself to commonsensical deduction 
like this if it attempted in a language which does not have it. When 
presented with a word for word translation of the sentence (Os agri‑
cultores rezaram a chuva), speakers of Portuguese are confused by what
the intended meaning might be. Typically, the first guess is that the sen‑
tence means ‘The farmers prayed for the rain,’ a purpose clause without 
the preposition pela (‘for’). It is a great leap from purpose or intention to 
result.
4.20. Gapping
Apart from the overt elements of its form and meaning, the MOC is also 
defined by those elements that are obligatorily absent in its constitution. 
This section discusses the gapping (omission) of the source argument in 
the form of the construction and of the counterfactual scenario implied 
in its meaning.
4.20.1. Complement blocking
The system of formal syntactic structure and the system of semantic 
structure correspond to each other but each has its own independent 
structuring patterns (Talmy, 2000a, p. 265). A participant that is present 
in the semantic content representation of a sentence may not necessarily 
be encoded overtly.
As Talmy demonstrates, not all participants are obligatory comple‑
ments. Some are optional, and some can even be gapped (blocked en‑
tirely). Such is the case of seller participants in sentences containing the 
verb spend. This verb exhibits an interesting selection pattern, because 
it activates a whole commercial transaction event frame, where a seller 
is obligatorily present in its semantic representation, but gapped in the 
syntactic structure and cannot appear in sentences like I spent $10 on the 
CD (*to the salesclerk).
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One criterion for gapping proposed by Talmy is the scope of per‑
ception (p. 266). In sentences expressing events of physical motion, one 
can choose to omit mention of the source argument, especially if it 
can easily be inferred and is less relevant than other elements of the sce‑
nario. In the two sentences below, the source can be omitted on limited 
scope of perception grounds. Recall that according to the goal ‑over ‑source 
principle, the source argument is presupposed, and thus often does not 
need to be mentioned, and is therefore underrepresented with respect 
to the goal.
(26) a. I yanked the plug out [of a socket].
b. I took the garbage out [of the house].
But while in physical motion sentences the source is an optional com‑
plement, in the MOC construction, the source argument is gapped alto‑
gether. Thus, one cannot say (26c—d):
(26) c. Wymodlili (?z nieba) dziecko.
(They) wy ‑prayed (from heaven) a child.
d. Wyśpiewali (*z jury) nagrodę.6
(They) wy ‑sang (from the jury) a prize.
It can be speculated that the conceptual shift from the physical motion 
schema to its metaphoric motion counterpart found in the MOC construc‑
tion induces a shift of status of the source argument from an optional 
complement to a blocked complement. The motivation behind the shift is 
probably a matter of pure discourse salience: The focus is obligatorily on 
obtainment and possession (final windowing) rather than on where the 
obtained theme was originally located. This is probably a consequence of 
the goal ‑over ‑source principle (section 4.2.4).
Also, in the case of real physical retrieval, the source is at least po‑
tentially visible, whereas retrieval out of a metaphoric container makes it 
hard to be specific about what that container is. The construction makes 
it a convenience not to have to mention the nebulous source, which is 
elusive and hard to name. A similar example of a construction where the 
6 Bogusław Bierwiaczonek pointed out that in some uses the source can be mention‑
ed, or is indeed obligatory. For example, in Wycisnęła z niego prawdę (‘She squeezed the 
truth out of him’). However, this is not a true MOC sentence, but a generic motion con‑
struction found in English (as is evident from the translation in parentheses). Therefore, 
the example can be thought of as a metaphoric expression of physical motion (compar‑ 
able to 26a—b), where the truth is imagined as if being squeezed out of somebody. In 
such cases, the source can be mentioned.
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logic of “omission for convenience” is at work is the Implicit Theme Con‑
struction (Goldberg, 1995; 2006), which allows the user to skip mention 
of the bodily fluids for reasons of politeness (as in Don’t spit into the wind, 
without making overt mention of saliva). In the Implicit Theme Construc‑
tion, the theme is most often omitted, being stylistically awkward:
(27) I bled (*blood) on my shirt.
Gapping is not to be confused with simple omission. The latter involves 
withholding information that is not otherwise available or inferable. In 
the case of gapping, information is blocked, but it is easy to recover the 
missing elements based on one’s knowledge of a given semantic frame. 
For example, a sentence like I spent $10 on the CD automatically evokes the 
commercial transaction frame, which includes a seller. Consequently, the 
seller, even if unnamed, will be in the background. Skipping mention of 
the seller does not conceal his or her presence and it is very different from 
distorting or burying facts that would otherwise be less obvious, such as 
by failing to mention that, say, the $10 in question was a counterfeit bill.
4.20.2. Gapping of counterfactual events
Counterfactual imagination is the ability to entertain alternate outcomes 
of actual situations. Experiencing, pondering or expressing a real life 
event often gives rise to thoughts about how that event could have turned 
out differently or not taken place at all. This is a universal and pervasive 
ability that humans put to use effortlessly and often involuntarily.
4.20.3. Situational triggers of counterfactuals
The rich psychological literature on counterfactual thinking offers one 
observation relevant to the construction under consideration, namely 
that counterfactual thought is triggered by unusual events (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1982; Byrne, 2005). People tend to mentally alter improbable 
events to imagine their more normal versions. Counterfactual thought 
in the opposite direction is possible, but not nearly as common or auto‑
matic. Although desert ‑island speculations, or visualizations of any other 
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fantastic scenario opposed to ordinary life, are a familiar motif, they are 
not flirted with as frequently or spontaneously as mental enactments 
triggered by near ‑misses, freak accidents or any other startling events. 
If a fortunate obtainment of a desired goal is also an event justifying 
the contemplation of other likely upshots, then counterfactual thinking 
might well be a subroutine activated for interpreting MOC descriptions.
Counterfactual thought is more than just an echo of processing an 
actual event. Counterfactual scenarios of real situations are not termini 
of the train of thought beyond which it does not progress. As such 
they would be mere decorative additions to thought, or even pointless 
distractions. It makes more sense to suspect that they serve a particular 
purpose. In the psychological literature (Roese & Olson, 1997; Byrne, 
2005), it is hypothesized that counterfactual thoughts serve as a means of 
evaluating an actual situation, its benefits, drawbacks, risks, as well as its 
probability. There is therefore a feedback loop between reasoning about 
a factual event and setting up its counterfactual foil.
4.20.4. Linguistic triggers of counterfactuals
The above ‑mentioned concerns intrinsic characteristics of the events 
themselves that induce counterfactual imagination. But the likelihood of 
counterfactual scenarios being entertained by an observer may also be 
heightened by means of how an event in question is expressed. It has 
been observed that expression of positive and negative factual scenarios 
is characterized by an asymmetry in that positive scenarios are a basic 
default constructed both in the case positive and negative factuals. 
Negation is understood as an unrealized positive; the interpretation of 
a negative occurs by activating its corresponding positive counterfactual 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, pp. 230—247). But does this mean that assert‑
ing a positive does not activate its negative counterfactual?
Talmy suggests that almost any construction other than a simple 
positive declarative clause will prompt a hearer to visualize a situation 
counterfactual to the actual utterance. “Among sentence types, perhaps 
mainly it is a simple positive factual declarative clause (e.g., I went to 
the movies last night) that raise in consciousness only the named event 
without the backgrounded accompaniment of its unrealized alternative” 
(Talmy, 2000a, p. 292). But although simple positive sentences do not 
implicate their negative counterfactuals, interpreting complex sentences 
may involve invoking a negative as a foil for comparison, as in (28).
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(28) I went to the movies yesterday because they were playing my favo‑
rite film.
Any mention of the reason for going evokes the unrealized counterpart 
of the event, since it is understood that in the absence of that reason, the 
event would not have occurred. That counterfactual does not normally 
surface as an overt expression like “or otherwise I wouldn’t have gone.” 
Although it is possible and perfectly natural to add it as an afterthought, 
counterfactual descriptions like this are implicatures that do not need to 
be asserted openly. Instead, they are routinely gapped.
A similar reasoning can be applied to MOC scenarios. Sentences like 
(29) can be paraphrased in a parallel way as (30).
(29) Wyśpiewała nagrodę.
She wy ‑sang award.
‘She won an award by singing well.’
(30) She managed to win the award [sub ‑event because she tried hard, by 
singing very well].
In other words, it is only thanks to the reason asserted in the subordinate 
clause that the event in the main clause occurred. Because MOC sentences 
name a special manner which is understood as a prerequisite for the oc‑
currence of the event, it seems likely that at least most MOC factuals 
are expressed against a conceptual background of non ‑occurrence. The 
reason why I am introducing the above qualification rather than insisting 
that all MOC sentences evoke foils of unrealized obtainment is that it is 
easy to think of examples of mundane obtainment which could also be 
expressed by means of conflated sub ‑events, such as (31).
(31) Wyssałem ostrygi z muszli.
I wy ‑sucked oysters out of the shells.
‘I sucked oysters out of the shells.’
(32) Wir haben uns Öl erbohrt.
We have ourselves oil er ‑drilled.
‘We drilled out oil.’ (Talmy, 2000, p. 242, ex. 10c)
These MOC examples express fairly ordinary instances of obtainment 
through predictable means that perhaps do not suggest any special 
difficulty or uncertainty of outcome, and as such may not necessarily 
induce a hearer to imagine unrealized scenarios. However, it should be 
pointed out that (31—32) are not typical MOC sentences, but rather non‑
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 ‑metaphoric conflations of manner and real physical motion. While true 
MOC sentences are hard to translate literally into English, the sentences 
in (31—32) can easily be rendered in English using the same pattern as is 
found in manner motion event integration sentences like I shoved the chair 
out of the way or He slammed the ball into the basket. To use mental space ter‑
minology, these examples are based on single ‑scope integration of inputs 
representing the same topologies. The manners mentioned (sucking or 
drilling) are manners that can be associated with retrieval.7
Now, in true MOC sentences like (26), the manner is conceptually 
more detached from the event of retrieval. Because MOC ‑proper sentences 
involve double ‑scope integration of incompatible inputs (as described in 
section 5), one must engage in metaphoric reasoning to imagine sing‑
ing as causing an award to move out of a container. It is perhaps this 
unconventional fusion of mismatching sub ‑events that alerts a hearer to 
the unusual nature of an event being discussed, and thus helps activate 
a counterfactual background for that event.
4.20.5. The role of counterfactuals in the MOC
It is also worth considering exactly what role counterfactual scenarios 
play in expressing MOC events. It is my claim that an unrealized scenario 
is an ingredient of the meaning of MOC sentences, and its function is to 
facilitate reasoning about the event that did take place. Gapped counter‑
factuals impose themselves as a background to the conceptual panorama 
of our reasoning when their likelihood was high or if they were almost 
bound to happen. Thus, considering MOC ‑sentence events against high‑
 ‑likelihood counterfactuals is a way of putting these accomplished events 
in perspective and understanding better their likelihood of success. With‑
out that comparison, estimating the likelihood of MOC events would be 
mathematically unfeasible. Against the counterfactual background, MOC 
events are depicted as improbable developments which took place almost 
against all odds, and it is appreciated that their realization is a rare feat.
7 Additionally, it can be observed that these sentences are paraphrasable without 
a because subordinate clause (e.g., We extracted oil because we drilled). Their paraphrases 
sound more natural with by prepositional phrases (We extracted oil by drilling. I remov‑
ed the oyster by sucking.) This seems to be a typical characteristic of literal physical
motion sentences pointing to the run ‑of ‑the ‑mill nature of manners employed in 
obtaining a particular result that such sentences describe. Peculiar manners would 
intuitively call for a circumlocutional paraphrase in a separate clause.
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4.21. Obtainment Through Retrieval in English
Although English does not seem to feature an obtainment construction 
parallel in form and function to the German and Polish pattern, the 
present analysis should also include mention of an example of expres‑
sions of production events based on the container schema. Rudzka ‑Ostyn 
(1988) provides numerous instances of a fairly productive pattern in Eng‑
lish, where retrieval out of a container serves as a metaphoric basis for 
conceptualizing communication events:
(33) a. She was so shocked that she could hardly bring out a word.
b. At last the prisoner faltered out his story.
c. In spite of his fear, he jerked out his request.
d. Mary flung out a curt remark and left. (Rudzka ‑Ostyn, 1988,
p. 523)
e. I didn’t mean to tell you his name, it just slipped out. (Rudzka‑
 ‑Ostyn, 1988, p. 525)
f.  …he could not have dealt out his venomous snaps more indiscrimi‑
nately. (Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, The Indian in His Wigwam)
As the examples above illustrate, verbal expression scenes can often be 
expressed by a range of verbs followed by the particle out, a clear refer‑
ence to the retrieval scenario, which Rudzka ‑Ostyn explains as follows:
In Western cultures, a person’s body or his mind can be seen as 
a container, and one’s feelings, thoughts, ideas as entities which fill the 
container. Expressing (verbally) one’s feelings is very much like taking 
money out of one’s pocket. In both cases, the moving object which is in‑
side the container (one’s pockets, one’s mind) moves out of it and can 
therefore be linked to one and the same image. (Rudzka ‑Ostyn, 2003, 
p. 21)
The naturalness of the above ‑mentioned uses is ensured by their align‑
ment with the logic of the Conduit Metaphor (Reddy, 1993), which frames 
thoughts and their linguistic expressions as being transferred via an 
imaginary conduit. As Reddy puts it, “communication transfers thought 
processes somehow bodily” (p. 166), and he provides dozens of estab‑
lished expressions that follow the conduit pattern (e.g. Your concepts come 
across beautifully). Here, in examples (33a—f), the source of communication 
is viewed as a container out of which information must first be retrieved 
before it is relayed on to the recipient.
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4.22. Event Schemas in the Time Away Construction
What follows is a description of the English time ‑away construction (dis‑
cussed in section 3.8), whose semantic contribution seems to be the op‑
posite of that of the MOC construction. The discussion here will serve to 
demonstrate that the meaning pattern in this construction too is a result 
of the interaction of event schemas.
The emergence of grammatical items is a consequence of event 
schemas which motivate certain syntactic patterns crystalizing out of 
reanalyzed expressions. Indeed, reanalyses become grammaticalized, 
because grammatical interpretations suggest themselves irresistibly by 
sheer force of their innate naturalness. Reanalyses are so intuitive and 
effortless that a speaker can’t help but entertain them, and differently 
from lexical items, this happens without the speaker’s awareness that 
a reanalysis is underway. For example, one can see a pattern in the time 
away construction, which most likely started out as a concrete scenario, 
originating from expressions like throw something away. Thus, the event 
schema instantiated by the phrase V theme away gave rise to uses such 
as twist the night away, laugh the class away.
The uses in question are anchored around the “riddance” mean‑
ing of the particle away, which often appears with many verbs such as 
throw, chuck, hurl, cast, sweep, give, turn, drive, send, brush or fritter away. 
Each of these verbs can take a concrete theme object, as in fritter away 
one’s fortune, or sweep sweat away. It is not surprising that such meanings 
lend themselves to metaphoric visualizations, where the theme affected 
in the event is not concrete. This is especially natural given the TIME 
IS MONEY metaphor, where time is treated like valuable things that 
can be wasted, gamed, frittered, wantoned, or gambled away. Verbs that can 
take both concrete and metaphoric themes include examples like the 
following.
(34) game away, piss away, banish away (sorrow/depression/dark mo‑
ments), throw (e.g. one’s life) away, fritter away (one’s time), waste
away (the summer, etc.), fool away, wanton away, gamble away, dwindle 
away.
Most verbs in (34) are found in both concrete and metaphoric uses are 
attested (examples 35a and b, respectively).
(35) a. Then, confound it, we’ve fooled away all this work for nothing. 
(Mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, 1876)
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b. Elzey came in to look on, and we fooled away the time talking 
till I forgot how late it was. (Eliza Frances Andrews, The War ‑Time 
Journal of a Georgia Girl, 1864—1865)
c. I’m trying to drink away the part of the day/that I cannot sleep 
away. (Modest Mouse, Polar Opposites)
The number of uses of ‘riddance’ verbs with metaphoric themes is enor‑
mous, including abstractions like sorrow, depression, dreams, reputation 
and the like; for obvious reasons of space, I am not going to list exam‑
ples here. However, what merits attention is that expressions to do with 
time form a large, semantically consistent set. Object NPs like the whole 
afternoon, one’s life, youth, and countless others make collocations with 
‘riddance’ verbs into a productive pattern (Table 7):
Table 7. Lose ‑time collocations
fool
gamble
game
piss
squander
throw
trifle
waste
wanton
an entire afternoon
his life
his whole youth
every single day of his life
three weeks
etc.
away
This pattern is additionally reinforced by time ‑only verbs like dally,
tick, dawdle, loiter, dally, and pass, which are normally found in uses
such as:
(36) a. Ticking away the moments that make up a dull day. (Pink Floyd, 
Time)
b. Never, talk with any man, or undertake any trifling employment, 
merely to pass the time away. (Jeremy Taylor, The Rule and Exerci‑
ses of Holy Living. 1813)
Collocations shown in Table 7 and example (36) are used frequently 
enough to be noted as a pattern with clear and predictable semantics, 
where the particle away marks disappearance as a result of an action 
whose manner is specified by the verb. It could further be speculated that 
the critical mass of possible verbs has accumulated to open the floodgates 
for verbs that do not in themselves convey the idea of riddance, but con‑
vey what can be construed as manners of riddance: frivol, prattle, laugh, 
dance, kiss, etc. Thus, what was initially a handful of collocations grew to 
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be a productive construction. It is safe to assume that the above account 
is indeed how events progressed, given what kinds of verbs are found in 
texts throughout the centuries. In the 1500s, only verbs of riddance are 
attested, as in (37).
(37) From day to day thus wastes my life away. (Thomas Wyatt, Songs and 
Epigrams, 1542)
Uses with other manner verbs do not emerge until the 18th century:
(38) Restless, he rolls and groans the night away. (Francis Fawkes, The 
Argonautics of Apollonius Rhodius, 1780)
These uses crystallize into a construction thanks to the grammatical 
nature of the meanings encapsulated. Both the concept of time and, as 
is argued in section 4.3, the resultative element of disappearance/loss are 
grammatical ‑enough meanings to be featured in a construction. The form 
of the time away construction itself condenses a common event schema 
where a participant loses possession of a theme (Table 8). Specifically, in 
the constructional sub ‑event, the complex predicate “lose possession of” 
is realized as CAUSE AWAY, where CAUSE is a general deep verb which 
surfaces as either throw, send, get, etc. This constructional sub ‑event then 
imposes a structure onto the verbal sub ‑event, yielding the construction 
form known as the time away construction.8
Table 8. Integration of sub ‑events
constructional sub‑event: CAUSE AWAY theme 
verbal sub ‑event: dance [AWAY theme ]
Indeed, it could be ventured that it is the alignment of the constructional 
sub ‑event and the event schema that is responsible for the gradual 
emergence of the construction. It is as if language users note that the 
grammatical meaning associated with the LOSS event schema “shines 
through” the form of the construction:
8 This approach to deriving constructional patterns is adopted from Goldberg
& Jackendoff 2004, where the idea is expressed as:
The semantic argument structure of the constructional subevent determines the syn‑
tactic argument structure of the sentence by general principles of argument linking. 
(Goldberg & Jackendoff 2004, point 15)
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Table 9. Association of the LOSS event schema with the constru‑
ction
event schema: LOSE POSSESSION OF theme
constructional sub ‑event: CAUSE AWAY theme
verbal sub ‑event: dance [AWAY theme]
This is of course a recurring theme in many grammaticization scenarios. 
Many uses are necessary for speakers to note a productive pattern as‑
sociated with a grammatical meaning. This is illustrated by the case of 
the future ‑reference function of the verb go in English and in Polish. The 
story of the English grammaticization path is familiar enough. Having 
started out as a lexical word expressing change of location, the verb 
acquired a grammatical function of marking a future plan/reference in 
the progressive aspect. The logic behind this change is fairly transparent. 
Moving somewhere with a specific intention to be carried out in the 
immediate future is easy to be reanalyzed as an intention only. Hopper 
and Traugott (2003, p. 93) show that initially going to was used in contexts, 
where actual physical movement occurred with the purpose of carrying 
out an action in the immediate future. Others accounted for the evolution 
in terms of metaphoric transfer from ‘moving on in space’ to ‘moving on 
in time’ (Sweetser, 1988).
So why did the same not happen in Polish? (Even more puzzlingly, no 
shift occurred in German, a language that “is in possession of all neces‑
sary lexical ingredients and in close contact with languages with go based 
future” (Eckardt, 2006, p. 95). A quick look at uses of the verb iść (‘go’) 
confirms that all it conveys is physical movement, and not a grammatical 
reference to the future. However, it is possible to find seeds of potential 
grammaticization. The sentence Idę spać (‘I’m going to sleep’) can be ut‑
tered by a person who is in bed already and will not take a single step in 
any direction. Does this mean that Polish too will develop a periphrastic 
future construction at some point in the future? Probably not. What 
seems to be happening here is that the Polish ‘go’ here expresses planned 
movement from awake to asleep. For this to become a productive pattern, 
Polish would need more expressions featuring the verb go conveying 
metaphoric motion. One can imagine that if many different expressions 
of the form go ‑V with a metaphoric motion meaning were used, at some 
point the verb go would be reanalyzed from metaphoric motion to plan 
of metaphoric motion to just plan, which in grammatical terms would be 
interpreted as future reference.
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4.23. Concluding Remarks
The meaning of the MOC is well within what can be expected of a closed‑
 ‑class form. Obtainment can be understood as an element of transfer of 
possession, a meaning associated with constructions such as the Double 
Object Construction or the Dative Construction. Furthermore, it is related 
to a host of grammatical forms serving to convey possessive relations. 
Thus, the meaning does not go beyond what is normally found in closed‑
 ‑class forms.
Also in terms of the internal composition of the meaning, little is 
extraordinary. Although it involves conflating incongruous sub ‑events, 
it does not in any way override or defy the aspectual logic of blending 
event schemas.
Counterfactual scenarios may be among grammatical means on a par 
with mood categories, which are standard grammatical instruments for 
framing propositional content as either conditional, hypothetical, inter‑
rogative, negative, etc. Indeed, negation involves counterfactual process‑
ing in that it brings to mind an event that did not happen. As such, 
they are not independent meanings, but rather pointers that instruct the 
listener on how to approach the proposition.
5. Way Too Much Meaning: 
The Semantics of the Way Construction
5.1. Introduction
Like in the preceding sections, here too I will challenge the proposal of 
CxG that all constructions should be treated as being equally capable of 
carrying semantic and pragmatic meaning. The specific objective of this 
section will be to dispute the idea that constructions “conventionally as‑
sociate special pragmatic forces or effects with specific morpho ‑syntactic 
structures” (Kay, 1995, p. 171). Kay’s position on pragmatic effects is, like 
many other cognitive claims, a departure from conventional wisdom. He 
argues that these “pragmatic forces or effects resulting from utterances 
of such expressions are conveyed according to conventions of language 
rather than by a process of conversational reasoning and so must be 
accounted for by the grammar.” If this is correct, semantic enrichments 
usually involve admitting pragmatic effects as part of the meanings of 
schematic patterns grammatical constructions.
This pronouncement represents a complete shift in identifying the 
source of pragmatic effects. Traditionally, it has been assumed that impli‑
catures derive from extra ‑linguistic conversational dynamics, and Kay’s 
proposal is to attribute them to linguistic convention, an evidently radical 
claim but one certainly worth examining. To appreciate the import and 
implications of this claim, it is necessary to indulge in an excursus on the 
nature of effects invoked by Kay. Given his description, it is justified to 
assume that Kay means conventional implicature. One must recall that 
effects that have a stable association with particular linguistic expressions 
cannot be canceled without anomaly. Linguistically ‑driven pragmatic ef‑
fects are not contingent on context to go through and should therefore 
always be present, regardless of context. For example, the adverb “yet,” 
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as in Kevin hasn’t phoned yet carries with it the implicature of expectation 
that Kevin will call at some point. This use of “yet” always triggers this 
pragmatic effect, heedless of context, and it cannot be cancelled without 
self ‑contradiction or a sense of oddness (? Kevin hasn’t called yet, and I know 
for a fact that he doesn’t plan to.) The problem with the CxG approach is that 
such pragmatic effects are postulated for constructions, where they are 
not always as stable. A case in point here is a meaning widely ascribed to 
the x’s way construction, namely the interpretation of difficulty accompa‑
nying the motion in sentences like We elbowed our way through the crowd. 
The problem with the difficulty reading as an implicature is that it is easy 
to point out examples of uses where that reading does not arise (as in 
Virtually unchallenged, she romped her way to gold). This shows that it cannot 
be a conventional implicature, and this should pretty settle the dispute: 
The remaining pragmatic effects (unfossilized, ‘live’ conversational 
implicatures) are not part of the meaning of a specific expression, and 
cannot therefore be attributed to a construction. This study will therefore 
make a case for two main ideas: namely, pragmatic effects proposed for 
grammatical constructions are not always due to linguistic convention 
nor do they always hold for grammatical constructions as conventional 
implicatures.1
More generally, this study contests the idea that grammatical con‑
structions can convey any kind of meaning whatsoever, even fairly rich 
contentful ones, which are otherwise not normally found in closed ‑set 
items. In the case of x’s way, the widely accepted difficulty reading 
(Goldberg, 1995; Michaelis, 2005; Nakajima, 2005; Jackendoff, 2010) 
can only be a conversational implicature, and not an entailment lexical‑
ized by the construction. Proposals of such unusual meanings are a con‑
sequence of the assumption made in Construction Grammar (and other 
cognitive linguistic models) that the distinction between closed and 
open classes of linguistic forms is of questionable veracity and benefit. 
Acknowledged reluctantly though it is, this distinction has been played 
down. The motivation behind this practice is that ignoring the distinction 
makes it possible for closed ‑class forms, traditionally declared meaning‑
1 To be sure, there is some room for doubt, as it is easier to prove the former than 
the latter. To demonstrate that pragmatic effects are due to factors beyond linguistic 
convention, one would only need to find uses of a construction where those pragmatic 
effects associated with it do not arise. Conversely, demonstrating that they are always 
in the domain of language would require ruling out the possibility of there ever being 
a context where a pragmatic effect observed for a given construction does not appear at 
all. Assuming the absence of such contexts is essentially tantamount to committing the 
fallacy of the argument from ignorance — namely, equating absence of proof with proof 
of absence.
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 ‑free, to be pairings of form and meaning just like any other linguistic 
elements. It is a primary contention of the present analysis that the dis‑
tinction and meaningful closed ‑class forms can be reconciled. That is, the 
key tenet of Construction Grammar that grammatical constructions do 
carry meanings does not call for dismissing the traditional view of sparse 
meanings allowed in constructions and other closed ‑class forms.
5.2. Particulars of the X’s Way
5.2.1. Obtainment senses
The x’s way construction has been a frequent subject in the cognitive 
linguistic literature. Indeed it is perhaps the most studied and best 
understood construction and something of a poster boy of Construction 
Grammar. Its characterization by authors like Goldberg (1995; 2010) and 
Jackendoff (1990; 2010) is thorough and for the most part seems consistent 
with speaker intuitions. However, as should become clear in the fol‑
lowing sections, our understanding of the construction is still far from 
complete. Especially in light of the main theme of the present study, 
which insists on questioning some semantic effects attributed to closed‑
 ‑class forms, some inadequacies in constructionist analyses will become 
evident. I will offer an alternate view accounting for less common uses 
of the construction. Specifically, this part will review examples where the 
x’s way construction serves to express obtainment senses, such as Jane 
gambled her way to a fortune or eat your way to health, where a fortune and 
health have a dual status of goal and possessum, and where the motion 
interpreted metaphorically is an instance of coming to obtain these pos‑
sessum goals.
These uses are interesting for two reasons. First, they differ quite 
markedly from now ‑familiar, indeed rather run ‑of ‑the ‑mill, instances 
such as The robbers made their way back to the car or Camels trek their way 
across the desert, where movement occurs over a physical path. Second, 
more importantly, in more metaphoric examples, there appear verbs that 
some authors consider unacceptable. That is, most notably Goldberg 
(1995) points out that verbs whose meanings are not associable with mo‑
tion (e.g. smile, giggle, sleep) yield uses of marginal acceptability. One of 
the main claims of this analysis is that far from being anomalous, uses 
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of verbs that have nothing to do with motion are more natural than in‑
stances of the construction with verbs lexicalizing a motion path. In fact, 
one of the major claims of the present analysis is that the construction 
features a resultative predicate (to do with the idea of covering a path), 
and as a consequence, it does not allow resultative motion verbs. This 
claim derives from and is an instance of Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s 
(1991) observation that manner and result are elements in complemen‑
tary distribution (which is evidenced by the fact that they cannot both 
be lexicalized within a single verb). When they appear together within 
a clause, the verb usually conveys a manner and the secondary predicate 
supplies a result. One does not find instances where say a result is speci‑
fied twice in the same clause. Thus, cases of acceptable verbs that seem to 
convey both manner and result can be shown to entail manner only and 
to merely implicate path or goal.
5.2.2. Closed ‑class characteristics of the x’s way 
All these claims are predicated on the assumption that the way construc‑
tion is a closed ‑class form. Of course, x’s way is not a perfect gram located 
near the closed ‑class extreme. It does exhibit some properties character‑
istic of lexical items. For example, it is not completely schematic—it does 
contain some pre ‑embedded material. This should not be a problem, be‑
cause so do many other grams like the dative prepositional construction 
(The general gave orders to the troops), which comes with the pre ‑embedded 
preposition to, and is nonetheless a firmly grammatical pattern. More 
seriously, the way construction contains a lexical element (the noun way), 
which places it further away from the grammatical extreme.
Still, the construction bears enough characteristics of closed ‑class 
forms to be considered one too. First, it is an example of a gram that 
has not emerged instantaneously. Unlike typical open ‑class items, which 
benefit from the lexicon’s full openness to additions (a characteristic 
discussed in section 2.3.1), the way construction has taken a long time 
to grammaticize from its early Middle English form described by Israel 
(1996). Initially, it was a loose group of collocations allowing many nouns 
and few verbs. Over the centuries, the collocations have crystallized into 
one modern form with a fixed noun phrase and a flexible verbal slot, 
a product of slow grammaticization pressures. What is important to note 
here is that it would be impossible to coin this construction overnight the 
way lexical items are allowed into the language.
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Secondly, x’s way is clearly dependent on the accompanying lexical 
material for its interpretation, so it is a closed ‑class item by the criteria of 
conceptual autonomy discussed in section 2.3.6. Out of context, a phrase 
like my way may have a range of meanings (‘my route,’ ‘my will/plan,’ 
‘my method,’ ‘my condition’), neither of which is really the reading trig‑
gered by the remaining elements present in the way construction (‘special 
progression/path’). This interpretational dependence of the construction 
is closely related to another of its characteristics, namely the fact that it is 
never used on its own as a stand ‑alone utterance. The way construction 
is not a minimal free form in the sense of Bloomfield (1926), so it acts as 
a closed ‑class form according to the criteria named in section 2.3.11.
The aforementioned two features are correlated with another feature 
of closed ‑class forms that has to do with the kinds of meanings they typi‑
cally convey (described in section 2.3.4). Specifically, closed ‑class forms 
tend to express non ‑propositional meanings or very general frames that 
serve as a conceptual scaffolding for scenes that are then fleshed out by 
lexical meanings (Talmy, 2000a). In our case, the way construction con‑
veys precisely meanings that are both non ‑propositional and schematic 
enough to serve as scaffolding. Briefly, the construction signals that the 
path traversed in the scene is perceived as being different from what 
would be an ordinary path. This point will be discussed in sections 5.9 
and 5.10.
It is also worth pointing out that x’s way is a closed ‑class form on 
one more count, namely non ‑substitutability (2.3.2). While it would be 
possible to substitute the constructional frame of I tiptoed my way to the 
bedroom using a simple motion pattern (only because the verb tiptoe freely 
participates in alternations), this would not be possible with sentences 
like Flagellants suffer their way to wisdom or indeed with many other verbs 
often featured in x’s way (e.g. push, elbow, threaten, sweet ‑talk, etc.)
The preceding characteristics can be taken to assume that x’s way is 
indeed a closed ‑class form and it will be examined here as such. It is in 
this spirit that the following analysis is undertaken. First, a brief review 
of the literature is offered about how the construction has been analyzed 
before. The review will highlight some implausible meanings observed 
by other scholars that are inconsistent with the main theme here, namely 
with the notion that closed ‑class forms (which the construction is a repre‑
sentative of) are unlikely to carry contentful meanings. As part of a more 
general agenda, I use these alleged meanings to make a case for critical 
circumspection about the kinds of meanings a construction like the x’s 
way can convey. This, in turn, should serve to show that it is possible 
and necessary to maintain the distinction between closed and open class 
elements in Construction Grammar.
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As an extra benefit of suspending the strict constructionist view of 
the way construction as an autonomous idiosyncratic entity with its 
own quirks (and as a benefit of reappraising traditional assumptions 
about what is and is not possible in grammar), the construction will be 
shown to be subject to some common, clearly non ‑idiosyncratic linguistic 
constraints. That is, manner and result complementarity will be shown 
to be reflected in the way construction’s resistance to result verbs. It is 
this resistance that is the real cause behind anomalous uses previously 
explained in terms of lacking the difficulty reading. Conversely, the 
preference for manner verbs explains why many uses asterisked as unac‑
ceptable by some researchers are in fact endorsed as quite unproblematic 
by many speakers.
It will also be demonstrated that metaphoric obtainment readings 
reveal interesting properties of the construction that define how it as‑
sembles motion events and paths in these events. These will be shown 
to follow constraints of differing rigidity. That is, the construction will 
be shown to be rather rigid about how it structures paths, disallowing 
blends of inconsistent elements. But at the same time, x’s way behaves 
differently about motion events, which it can build out of disparate, 
indeed incongruous sub ‑events blended together. In other words, the 
construction is very tolerant of inconsistencies in constructing motion 
events out of apples ‑and ‑oranges elements. Still, although the construc‑
tion makes ample use of available event schemas—indeed, its meaning is 
built around them—it does not feature any other elements going beyond 
a spare reading typical of a closed ‑class form.
5.3. The Semantics of the X’s Way
5.3.1. Activity inherent to motion against obstacles
In the broadest strokes, the construction is a specialized syntactic pat‑
tern for expressing motion toward a goal. In the example below, the verb 
(limped) encodes the manner of motion along a path (his way) leading to 
the goal expressed by the prepositional phrase (to the finish line).
(1) Parker limped his way to the finish line in extreme pain.
1575.3. The Semantics of the X’s Way
Three major senses of verbs attested in the x’s way construction have been 
identified in the literature. They include the means (2a) or the manner (2b) 
in which the motion occurs. The distinction is that the means represents 
a method that is at the same time a prerequisite for the motion, while 
a manner does not in itself make the motion possible, but is only a char‑
acteristic by which the motion can be recognized. The “drilling” in (2a) is 
the prime impetus that powers the motion, while the “schlepping” in (2b) 
is merely an externally observable, secondary feature of walking—in this 
scenario, it is not the “schlepping,” but the walking that is seen as giving 
traction to the moving participant. However, the “schlepping” in (2b) can 
still be considered an inherent, perfectly integral element of motion, and 
is not as detached from motion as the incidental activity in (2c). Here, 
the sniveling occurs while the motion is in progress, and it is not even 
a secondary feature of walking. As Goldberg (1995; 1999) and Israel (1996) 
note, the incidental activity use of the x’s way construction is marginal for 
many speakers. Goldberg also remarks that the means interpretation takes 
precedence over the manner interpretation. Also, because this means that 
reading predates the manner by at least four centuries, which proves that 
the latter is an outgrowth of the former. Goldberg concludes that “(t)his 
analysis predicts, for example, that there are no speakers who accept only 
the manner interpretation and not the means interpretation. And to date, 
I have found none” (Goldberg, 1999, p. 34). This conclusion is convincing 
enough, but it does not warrant the view that the manner interpretation 
is in some way deficient. If it is diachronically secondary to the means 
interpretation, it is a new sense under development, and indeed in recent 
years it has been gaining currency, as is clear from examples provided 
further (in point 7), most of which come from fiction works published 
after the year 2000.
(2) a. The workers drilled their way out of the mine.
b. The Canucks schlepped their way to Calgary.
c. We sniveled our way out of the movie theater.
According to Goldberg, the anomaly in (2c) is that an incidental activ‑
ity verb does not portray motion as taking place in the face of difficulty 
or resistance. Goldberg (2010, p. 53) insists that the construction should 
carry the “presupposition that the motion was difficult in some way” and 
that the motion involved “the creation of a path.”
Thus, Goldberg identifies two principal features found in the most 
felicitous uses of the construction. The first is the stipulation that the 
activity expressed by the verb should be closely associated with the mo‑
tion in question, rather than being a nonessential ornamental attachment. 
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Second, it should be possible to imagine the motion as occurring despite 
some hindrance.
Finally, the construction is not to be confused with more literal uses 
of the phrase one’s way, as in I lit my way with a flashlight. Superficially, the 
form of both constructions is identical, but literal uses differ from the way 
construction. First, they foreground the image of a way as a specific route 
a person takes, while the way construction treats the path more schemati‑
cally, focusing more on the motion event. Put another way, the phrase 
way in the construction is a desemanticized equivalent of the way in the 
literal construction. Second, the literal uses are less conventionalized in 
that they allow any genitive phrase, so one can say I lit her way or I lit 
Amy’s way with a candle, while the genitive in the way construction must 
always be co ‑referential with the subject (conf. I groped my/*her/*Amy’s way 
out of the dungeon.) This is a fairly straightforward consequence of the way 
construction being a closed ‑class form whose meaning can be expected 
to be simplified compared to more literal open ‑class forms with more 
contentful semantics.
5.3.2. Aktionsart
The characterization presented in the previous section is largely consist‑
ent with earlier descriptions of the way construction. Jackendoff (1990) 
identified two aspectual constraints on the meaning of the verb. The first 
is that the verb should express what can be construed as a process or 
a bounded repeated event (e.g. crawl, knock, skip). In other words, from the 
point of view of Aktionsart, the construction takes activity and semelfac‑
tive verbs. This means that states, accomplishments and achievements 
(*They existed/drowned/died their way to fame) do not appear in the construc‑
tion, since the kinds of events they express are non ‑repeatable. Jackendoff 
adds one more constraint, the condition that the verb be construed as 
“a process with some kind of internal structure.” This explains why the 
following hypothetical uses are unacceptable.
(3) a. *I paused my way through the phone call.
b. *She sat her way to the end of the conference. 
Additionally, it has been noted that the construction is an unaccusative 
diagnostic, and it only takes unergative and transitive verbs (Levin, 1993, 
p. 99). Uses with unaccusative verbs are unacceptable:
1595.4. Soft Constraints
(4) a. *Some dividend and interest have accrued their way to the account.
b. *The guests arrived their way to the wedding.
c. *The flower bloomed its way to a prize. (Levin, 1993, p. 99)
What the aspectual analyses share with the Goldberg ‑Israel observa‑
tion of motion despite difficulty and motion ‑specific activities is that 
they all make similar predictions about which verbs are possible in the 
construction. The above ‑asterisked sentences turn out to violate both the 
aspectual requirements and the lexical ‑semantic specifications. However, 
the Goldberg ‑Israel views are more detailed than Jackendoff’s aspectual 
analysis. That is, while Jackendoff identifies unergative verbs in general 
as candidates possible in the construction, Goldberg and Israel take 
a more fine ‑grained look and single out a subclass of unergative verbs as 
unlikely (undesirable even) to appear in the construction.
In what follows I will question some of Goldberg’s findings. I will 
start by reviewing the claim that the difficulty reading arises with real 
motion verbs. Then I will call into question the construction’s selectional 
properties responsible for allowing and disallowing specific verbs. I will 
attempt to show that the construction’s alleged discernment between 
inherent and incidental activities is not as fine ‑grained and sensitive to 
graphic detail as Goldberg insists.
5.4. Soft Constraints
The preceding discussion focused on two important constraints: one that 
calls for verbs with meanings that have to do with directional movement 
(call it the motion constraint) and another that requires that the motion 
be construed as defying some obstacles (the difficulty constraint). Neither 
constraint is really observed. As far as the motion constraint is concerned, 
contrary to the widely accepted views, the construction does not really 
see through the verb’s meaning; it does not select for the nature of the 
activity expressed by the verb. What it does see is the verb’s Aktionsart. 
Hence, as long as an activity is expressed by an unergative verb, it does 
not matter whether that activity is incidental or inherent to motion. In 
other words, it is not within the construction’s purview to control exactly 
what the logical connection should be between the activity and motion. 
As to the difficulty constraint, the alleged expression of “motion achieved 
despite some obstacle,” though frequently observed, may be no more 
than a consequence and reflection of another more basic property of the 
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construction. Further in this analysis, I argue that “adversity” readings 
of motion in the face of obstacles arise as a result of the implicature of 
a special path triggered by the construction.
It is rather surprising to see how the two constraints are accepted so 
unquestioningly despite evidence to the contrary found in corpus data. 
That is, a brief glance at corpus evidence reveals a considerable number of 
instances of the way construction that do not follow the two constraints. 
Given how fully acceptable and numerous those uses are, it is rather hard 
to argue that we are dealing with real constraints that are sometimes 
ignored, overridden by other considerations. The difficulty reading arises 
frequently enough to be taken for an essential meaning component of the 
construction, but it is certainly not found in all uses and is not a neces‑
sary condition for a use to sound natural and grammatical. The following 
uses involve motion verbs, in keeping with the motion constraint, but 
they lack any hint of obstacles for the motion in question.
(5) a. Attired in jugglers’ costumes, the two frolicked their way to a splen‑
did victory. (Spokane Daily Chronicle, April 24, 1978)
b. Inspiring gay athlete Blake Skjellerup has whizzed his way to the 
2010 New Zealand Senior Speed Skating title. http://www.gaynz.
com/articles/publish/2/article_9355.php
c. Schultz rollicked his way to the front of the stage, swinging his
unruly mop of hair around like a young Eddie Vedder and 
hucking himself over the edge. http://www.theblueindian.com/
show ‑coverage/show ‑photos ‑videos/music ‑midtown ‑2011 ‑a‑
 ‑retrospective/
d. Fatiniza romped her way through her debut album ‘Confusion’ and 
a few of her favourite cover songs to a very appreciative audience. 
http://www.fatiniza.com/index.php?article_id=34&clang=0
On the other hand, some uses involve verbs whose meanings do convey 
a sense of difficulty, but they are sound emission verbs, not motion verbs. 
They express an activity incidental to the motion, flouting the motion 
constraint.
(6) a. Martyn Brabbins panted his way over the line in 863rd place in the 
Stroud half ‑marathon. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/music/
festivals/article3804282.ece
b. The train huffed and puffed its way over the hill.
While the above examples violate one constraint and follow the other, it is 
easy enough to come across uses that ignore both of them. The sentences 
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in (7) involve incidental activity verbs and they describe motion scenarios 
where no difficulty is experienced.
(7) a. A murmur buzzed its way through the room as the girls recognized 
him standing with several of his teammates. (Candy Rules, Linton 
Lewis)
b. (T)he train echoed its way into the gigantic Union Station in Kansas 
City. (Intercept, Patrick Robinson)
c. A strong wind, blowing from the gates of hell, rustled its way out of 
the mountains. (Place of Skulls, Caleb Pirtle)
d. The walkie ‑talkie hissed and crackled its way back from its slumber. 
(The Servants of Freedom, Keith R. Parris)
e. … the road that crinkled its way through the luxuriant vineyards. 
(A Rockwell Portrait: An Intimate Biography, Donald Walton)
f.  The chicken … clucked its way to the other side of the road. (The 
Book of Want, Daniel A. Olivas)
g. His work thrived; and he hummed his way homeward once more 
well content. (The Lordly Ones, Keith Roberts)
h. Billie Holiday crooned her way into the room. (Lust for Life, Adele 
Parks)
i.   She came right to me and purred her way onto my lap. (Abby, Lisa
A. McCombs)
j.   Only last month a Mercedes broadsided a young javelina as it 
oinked its way across the street in back of the IMAX Theater. (Desert 
Noir: A Lena Jones Mystery, Betty Webb)
k. The sun sizzled its way through the heavy sky. (Tramping Through 
Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, Harry A. Franck)
l.   The river is merrily chuckling its way through the woodland. (Wal‑
king in Eden, Ron Scholes)
The list could go on. Practically any sound emission verb can be found 
in multiple uses in books (searched by means of the Google Books service). 
In fact, non ‑difficulty and non ‑motion verbs are easier to find than sentences 
that violate only one of the two constraints. It is therefore justified to claim 
that the above are far from being isolated cases of the construction used in 
defiance of the motion and difficulty constraints. When presented to native 
speakers, such sentences are generally not found to be any less natural or 
acceptable than conventional uses with verbs suggesting effortfulness. None 
of the examples above can therefore be dismissed as unproblematic on the 
grounds that they may be sloppy (they appear in the work of too many 
published authors) or overly experimental through poetic license (we are 
dealing with a strong common pattern, and not single experimental cases).
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5.5. The Inference of Difficulty
If the “difficulty” constraint can be ignored so easily, what exactly is 
the status of the difficulty sense: an entailment, presupposition or an 
implicature? If we assume that the notion of difficulty is an entailment, 
then its cancellation would necessarily have to make the above examples 
anomalous. If it was a presupposition, its absence would also be a serious 
problem, as sentences with false presuppositions do not have truth value. 
For example, the sentence I want to break up with my girlfriend takes for 
granted that there is a girlfriend and that we are currently in a relation‑
ship. If these presuppositions turn out to be false, then the sentence can 
neither be true nor false. It would then have no truth value at all: If we 
are no longer in a relationship, I could not answer the question Do I want 
to break up with her? with a simple yes or no. Returning to the examples 
from the previous section, if the notion of effortfulness can be absent 
from the sentences, as it clearly is, without making them nonsensical, 
then it is not a presupposition. 
The only remaining possibility is that the notion of difficulty is an 
implicature, which is a problem for the “difficulty” constraint, because 
for the difficulty reading to be a defining property of the construction, it 
should be either an entailment or a presupposition. In principle, it should 
not be an implicature, since implicatures are assigned to utterances, rather 
than to concrete linguistic forms; they are merely epiphenomena of other 
properties, and consequently, and perhaps most importantly, they are not 
likely to be semantic components of a construction. In Goldberg’s (1995) 
discussion of the difficulty reading, she uses “implication” and “imply,” 
but if the difficulty interpretation is an implicature, then it cannot be part 
of the construction’s meaning.
Theoretically, the problem of an all ‑too ‑soft difficulty constraint could 
be alleviated by observing that the constraint is violated precisely in those 
sentences that are considered marginal by most users. This way, not only 
does the constraint not appear so soft after all, but the marginality of 
the sentences in question is thus accounted for. Indeed Goldberg shows 
that the difficulty reading is absent in sentences where the verb expresses 
a manner rather than a means of motion (e.g. We sniveled our way out of
the movie theater), and recall that manner readings are not primary cen‑
tral instances of the way construction. However, I wish to question the 
premise of this argument, namely the claim that manner reading sen‑
tences are considered marginal. The malformedness of examples like We 
sniveled our way…, however marginal they may seem to some speakers, is 
rather suspect. Manner reading sentences are not rated lower than means 
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reading sentences. Where there is anomaly, observed in truly problematic 
uses, it is not due to a lack of an obstacle to motion or to the presence 
of non ‑motion verbs. Indeed, the objective of the following sections will 
be to demonstrate that the construction is particularly conducive to 
blends of incongruous events, which involve precisely non ‑motion verbs. 
Instead, what the construction requires is a specific type of entailment 
that the verb should contribute. Concretely speaking, the construction 
resists result verbs that do not lexicalize manner. This dispreference is 
a consequence of what the construction really conveys—that is, not the 
implied presence of an obstacle but, as Goldberg (1995, p. 203) calls it, 
a “self ‑created path” reading. The construction serves to describe mo‑
tion events taking place along a path, whether concrete or metaphorical 
(a point to be discussed in section 5.10), and the contribution of the verbs 
is to complement this meaning by specifying the manner of the motion 
in question. Classic motion verbs, that is those that only express a path 
(go, move, travel, reach, leave, etc.) not only duplicate the path meaning al‑
ready expressed by the construction, but fail to contribute much else. The 
problem is that true motion verbs could not contribute more meaning if 
they tried, and that is because of a curious phenomenon referred to as 
complementarity of manner and result which, to the best of my knowl‑
edge, was first observed and studied thoroughly by Levin and Rappaport 
Hovav (1991).
5.6. Complementary Distribution of Manner and Result
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1991; 2010) observed that single lexical items 
(roots) are incapable of entailing manner and result at the same time. 
If manner is lexicalized in a verb (e.g. to scrub, sweep, lick, mop, etc.), it is 
as if the manner information uses up the semantic potential of the verb 
and leaves no room to convey result. As a consequence, verbs like scrub 
or sweep do not specify whether or not the action resulted in cleanliness. 
The opposite is also true: if a verb lexicalizes a result (to clean, empty, 
kill, etc.), it is mute about how the activity is carried out. In Levin and 
Rappaport’s words, “lexicalized manner and result are in complementary 
distribution” (Levin & Rappaport Hovav, 2008, p. 1).
The complementarity of manner and result is questioned by Goldberg 
(2010) based on a number of exceptions. However, a closer look at Gold‑
berg’s counterexamples actually helps confirm rather than deny the regu‑
larity. Indeed, one might venture that any exceptions, including those 
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to be encountered in the future, will ultimately corroborate Levin and 
Rappaport’s observation. Perhaps the most familiar alleged exception, 
the verb climb, which is argued to entail both a result (upward motion) 
and manner (by using hands and feet), may probably not lexicalize the 
result after all. The upward motion is not an entailment because it can 
be canceled without falling into a self ‑contradiction, as in climb down the 
ladder or climb sideways. More generally, the absence of directionality is 
evidenced by the fact that the verb invites the use of a wide range of 
prepositions as in climb over the fence, climb into bed, climb onto mom’s lap, 
or climb across the glacier.
But the case of climb is more nuanced than it may seem at first glance. 
To put it otherwise, one could argue that the result reading being lexical‑
ized is not “upward motion” but simply “motion” itself, in which case 
we are faced with both a manner and a result. But then, how firmly 
lexicalized is the manner component? Is it really lexicalized at all? Upon 
some further reflection, it is not altogether clear that the use of limbs 
is a defining characteristic of the verb’s meaning. Certainly more kinds 
of driving forces may qualify as manner components of climb. To take 
a handful of the most obvious examples, a car can climb a hill by means 
of spinning wheels. A plant can climb a wall by means of prehensile 
leaf ‑tips. A road may climb a slope, etc. Now, for the sake of the argu‑
ment, let us assume that these could be dismissed as metaphoric exten‑
sions of the prototypical sense of climb. Similarly, a road climbing a slope 
can be accounted for as a case of fictive motion, where it is imagined as 
ascending, as if afoot, from the base of the slope up to the top, in which 
case it can also be seen as an extension of the classic full ‑manner sense 
of climb. This means that the question of manner of climb dissipates into 
a nebulous phenomenon of metaphoric cognition, which makes it harder 
to observe. Still, a handful of additional examples like the following, 
suggest that climb is used in a watered ‑down sense comparable to that of 
the manner ‑neutral verb rise:
(11) a. The sun climbs over the horizon.
b. The plane climbed to an altitude of 31,000 feet.
c. Government spending continues to climb.
d. The value of the company’s stock climbed steadily.
e. Japan climbed to world power status.
In other words, as the result component asserts itself in our manner ‑result 
calculus, it is the manner component that seems to unravel. It seems that 
if the two components may coexist within a verb at all, it is only when 
either one of them is fairly imprecise. We do not find an exception to the 
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Levin‑Rappaport regularity represented by a verb where both the man‑
ner and result are graphically detailed.
Another apparent exception that may seem to pose a problem to the 
complementarity of manner and motion is the verb decapitate, if it is ana‑
lyzed as meaning ‘kill (result) by removing the head (manner).’ However, 
what appears to be an entailment of death is not a real entailment, but 
merely an implicature arising from our understanding of the external 
world. That decapitated beings eventually die is not a rule of language, 
but a common ‑sense realization that a person or animal cannot survive 
without a head, and this impression is only true of some, not all living 
animal species. It is by all means perfectly possible to decapitate without 
killing—and not only in the case of Greek mythology, where the Hydra 
was decapitated only to grow back its heads. In real life, among animals 
that do not succumb to decapitation are earthworms, which not only can 
function without their heads but also reproduce faster.2 In other words, 
the result “death” in the case of decapitate is little more than an implica‑
ture, albeit strong and consistent enough to be confused for a lexicalized 
entailment. 
Yet another counterexample is the verb drown. At first glance, it 
seems to lexicalize both a result (killing) and a manner (by submerging 
under water or other liquid). Indeed, Talmy (2000b) argues that there is 
a cline in strength of implicature, and while some verbs, such as choke, 
merely implicate result, others like strangle implicate it more strongly, 
and verbs like drown are at the entailment of the cline. Hence drown “no 
longer implicates but asserts the killing” (2000b, p. 268). It is true that in 
its lexicalization of result, the verb drown is very close to the entailment 
extreme, but it is questionable that it conveys a full entailment of killing. 
There are ways of canceling the result reading; for example, one can say 
“In cases of drowning, mouth ‑to ‑mouth resuscitation should be started 
immediately,” while this would sound odd in the sentence “In cases of 
killing… .” It seems speakers are ready to use drown in “nearly dead” 
situations. This could of course be dismissed as sloppy usage, but it is 
unlikely that many people would be equally sloppy with kill in “nearly 
dead” situations. There is something about the verb drown that makes it 
possible to use it loosely. I suspect there is a qualitative difference that 
speakers are sensitive to between a full entailment and a very strong 
implicature. This strong implicature is of course very near an entailment 
and at first glance, it can be confused for an entailment, but there are 
2 Other animals capable of surviving decapitation include many insects, the most 
familiar of which are cockroaches. According to entomologist Christopher Tipping, 
cockroaches do not die until weeks after being decapitated, and when they do, it is not 
as a direct result of decapitation itself, but starvation. 
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uses that can still tease apart such close neighbors and show them to be 
really distinct. More apparent exceptions could no doubt be adduced, but 
considerations of space (as well as my own ignorance of further examples) 
do not allow an exhaustive treatment of every single case here. Nonethe‑
less, based on the above examples, one might venture the conjecture that 
other such putative exceptions will ultimately prove to lexicalize only 
either the manner or result, not both. Combining result and manner is 
an operation involving two sub ‑events, something that in the design of 
language was meant to be performed by clause ‑sized units, not single 
root ‑sized lexical items.
The most relevant cases of complementarity as far as the way construc‑
tion is concerned are motion verbs. These too lexicalize either a result 
(goal of motion) or a manner only, but not both. If a verb conveys a result, 
such as attaining a goal (arrive, reach, come, make it), it does not specify the 
manner in which the motion took place. On the other hand, verbs like 
flutter, plod or tiptoe are neutral about whether or not the subject in the 
sentence reached the intended goal. Indeed, they do not even entail mo‑
tion at all—each verb be used to describe an activity taking place without 
advancing or retreating. Note that each can be followed by the phrase in 
the same spot/in place without much of a contradiction: 
(12) a. The crow erupted in chatter and fluttered in place just out of reach. 
(People of the Lakes, Kathleen O’Neal Gear, W. Michael Gear)
b. Sawyer struggled up out of his seat, cigar ash spilling down his 
damp shirt as he churned his stubby arms at the slow ‑motion 
teams plodding in place out on the floor. (History of England, John 
McDermott)
c. As they tiptoed in place, they cast interested glances at the coffee 
table and the cake. (The Invisible Bridge, Julie Orringer)
Result motion verbs cannot be used in such ways: *He was going in
place. Some such uses are downright unintelligible: *The plane arrived 
motionless.
At this point, one should mention the case of many Polish verbs 
which may seem to go counter the regularity. Verbs like dojechać (‘arrive 
in a vehicle’), doczołgać się (‘reach [a place] by crawling’), wybiec (‘run out’), 
zastrzelić (‘shoot dead’), etc., seem to contradict the regularity by being 
orthographic words that combine in their meaning the element of man‑
ner (‘ride,’ ‘crawl,’ ‘run,’ ‘shoot’) and the element of result (‘reach a goal,’ 
‘leave a location’ and ‘kill’). However, these are not exactly morphologi‑
cally simplex verbs. Apart from their root (which in each case expresses 
the manner), each verb is preceded by a prefix (adding the element of 
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result). Because the regularity of complementary distribution applies to 
single roots, these examples do not pose a problem to it.
All this leads to an apparently counterintuitive conclusion that a great 
majority of motion verbs turn out to be manner of motion verbs, with 
very few being real path of motion (result) verbs. The reason why this 
has been overlooked so far is probably that many motion (result) verbs 
are practically always associated with motion, because the manner they 
specify does not make sense without motion. For example, it would be 
rather bizarre to argue that walk is not a “real” motion verb. However, the 
element of directed motion does not come from the verb itself, but from 
the prepositional phrase accompanying it. Without path or goal phrases, 
the direction is merely an implicature, albeit a reliable one, but one which 
is perfectly cancelable:
(13) He likes to walk for hours. After all, this is the only entertainment he 
has in his 2m x 2m prison cell.
Thus, one could put forward a rather controversial conjecture that the 
path element in many motion verbs is something of an illusion. One 
way to understand it is to think of it as an event anticipated with a high 
degree of certainty, based on partial information about motion. Paths in 
verbs such as walk or step can be viewed as predictions in the same way 
as a still image of a ball being kicked into a goal automatically brings 
to mind the image of that ball hitting the net. This is what will hap‑
pen most of the time, but of course it does not have to, as the shot can 
sometimes be intercepted at the last second right above the goal line. 
Similarly, a photograph of a person lifting one foot will co ‑activate the 
anticipation of motion along a path. One difference in this analogy is that 
in the ball ‑net scenario, kicking the ball and the ball hitting the net are 
two events a brief instant apart, while moving one’s feet and advancing 
along a path are events not separated in time, and therefore more firmly 
integrated. However, predicting a path on the basis of manner is not the 
same thing as entailing it. Although the prediction can be counted on to 
check out more than regularly, it does not have to go through, as example 
(13) illustrates.
A similar logic of separating semantic components within verb mean‑
ings can be found in Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004) where a case is 
presented against viewing certain sound emission verbs as motion verbs. 
They discuss the ability of the verb belch to appear in sentences such 
as Bill belched his way out of the restaurant (Goldberg & Jackendoff, 2004,
p. 534, ex. 4a), where it appears to be a motion verb. They state:
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The essential point is that the verb does not change its meaning so as to 
license these extra arguments: for instance, belch in 4a is not ‘converted’ 
to a motion verb in the lexicon or anywhere else. Its contribution to 
the meaning of 4a is the same as its contribution to the meaning of 
Bill belched loudly; it is, in both cases, a verb expressing bodily function 
and sound emission. The sense of motion and the sense of repeated 
belching in 4a come from the construction and from the way the con‑
struction combines semantically with the verb to express a complex 
event. (p. 534)
By the same token, it can be argued that the contribution of result in 
manner ‑of ‑motion verbs comes from the construction in which these 
verbs are used, and they are still nothing more than activity verbs. View‑
ing verbs like plod or shuffle as verbs with a path component would be an 
example in false conversion where a verb would acquire a result sense 
on top of a manner sense, in contradiction with the Levin‑Rappaport 
complementarity observation and with Goldberg‑Jackendoff analysis of 
sound ‑emission verbs.
Now, the group of verbs prematurely classified as motion verbs 
includes a large number of sound emission verbs such as boom, clang, 
clop, howl, hum, pitter ‑patter, rattle, roar, swoosh, vroom, wail, or whish. In 
most dictionaries, these verbs are defined as motion verbs glossed with 
definitions like “to make or move with such a sound.” That is no doubt 
because of the frequency with which these verbs are used in motion 
constructions. The following sentences illustrate uses of just the first few 
examples of verbs found by searching a dictionary for sound emission 
verbs that are also automatically defined as motion verbs:
(14) a. Horses pulling carriages clip ‑clopped down the street.
b. A black race car roared its way around the track.
c. A garbage truck rumbled from street to street.
d. A meteorite swooshed across the sky over Siberia.
e. The soldiers squelched across the marsh.
f.  Birds flapped through the mist.
g. Elephants rumbled across the savannah.
h. An empty beer can clanged down the stairs.
i.  A bee buzzed into the room.
j.  Uncle Jim’s old tractor coughed down the road.
k. An elusive lone mosquito whined around the room.
l.  An iridescent dragonfly that droned through the air.
m. Goats were trip ‑trapping over the bridge.
n. A balloon farted through the air.
o. The train chugged through the canyon.
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This list is by no means exhaustive; it is limited only to sounds pro‑
duced as a direct result of motion. It does not include verbs like whistle, 
chirp, or any of dozens of verbs like belch that Goldberg and Jackendoff 
convincingly argued to be non ‑motion verbs. Although they are often 
used in motion constructions and they describe sounds that may accom‑
pany motion, they do not result from activities that drive the motion in 
question. The point to be made here is that the multitude of such uses 
illustrates the ease with which one can mislabel a large group of verbs.
Yet the fact remains that the above examples are verbs of sound 
emission; they do not undergo automatic conversion into motion verbs. 
Although each of the sentences above clearly convey motion along a path, 
but it is not by means of the verb, but of prepositional phrases, just as 
was the case with manner of motion verbs. To take just the first example 
from the list above, Horses pulling carriages clip ‑clopped down the street can 
be made “motionless” by removing the prepositional phrase, especially 
if the sentence is supplied with an additional clause that cancels the 
implicature of motion:
(15) Horses pulling carriages clip ‑clopped, but the carriages wouldn’t budge.
This inability of lexical items to hold both manner and result might be 
a result of a more global design of how language divides labor between 
verbs and prepositions. The manner of an activity is expressed by verbs, 
the part of speech prototypically associated with expressing dynamic 
events, while the topographic details of the path are left to prepositions, 
the part of speech naturally associated with delineating the spatial spe‑
cifications of a scene. When elements of path do get expressed by verbs 
(go, arrive), it is only the sketchiest hints of the path that make it into the 
verb’s meaning (‘translocation’, ‘reaching the goal’, respectively), and if 
there are more elaborate trajectory details in a scene, they are supplied 
by prepositions anyway. That is why there are incomparably more verbs 
of manner than “true” verbs of motion.
More generally still, all this might be the very raison d’être of motion 
constructions, as progression toward a given location is among most 
basic experiential gestalts that language can be hypothesized to have 
evolved to express. Of course, hypothetically, one can imagine various 
combinations of manner of motion coupled with specific path trajectories 
within single lexical items. Such a language design would not require 
the x’s way or indeed even the ordinary intransitive motion frames, as 
the path prepositional phrase could be entailed by the verb. However, 
such a design would face the obvious problem of staggering numbers of 
possible manner ‑path configurations. In practice, this would mean the 
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need to store enormous numbers of motion manner ‑result coinages. At 
this point we can only speculate on how many such verbs would have 
to exist—thousands, maybe tens of thousands, which may not seem un‑
feasible, given that language users are estimated to be familiar with at 
least tens of thousands of words anyway. However, the tens of thousands 
of hypothetical motion manner ‑result verbs would include items with 
very slight differences in meaning discernible to specialists only, much 
the way arcane color terms are appreciated by trained and experienced 
artists. While such a system would not be an impossible burden for 
memory, it would certainly be an unnecessary one, which can be avoided 
by a simpler system where the two components are kept separate. A solu‑
tion to this comes in the form of constructions with empty slots for both 
elements. One obvious advantage of constructions over capacious lexical 
items is that constructions can easily accommodate rare combinations of 
manner and result (e.g. prance + against the wall), where both result and 
manner are transparent. Viewed another way, this simple logic can be 
thought of as a restatement of Rappaport Hovav and Levin’s (1998, p. 112) 
Sub ‑Event Identification Condition which states that “(e)ach sub ‑event in 
the event structure must be identified by a lexical head (e.g., a V, an A, 
or a P) in the syntax.” The fairly considerable informational load makes 
it necessary for manner and result to be linked to separate lexical units, 
which must be expressed overtly. And this is precisely what the x’s way 
construction enables by realizing both constants overtly. For morpho‑
logically simplex roots like stawd to convey manner ‑result combinations, 
they would also be arbitrary and rather difficult for children to learn, 
especially in the case of combinations rarely heard in the input. Signs of 
separating manner and result can be seen all over language, in syntac‑
tic constructions, in morphologically complex words (Polish verbs like 
zastrzelić or wybiec, mentioned earlier), in English phrasal verbs like dream 
up, or in resultative phrases such as shoot dead or wipe clean. Given how 
pervasive this linguistic habit to separate is, it is unclear why language 
should insist on allowing exceptions to the tendency, exceptions that turn 
out to be more and more dubious upon closer examination.
5.7. Blending Disparate Events
In the previous sections I have argued that x’s way sentences violating 
the two proposed constraints are in fact not as anomalous as they are 
considered to be in the literature. In this section, I will attempt to explain 
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why such uses do not differ very strongly from uses that are endorsed 
by Goldberg and others. I argue that this is not a question of subjective 
preferences or willingness on the part of some speakers to experiment 
with creative uses of the construction. As I will demonstrate below, the 
acceptability of a use of the x’s way construction does not depend on 
whether a verb conveys motion despite difficulty. The construction is not 
and cannot be sensitive to fine details of meaning. Instead, what matters 
is how event schemas are blended in the event structure created by the 
predicate. If the construction is sensitive to anything, it is the aspectual 
status of the sub ‑events present in the clause.
5.7.1. Event schemas
It might be speculated that what motivates the existence of constructions 
is their ability to capture recurrent situation types. Like in the case of the 
Manner of Obtainment Construction discussed in the previous chapter, 
here too, I will attempt to analyze the event ‑schematic constitution of the 
x’s way construction. 
Constructions can be thought of as syntactic configurations which 
have evolved as schematic reflections of the structure of experiential 
frames. That is, the more frequent the expression of a given experiential 
scene such as transfer of possession or direct impingement, the greater the 
need for a syntactic pattern dedicated to the expression of such situations. 
Heine (1993, p. 91) refers to such stereotypical mental representations of 
recurrent experiences as event schemas. These are schematic models that 
distill the most important characteristics from large numbers of diverse 
events, which are thus grouped in classes relevant to and preformed for 
linguistic expression. Essentially, the characteristics distilled are not only 
responsible for the existence of syntactic patterns, but they also affect 
their syntactic shape. For example, transfer of possession patterns such as 
X VERB Y to Z captures characteristics such as the number of participants 
(source, theme and recipient), the order in which the transfer proceeds, 
and the sense that the transfer involves motion, whether actual (e.g. 
throw, pass) or metaphoric (e.g. explain, recommend). It is neutral as regards 
the type of theme being transferred (is it a tangible object, is it a welcome 
gift?), the reasons behind the transfer (e.g. is it good will, pity, extortion?), 
the amount of time needed to realize the transfer, etc. In English, these 
aspects are gapped, but one can imagine syntactic structures that would 
reflect these and perhaps other details. The point of constructions is that 
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they reflect only a small number of salient characteristics, while ignor‑
ing many others, because they are less frequent or less relevant in most 
descriptions of transfer of possession. Similarly, constructions dedicated 
to expression motion also pick out only some salient characteristics 
which are responsible for their syntactic constitutions. What is interest‑
ing is that the syntactic forms of constructions such as the x’s way can be 
manipulated to compose synthetic motion scenarios quite unlike typical 
real ‑life motion types. The following is a discussion of the event schema 
makeup of the x’s way construction.
In section 4.10, a number of basic event schemas were identified, 
including the action (doing) schema, the process (happening) schema 
and the motion schema. These three schemas are relevant in our dis‑
cussion, because they are the building blocks of scenes described in x’s 
way sentences. Before their presence in the construction is discussed, it 
is first necessary to address a point of potential confusion here. The term 
“process” has two different applications. It can mean a simple atelic activ‑
ity, and this is how it is used by Jackendoff (1990, p. 213), who identifies 
verbs in the x’s way construction as being “inherently a process verb (e.g. 
eat, whistle, roll) or … a repeated bounded event (e.g. belch, joke, homer).” 
But the term “process” (also termed as “happening”) can also mean an 
event where a participant completes a change of location (e.g. he fell; they 
appeared) and is thus resultative in nature. Although “process,” tradition‑
ally interpreted as a continuing event, is a rather misleading label for 
the unaccusative sense, the label has become established and for want of 
a better term, it is this second sense that will be applied in the present 
analysis.
While analyzing the aspectual structure of x’s way sentences, it is im‑
portant to note that there are two main types of scenes expressed by the 
x’s way construction, and they differ in terms of their aspect. Specifically, 
a sentence built on the construction can be telic (16a) or atelic (16b).
(16) a. We pushed our way out of the building.
b. We pushed our way through the crowd.
The two sentences also differ in terms of the event schema they depict 
in that the first one is a process (in the “happening” sense) and the 
other an atelic motion schema. The difference is considerable because 
(16a) involves the resultative element of reaching a goal, while (16b) is 
a continuing action. Despite this difference, however, both cases include 
a common sub‑event, namely an action schema. The difference results 
from the addition of the prepositional phrase conveying an achievement‑
 ‑type event (out of x, to, onto or into x):
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(17) a. He felt his way up the stairs/out of the basement.
b. Simpson fought his way down the track/to the finish line.
c. We paddled our way across the lake/to the other end of the 
lake.
d. The dog wriggled its way up his leg/onto his lap.
e. Two robbers dug their way underneath a hospital/into the bank 
vault.
Thus, in the aspectual calculus of an event expressed in a typical x’s way 
sentence, whether the sentence is an accomplishment or an activity, in 
each case, an activity ‑type event (feeling, fighting, paddling, wriggling or 
digging) is present.
Of considerable importance here is the fact that incidental activity 
verbs (giggle, whistle) are, in terms of Aktionsart (Vendler, 1967), on a par 
with real manner verbs. From the point of view of lexical aspect, both the 
events inherent and those incidental to motion are action (‘doing’) sche‑
mas, which are eligible to appear alongside a goal and form a process 
schema or a motion schema, and hence also ideal in the x’s way construc‑
tion, a realization of the motion or process schema.
As a result, it is fairly easy to come across sentences involving blended 
event schemas like A loose tile rattled its way down the roof. Sentences like 
this are so common, especially in formal registers that claims that they 
are marginal appear rather dubious.
5.7.2. Salience of manner
One reason why incidental details make it into x’s way sentences is that 
linguistic descriptions of physical scenes are a reflection of our habit of 
observing salient accompanying characteristics in a scene. These charac‑
teristics are most often manner, enablement, or other elements that are 
instrumental in the larger scene. This is uncontroversial enough. Manner 
is a key factor in achieving a result, so it goes without saying that it is 
included in linguistic descriptions, and there is indeed a wide selection 
of grammatical means for singling it out from result. The same is true of 
sentences depicting motion events: in English at least, there is a strong 
tendency to assert it apart from specifying goal and direction (taken to 
be motion equivalents of result). Manner is somewhat less prominent in 
many other languages, but even these languages lend support to our hy‑
pothesis that manner verbs and incidental activity verbs are alike when 
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it comes to expressing motion scenes. As was explained in section 4.5, 
languages conflate manner and motion differently. Briefly, the difference 
is that in English the main verb in the sentence expresses manner and the 
path is relegated to the preposition:
(18) A butterfly fluttered (MANNER) into (PATH) the room.
In Romance languages, the main verb expresses the path, while man‑
ner is conveyed by an optional phrase, as in this Portuguese example:
(19) Uma    borboleta   entrou (PATH) no quarto   rodopiando (MANNER).
A    butterfly  entered      in the room fluttering.
In practice, in Romance languages, the manner element is often not 
asserted, and by comparison with English, they have few manner of mo‑
tion verbs. On the other hand, English offers a great number of manner 
verbs which are commonly featured in sentences. There is no fusion of 
manner and motion within a single verb. Additionally, in Romance lan‑
guages, verbs expressing incidental activities co ‑occurring with motion 
appear in the same position and gerundive construction as manner of 
motion verbs:
(20) Um cão entrou no quarto ladrando/uivando/rosnando/salivando, etc.
A dog entered the room barking/howling/growling/salivating, etc.
The point here is not to compare the gerundive in Portuguese to 
the verb slot in the x’s way construction (they are different, and the 
Portuguese gerundive can accommodate many more verbs that would 
not appear in the x’s way construction). The point is that manner is kept 
separate from the motion verb the way incidental activity verbs are. In 
other words, both in English and Portuguese, from the point of view of 
syntax, manner of motion verbs are more alike incidental activity verbs 
than they are with motion verbs or other motion elements.
It is possible to venture the claim that in descriptions of directed mo‑
tion, there is a universal tendency to distill manner from other elements 
such as path or goal. Manner tends to be viewed as an independent vari‑
able. This tendency is perhaps most striking in new languages such as 
Idioma de señas nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Sign Language), created some 
thirty years ago by deaf children, where users express manner and path 
sequentially (Senghas et al., 2004). Data from the study prompt Zubi‑
zarreta and Oh (2007) to argue that “the compositional nature of human 
languages is truly universal and … verb does not simultaneously encode 
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manner and directed motion, but that at some abstract level, these two 
are represented independently” (2007, p. 3).
Finally, one could speculate that the salience of incidental activities 
benefits from the salience of manner in accomplishment events. Slobin 
(2003, p. 162) notes that manner is an important semantic component in 
descriptions of events and “English speakers … make widespread com‑
municative and cognitive use of this dimension.” Because manner is 
attended to closely as an essential independent variable in any situation 
where a result is attained, a habit has developed of attending to any activ‑
ity accompanying an effort to achieve a result, including activities that 
may be less instrumental in achieving a result. It is reasonable to assume 
that given the special prominence of manner, in the mental resources 
dedicated to computations of dynamic events, a slot is reserved for infor‑
mation to do with manner. If that slot is not filled with details specify‑
ing manner of motion, the slot remains open to elements like incidental 
activities occurring in the course of a motion event.
Whether one looks at satellite ‑framed languages like English, which 
incorporate manners into the main clause or verb ‑framed languages 
like Spanish which tend to omit manner altogether, one could postu‑
late a natural junction in motion events, where direction of motion is 
separate from but can blend with other elements like manner. In satellite 
languages, users may have taken a step further and mentally fuse to‑
gether meaning elements that are associable less closely than direction of 
motion and manner of motion. Thus, we see constructions fusing result 
with incidental activities not only in English, but also Polish and Ger‑
man, where blends are possible like those discussed in section 5.4. This is 
not to say that all and any blends are allowed. While it is feasible to fuse 
event schemas, this is not the case with constructing paths, a question 
addressed further in section 5.10.
5.8. Motion Verbs Unattested in the Construction
In support of the hypothesis that the x’s way construction conveys a sense 
of difficulty, Goldberg (1995, p. 205) notes that the construction resists 
many basic motion verbs like “move,” “step,” or “walk”:
(21) a. *She stepped/moved her way to New York. (Goldberg, 1995, 
p. 205)
b. *He walked his way from the kitchen to the bathroom.
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c. *The kid jumped his way into the sandbox. (Kuno & Takami, 
2004, p. 73)
d. *The mountaineer arrived his way to the top.
According to Goldberg, these sentences are anomalous because “va‑
nilla motion verbs do not normally imply that there is any difficulty or 
indirect motion involved, an implication which is required by the means 
interpretation of the construction” (1995, p. 205). Even more interestingly, 
uses of these verbs in the construction suddenly become more acceptable, 
if not perfectly so, in a context where some difficulty or effort can be 
imagined (22a—b). On the face of it, this makes sense, but then, upon 
further reflection, one can of course construct more contexts combining 
the use of the above verbs with a sense of difficulty (22c), which do not 
work as smoothly as (22a—b). Examples like (22c) are not anomalous for 
lack of a difficulty reading, but because there is something about the 
verbs themselves, not the resulting reading that makes such examples 
sound unnatural.
(22) a. The old man walked his way across the country to earn money 
for charity. (Goldberg, 1995, p. 205)
b. He carefully walked his way down the tightrope.
c. ? With extreme difficulty and pain, he walked/stepped his way 
through the thick hedge.
At the risk of belaboring the point, it should be stressed that in theory, 
(22c) should be perfectly unproblematic. Here is a sentence that clearly 
asserts the existence of an obstacle, a fact that should be welcomed by the 
x’s way construction. So it must be something else that makes it anoma‑
lous. A more straightforward explanation of the anomaly is to suppose 
that the construction is not about difficulty at all, but instead conveys 
something other than a default path. That is, the use of the phrase “one’s 
way” featured in the construction signals that there is something about 
the path that makes it noticeably different from a typical path that a par‑
ticipant would travel. Put simply, the path conveyed must be construable 
as being distinct from an average ordinary path.
One important advantage of this “unusual path” reading of the con‑
struction is that it parallels other observed semantic effects associable 
with closed ‑class forms. For example, there are various constructions 
dedicated to expressing indirect causation (e.g. I had the wall painted), 
where indirectness is conveyed on the iconic principle that there is 
a greater distance between the causer’s action and the caused effect than 
in the case of a simple I painted the wall. In other words, if there were 
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nothing unusual about the causation event in question, an ordinary 
construction like I painted the wall would suffice. But the internal com‑
plexity of the event justifies using a more complex construction. More 
formally speaking, this is captured by the principle that “unmarked 
forms tend to be used for unmarked situations, and marked forms 
for marked situations” (Horn, 1984, p. 26). This property is also cap‑
tured by Levinson’s (2000, p. 38) M ‑heuristic, which states that “What’s 
said in an abnormal way isn’t normal.” (Recall that this is analogous to 
the inference process in the into‑gerund construction discussed in the 
previous chapter, where it was natural to conjecture that unusual causa‑
tion may but does not have to involve some dishonesty in pursuing an 
action.)
In the case of the way construction too, the idea that the path traveled 
is different from a normal path is hinted at by the form of the construc‑
tion, more specifically, by the appearance of the one’s way phrase. Note 
that this unusualness of a path explains the difficulty reading. It is sim‑
ply a pragmatic inference triggered by the impression that the path ex‑
pressed is of a special kind and one can therefore suspect that a different 
path may be harder to travel than an ordinary path. A similar proposal 
is made by Kuno and Takami (2004) who claim that “the implication of 
difficulty is attributable to the fact that the distance is perceived to be of 
a nontrivial nature” (2004, p. 82).
The unusual path reading is also reinforced by the so called “window‑
ing of attention.” According to Talmy (2007, pp. 268—269), lexical units 
tend to focus attention more strongly than closed ‑class units, which by 
nature serve to background presupposed meanings. For example, the ad‑
jectives continuous or incessant in her continuous/incessant complaints clearly 
foreground the repetitive aspect of the activity, while the closed ‑class 
suffix  ‑ing in she’s complaining merely expresses this semantic element 
as an element of the background of the scene. In the construction, the 
phrase one’s way is an attention ‑windowing device which brings to the 
forth the path more effectively than the bare prepositional phrase that 
would be part of the “ordinary” intransitive motion construction.
It is now time to attempt to explain why examples (22a—b) seem ac‑
ceptable while (22c) is rather anomalous. Consider the tentative hypoth‑
esis that the mental image of a special path signaled by the construction 
should be consistent with the meaning contributed by the verb. While 
manner verbs do not entail paths, they usually evoke expectations of 
paths associated with given manners of motion. For example, a verb like 
walk comes with some typical, fairly mundane paths, while push and elbow 
naturally trigger mental pictures of less straightforward paths. Of course, 
a manner of motion expressed by any given verb will be possible along 
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many paths, but some of them will be default, while others less likely. 
In the case of the x’s way construction, the verb should be compatible 
with the nontrivial distance and special path conveyed. The reason why 
walk does not normally appear in the way construction is that in most 
scenarios, the path portrayed is too predictably ordinary for the construc‑
tion. When walk does work, it is in the case of paths where walking is 
not the most typical manner of motion. For example, in a sentence like 
The skier walked his way down the slope, the verb walk works well enough 
precisely, because the path visualized is rather unusual for that context, 
because here one would normally expect skiing, not walking. Similarly, 
in the cross ‑country travel scenario (22a), one can visualize a rather 
extraordinary path. The man did not cross the country in one fell swoop, 
but instead took at least several days to complete his journey. Further‑
more, the traverse was most likely accompanied by additional activities. 
All this makes the path drastically distinct from one that could be 
summed up by saying simply walked across the country. Finally, in
example (22b), the tightrope walker traverses a path that only an in‑
finitesimal section of the population dares take it. That makes it unusual 
enough.
In conclusion, we can see that sentences built around the way con‑
struction are acceptable when they convey unusual manners and unusual 
paths, not the difficulty reading. But while the path should be construed 
as being somewhat out ‑of ‑the ‑way, it is also constrained in ways to be 
discussed below.
5.9. The Path Phrase
The way construction allows a range of types of paths, from physical ones 
running through space to cases of paths in time, and last but not least, 
atemporal metaphoric paths. Paths running through space can safely be 
considered to be most basic. First, as Mondorf (2011) shows, throughout 
its history the construction has been used most often to convey motion 
along concrete paths. Second, they serve as a basis for the expression of 
paths through time (23a—b) or metaphoric locations (23c—d).
(23) a. He walked his way to the end of his existence. 
b. Pat was making her way to dinner.
c. Lennon composed his way to critical acclaim.
d. Some stars rebelled their way to stardom.
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Although time paths and metaphoric paths can both be subsumed under 
the category of metaphor, and they must both coincide with the passage 
of time, there is a distinction between them. Typical time paths are de‑
scribed by strictly temporal expressions such as the end of his existence, 
midnight, or dinner. These are points in time, quite unlike critical acclaim, 
or stardom, which are not even occurrences, but states. But regardless 
of whether these two types should be considered two independent or 
interrelated kinds of paths, the existence of at least three types of paths 
goes to show that the construction is quite flexible in terms of how it 
structures paths.
Despite this flexibility, the construction seems to be severely constrain‑ 
ed in one important respect, namely the uniformity of the entire stretch 
of the path. That is, if the path is metaphoric and abstract, so should 
the goal. In (24a), the path is not through space, but through a period/
state, and the goal is interpreted as a point ending that period—it is not 
a physical location. In (24b), although the goal could be a physical object 
(a plate full of food), here it is interpreted figuratively, as is the path.
(24) a. The bird sang his way to freedom.
b. Flirt your way to a free lunch. 
Conversely, if the path is concrete, of course the goal is concrete too.
(25) Hundreds stormed their way into the store.
These parallels between the status of the path and the goal hold re‑
gardless of the type of manner. Incidental and inherent manner verbs 
combine with both literal physical paths and abstract paths. Although 
some speakers, as was mentioned above, reject expressions of physical 
path if the manner is incidental, such sentences are generally possible, 
and considered much more natural than uses where an abstract path is 
combined with a concrete goal: 
(26) *At the library, the schoolgirl lied her way to a book (under the 
interpretation that the girl lies to a reluctant librarian who finally 
gives in and offers a book).
Note that the verb lie is not incompatible with the construction. It is found 
in many diverse uses such as:
(27) A former South Philadelphia bank branch manager talked and lied 
her way to a one day sentence in a half million dollar embezzlement 
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case … . http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2013/05/18/bank ‑embezzler‑
 ‑pays ‑steep ‑prices ‑after ‑lying ‑her ‑way ‑to ‑a ‑1 ‑day ‑sentencing/
(28) [Martha Stewart] lied her way to the top. http://www.freerepublic.
com/focus/f ‑news/1092515/posts
(29) [Lance Armstrong] lied his way to fame. http://www.theguardian.
com/football/blog/2012/nov/26/happy ‑150th ‑notts ‑county
There are some problematic uses, especially ones to do with money, 
which do seem similar to (26). For example, in the following sentences, 
the goal could be interpreted as a physical, concrete one.
(30) Woman lied her way to £30,000 (headline). http://www.cambridge‑
 ‑news.co.uk/Cambridge/Woman ‑lied ‑her ‑way ‑to ‑30000.htm
(31) [Marion Jones] cheated and lied her way to medals and millions 
of dollars. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/athletics/ 
2288593/Jail ‑beckons ‑for ‑drug ‑cheat ‑Marion ‑Jones.html
However, the sums specified are almost certainly not intended as sin‑
gle unitary objects that the possessor ‑to ‑be can hold in her hands after 
completing the abstract path—such events would not be plausible in any 
conceivable scenario, shy of a scene featuring a suitcase full of hundred‑
 ‑dollar bills. More likely, the sum of money mentioned is also to be imag‑
ined as an abstract goal, a mathematic quantity that the person is entitled 
to, rather than an actual physical bundle of cash.
There are other apparent counterexamples. For instance, in example 
(32) an abstract path appears to combine with what looks like a physical 
goal. However, it is in reality a metaphoric goal. It should be noted that 
a physical object can be meant as a metonymic substitute for an abstrac‑
tion. In this case a gold medal is a token of victory; it does not represent 
a value in itself like the goals in (33). These would be hard to imagine as 
standing in a metonymic relationship to something abstract, and conse‑
quently sentences with such insufficiently abstract goals are perceived as 
anomalous.
(32) The team powered their way to a gold cup.
(33) a. *Mr. Cheswick tried to rant his way to a cigarette (under the 
interpretation that he attempted to obtain a cigarette by ranting).
b. … ranted his way to a red card.
A sentence with an abstract path and physical goal can be considered 
grammatical to the extent that the goal NP lends itself to an abstract 
interpretation. One can therefore predict some variability in users’ re‑
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actions to sentences with physical goal NPs, because people will often 
differ in their ability and openness to translate a physical goal into an 
abstract meaning.
There are eight theoretical combinations of manner, path, and goal:
 i. inherent manner — physical path — physical goal
 ii. incidental manner — physical path — physical goal
 iii. inherent manner — abstract path — abstract goal
 iv. incidental manner — abstract path — abstract goal
  v. inherent manner — abstract path — physical goal
 vi. incidental manner — abstract path — physical goal
 vii. inherent manner — physical path — abstract goal
viii. incidental manner — physical path — abstract goal
Of these, the first four are attested commonly enough:
(34) a. Mel strong ‑armed his way through the crowd (pattern i).
b. I chuckled my way down the ski hill (pattern ii).
c. He fornicated his way into an early grave (pattern iii).
d. He smoked his way to a PhD (pattern iv).
Patterns (v) and (vi) are less straightforward. To take pattern (vi) first, 
while it is theoretically possible to comprehend a sentence based on it, 
such as The girl lied her way to the book, such examples are for the most 
part found unacceptable by speakers. On the other hand, pattern (v) is 
unattested and indeed it is an impossible scenario. One cannot visualize 
a scene, where a participant moves toward a physical goal in a motion‑
 ‑inherent manner along an abstract path. For example, in a sentence like 
Kevin sprinted his way to the finish line, one cannot conceivably imagine the 
path to the physical finish line as being abstract. Confronted with such 
examples, a listener automatically assumes that the path to the finish 
line is physical, and even after being told that the path is abstract (e.g. 
a long arduous training regime), the physical path scenario seems to get 
in the way of entertaining an abstract path interpretation. Similarly in 
scenarios (vii) and (viii), a participant traveling toward an abstract goal is 
automatically imagined to traverse an abstract path, and a physical path 
interpretation is blocked from even being considered. For example, if one 
were to imagine a scene such as Fred Astaire tap ‑danced his way to stardom, 
the image that emerges is that of a career progression (abstract path) 
toward popular acclaim (abstract goal). Even if one were told that Astaire 
only performed one single tap dance while moving across a stage from 
point A to point B (physical path) and that single event assured his ascent 
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to stardom, this path is still superimposed on by the notion of an abstract 
path, namely an increase in popularity leading to a level of stardom. 
This is because the attainment of an abstract goal cannot be processed as 
a focus on a single static point, excluding the prior progression toward 
that point. There seems to be a mental constraint against disconnecting 
the goal from the progression leading up to it, and replacing that progres‑
sion with an equivalent stretch of a path. For all our conceptual blending 
ability, we seem unable to splice sections of physical and abstract paths.
This simple fact is captured by Table 10. It shows that sentences featuring 
the way construction are acceptable where the path and the goal are of 
the same type (i—iv). The grey half (v—viii) includes configurations of 
spliced paths and goals. Such sentences are either impossible (v, vii, viii) 
or considered odd (vi).
Table 10. Manner ‑path ‑goal combinations
Manner Path  Goal
i OK inherent physical 
ii OK incidental physical
iii OK inherent abstract
iv OK incidental abstract
v — inherent abstract
(impossible)
physical 
vi anomalous incidental abstract physical 
vii — inherent physical 
(impossible)
abstract 
viii — incidental physical
(impossible)
abstract 
The insistence of the path being uniform can be accounted for as an 
instance of the Invariance Principle (Lakoff, 1993), which holds that:
Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the 
image ‑schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent 
with the inherent structure of the target domain. (Lakoff, 1993, p. 215)
Lakoff points out that an important consequence of the Principle is that 
“image ‑schematic structure of the target domain cannot be violated” 
(p. 215). In metaphoric uses of the way construction, abstract elements 
of the scene are mapped onto the target domain of a path, and in this 
case, the Principle ensures that the mapping onto the target domain of 
a path does not violate the integrity of a uniform path whose goal is of 
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the same nature as the trajectory itself. There only exist paths composed 
of trajectories and goals coinciding on the same plain, and attempts to 
build a path violating this image ‑schematic structure result in anomalous 
sentences.
5.10. Meanings of the Way Construction
What sorts of meanings does the way construction convey then? The 
main, most basic meanings are of course those of motion along a path. 
However, note that motion is often associated with possession, as was 
discussed in section 4.12. Therefore, reaching a location can also be un‑
derstood metaphorically as coming into possession of objects found in 
that location. This is why sentences like Astaire tap ‑danced his way to fame 
should, perhaps more accurately, be considered descriptions of possession‑
 ‑obtainment rather than of pure motion toward a location. Abstractions 
like ‘wealth’ and ‘fame’ can be thought of as possessed objects—it is more 
natural to talk about having wealth or fame than being in wealth or fame, 
and even cases of concepts like ‘love,’ which are conventionalized meta‑
phoric locations (fall/be in/out of love) can also be expressed as possessed 
objects (I have your love/give me back my love). This metaphoric processing 
makes the construction quite versatile, especially in comparison with 
the basic motion constructions based on simple motion prepositional 
phrases.
Note, however, that obtainment readings only arise in abstract in‑
terpretations. Thus, while the person in (35a) can be assumed to have 
won or obtained fame, the same cannot be said about the person in (35b). 
Physical motion along a physical path leading to a physical goal is only 
interpreted as motion and little else, whereas abstract motion is open to 
being interpreted as obtainment.
(35) a. The man made/tiptoed/hobbled/inched his way to fame.
b. The man made/tiptoed/hobbled/inched his way to the car.
Recall from section 7 that abstract paths come in two types. There are 
temporal paths, where goals are specific points in time such as ‘midnight,’ 
‘marriage,’ ‘end of one’s existence,’ or ‘an early grave.’ Then there are atem‑
poral abstract paths, with abstract concepts for goals such as ‘happiness,’ 
‘fame,’ or ‘health.’ These two types behave differently in terms of the 
potential for obtainment interpretations. It seems only purely atemporal 
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paths yield obtainment readings (36), while the temporal paths serve to 
express abstract travel through time (37). While it is perfectly natural to 
talk about a person obtaining or having wealth or international renown, 
it would be markedly odd to say a person “has midnight” or “obtains/
has marriage.”
(36) a. She clawed her way from poverty/to wealth.
b. He scintillated his way from obscurity/to international renown.
(37) a. They danced their way from dawn/through the day/to midnight.
b. We gallivanted our way from dawn to the evening.
c. Maneuver your way through your single life/to marriage.
The facts outlined above lead to an interesting conclusion. That is, if ab‑
stract paths cannot lead to physical goals and if only abstract atemporal 
paths yield obtainment readings, then physical goals consequently fall out 
of the circle of objects that can be expressed by the way construction as 
obtained. While the construction freely expresses obtainment of abstract 
objects like kisses or victories, it cannot be used to convey obtainment of 
physical, tangible objects such as keys or coins. It should be stressed that 
this is really caused by the properties of path, and not by the fact that 
the meaning of metaphoric obtainment of a concrete object is impossible 
for other reasons. Recall that the Manner of Obtainment Construction 
discussed in the preceding chapter is used (in Polish as well as in Ger‑
man) to express getting or winning both physical and metaphoric objects 
(38). This is possible because unlike x’s way, the Manner of Obtainment 
Construction does not frame the obtained object as a goal at the end 
of a path, but as an object retrieved out of a container. As a result, the 
construction and in Polish and German does not run into problems to do 
with joining disparate sections of a path.
(38) Zenek wyżebrał   koc   i  jedzenie.
Zenek wy ‑begged  blanket and  food.
‘Zenek scrounged a blanket and food.’
5.11. Conclusion
The difficulty reading attributed to the construction is most likely not 
a semantic contribution of the construction. If anything, the observed 
difficulty effect is at most an inference arising in many—but not all—con‑
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texts. At the risk of sounding redundant, the difficulty reading is perhaps 
too much on the graphic side for a closed ‑class item that the construction 
is. A more credible candidate for the construction’s semantic content is 
the reading of motion along a path, with the possible stipulation that 
there is something unusual about the path making it differ from typical 
ordinary paths. However, it should be noted that the image of the path 
conveyed by the noun inclusion way is schematic, which becomes appar‑
ent when it is compared to how the path is profiled in literal construc‑
tions like I traced our way on the map. Unlike the literal uses, however, the 
way construction can serve to convey metaphoric obtainment meanings, 
which despite their rather exotic feel, are meanings perfectly typical of 
other closed ‑class forms found in possessive constructions.

6. Too Contentful to Be True
In this chapter, we will consider a number of examples of what at first 
might seem to be very contentful constructions—genuinely productive 
patterns that at the same time carry surprisingly—indeed fantastically—
rich meanings. However, as the following discussion will seek to demon‑
strate, these patterns are close to but not quite constructions.
6.1. Constructional Frames
In Construction Grammar, there is a move to recognize as constructions 
and as large as possible number of items. As Goldberg (2006, p. 5) argues, 
“patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as 
long as they occur with sufficient frequency.” Similarly, Jackendoff (1997a, 
p. 157) advocates “a more inclusive view of linguistic knowledge that in‑
cludes this material,” where by “this material” he means “potential Wheel 
of Fortune puzzles,” namely, idioms, clichés, meaningful names, titles of 
songs, quotations, etc. Specifically, the move is to include among linguis‑
tic constructions instances such as All you need is love, fair price, easy come 
easy go, or the right to bear arms, and countless other examples, most of 
which can be expected to be familiar to an average speaker of English. 
He observes that the number of such multi ‑word elements “is of about the 
same order of magnitude as the single words of the vocabulary” (1997a, 
p. 156), which makes them anything but a periphery of language. It seems 
logical, therefore, to consider them as part of a person’s lexicon or, as 
construction grammarians argue, include them in the constructicon, the 
all ‑inclusive storage area containing all pairings of form and meaning.
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However, it is important to distinguish between linguistic items 
stored in the lexicon and linguistic constructions. While both are stored, 
they are not necessarily the same. Certain memorized expressions may 
very well be part of a speaker’s competence, but they are governed by 
entirely different rules. Quite simply, just because they are stored does 
not automatically make them constructions.
It is worth asking why some scholars are ready to view patterns such 
as long time no see as constructions. One argument is that they are open 
to modification. Rasulić (2010) provides a number of examples of expres‑
sions such as first come first serve or easy come easy go, which she considers 
not only lexical entries, but precisely constructions, or—as she also terms 
them—“constructional frames,” capable of being used creatively and 
altered freely in everyday language use. Indeed, a look at the clearly high 
degree of variability of form in these expressions confirms that they are 
not as fixed as the name suggests. To take just one example of a fixed 
expression, easy come easy go is attested as easy come easy love, easy come 
easy grow, etc.
One should stress that the readiness to consider fixed phrases as 
constructions to be modified is also evinced by other authors. Hurford 
(2012, pp. 164—265) provides the example of the proverb A bird in the hand 
is worth two in the bush, and argues that such sentence ‑length units are 
stored and “can be productively used as templates for parallel expres‑
sions” such as (1).
(1) a. A grand in the bank is worth two in the stock market. (Hurford, 2012,
p. 265)
b. A Voter in the Hand Is Worth Two in the Focus Group. http://www.
teapartytribune.com/2013/04/04/a ‑voter ‑in ‑the ‑hand ‑is ‑worth ‑two‑
 ‑in ‑the ‑focus ‑group/
c. A Pistol in Hand Is Worth Two in the Glove Box. (title of a 2008 movie)
d. A Girl In Your Arms Is Worth Two In Your Dream. (title of a 1915 song 
by Grace Nash and Henry Burr)
Hurford proposes the schematic formula A NOUN in the NOUN is worth 
two in the NOUN as a representation accommodating novel uses based 
on the proverb. Although he never claims that this formula is stored as 
a construction in the lexicon, this is in fact what would have to be the 
case if A bird in the hand is to be considered a productive template.
It should come as no surprise that the possibility of ample modification 
is touted as evidence that such constructional frames are just as produc‑
tive as familiar constructions. However, there is something suspect about 
this kind of modification. It seems that the high degree of modification 
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freedom in constructional frames is indicative of a different nature of 
constructional frames. 
First, it should be noted that constructional frames are not productive 
in the same way as “conventional” classic constructions. In other words, 
they are not productive in the sense of Lyons (1977). They do not fol‑
low syntactic rules associated with a given construction but “creatively 
extend or transcend them” (1977, p. 548). Creativity is therefore to be 
distinguished from productivity. Lyons invokes the productivity vs. 
creativity distinction in the context of coining compounds and notes 
that “lexicalization of compounds by means of metaphorical extension 
is a normal process in the everyday use of language and … can only 
be accounted for in terms of strategies, rather than rules … .” However, 
the distinction applies equally fruitfully to all cases of introducing new 
forms on analogy with existing ones.
The following discussion will attempt to elaborate on this difference.
6.1.1. The productive behavior of once bitten twice shy
Rasulić’s analysis comes with ample corpus material to show how host 
expressions are modified. This happens by one of the elements of the 
expression being replaced, but in such a way that the correspondence 
between the new version and the original template is clear. In the follow‑
ing, the last element shy is replaced by rhyming words, which reinforce 
the association with the original form of the idiom. Right here, it could be 
pointed out that syntax does not include rhyme as one of its selectional 
restrictions.
(2) a. Once bitten twice lie.
b. Once bitten twice die.
c. Once bitten twice cry.
Further, the modification of fixed expressions often involves the use 
of lexical items of diverse syntactic stock. For example, modifications 
include
(3) a. Once bitten, twice Ed.
b. Once bitten, twice watch out.
c.  Once bitten, twice burned.
d. Once bitten, twice as curious.
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An adjective can be replaced with a noun, verb or a prepositional phrase. 
This is very different from the behavior of phrases like the time away 
construction, where one does not insert words representing grammatical 
categories other than the one intended for a given slot. Thus, for example, 
one can say dance, laugh or talk the night away but not curious the night away. 
(Of course, certain seemingly cross ‑categorial replacements are possible. 
For example, it is possible to imagine something like to Ed your way PP, 
but this is really a conversion, and therefore not an actual cross ‑categorial 
insertion).
Another point of difference is that in constructional frames, it is theo‑
retically possible to replace any part of the expression.
(4) a. Once bitten, never shy.
b. Once Biden, twice shy.
c. Once written, twice shy.
d. Frost bitten, twice shy.
This too is quite unheard of in constructions. In the x’s way, one can only 
manipulate the verb slot and to some degree the genitive slot. Thus, one 
can of course push, elbow, or feel one’s way PP, but it is not possible to force 
one’s *street/*alley/*hallway PP. Also, one can hear push your/his/her, etc. way, 
but not push Jenny’s way.
All the above differences are really consequences of the one main 
difference between constructions and constructional frames, which is 
that the former leave at least one slot open which is intended for inser‑
tion and imposes specific criteria for what is allowed in the slot. On 
the other hand, the latter are entirely lexically filled expressions, with 
no empty slots. The only possibility that they can be used in new ways 
is by creative modification. Incidentally, this is why it is very unlikely 
that speakers actually store schematic templates like A NOUN in the 
NOUN is worth two in the NOUN. In the case of once bitten, twice shy, 
what would the template look like, if in principle each slot could be 
modified?
The problem with the professed productivity of fixed expressions is 
illustrated by their similarity with what Goldberg (2006, p. 5) calls “filled 
idioms” examples of which include going great guns or give the devil his 
due. According to Hurford, these expressions “don’t allow any produc‑
tive substitution” (Hurford, 2012, p. 265). Now, rather predictably, a quick 
Google search does turn up modified examples, and these include not 
only those like give the devil his pew/brew/blue, where the theme noun is 
conspicuous through rhyme with due, but also modifications like give 
the devil his opportunity or give the devil his violin. These modifications are 
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exactly the kind of novel uses accruing around once bitten twice shy or 
a bird in the hand.
What they all have in common is that they do not seem like obvious 
candidates for productive uses for all users. Just like once bitten twice shy 
strikes very few as interesting material for modification, the potential of 
give the devil his due escaped Hurford’s attention too. And no wonder—the 
reason this happens is that these expressions are not productive idioms 
any more than a spoon is a multipurpose tool just because it can be made 
into a bracelet, paper weight or an improvised prison weapon. There is 
a difference between modification that repurposes a fixed expression and 
inherent versatility of an open ‑ended construction. There is a difference 
between creativity and productivity.
But what exactly is creativity and how does it differ from productivity? 
The notion of creativity is invoked but, to the best of my knowledge, never 
really elaborated on. Though creativity is often contrasted with produc‑
tivity, it is not explained how, in Lyons’s words, it extends and transcends 
syntactic rules. I will now proceed to attempt to analyze creative use of 
constructions by drawing upon accounts of creativity in psychology.
6.1.2. Creativity
Creativity here is meant in the now classic sense of well working asso‑
ciative memory, which allows one to combine two seemingly disparate 
elements. According to Mednick (1962), a person’s creative potential is 
characterized by considerable individual variability. It is hypothesized 
that what the essence of creativity boils down to is finding what two or 
more seemingly unrelated things have in common. How creative a per‑
son is can be measured by means of the so called Remote Associates Test, 
or RAT for short. This task requires a subject to identify an element that 
links three words, such as sore — shoulder — sweat (here, the connecting 
word is COLD, as is illustrated in Figure 7). Generally, creative people 
tend to identify connecting words more often and more quickly. The point 
here is captured by the name of the task: the parts presented are fairly 
remote and thus require a person’s performance outside of conventional 
rules of logic. Some people are better at solving RAT items than others. 
They will spot the unifying element, and others will not.
How does a creative association occur? As the following figure il‑
lustrates, the clue words sore, shoulder, and sweat activate large cohorts 
of expressions in which they can be found. Thus, shoulder appears in 
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shoulder blade, hard shoulder, etc. It can be assumed that a person looking 
for a common denominator between sore, shoulder and sweat pulls up 
three such cohorts at the same time and looks for expressions that may 
share a similar or the same element. The challenge is that the cohort 
contains elements that are not part of expressions with shoulder, but may 
be collocates, such as shrug. Yet they still have to be considered because 
they may very well be just the connecting element. This of course ex‑
tends the cohort of possible associates. (The cohorts shown in Figure 7 
are by no means complete. They do not include many other elements 
that a speaker may think of when primed with the clue shoulder, such 
as chip on the shoulder). Another complication is that the clue word can 
be meant in more than one sense or grammatical category. For example, 
the clue sore can be used as an adjective with the meaning ‘angry,’ as in 
sore loser, or as a noun with the meaning ‘sensitive spot,’ as in bedsore. 
Yet despite this enormous number of combinations (represented by 
arrows), most of which are dead ‑ends, the true common link is found 
sooner rather than later. It is my experience that if the common element 
suggests itself, it does so in the first seconds, and before the exact word 
emerges, it is preceded by a realization that the connection has been 
found.
running sore
open sore
sore muscle
sore feet
sore loser
sore throat
sight for sore eyes
cold sore
bedsore
sore spot
tango till they’re sore
angry
shoulder bones
hard shoulder
shoulder blade
cold shoulder
shoulder strap
pat on the shoulder
shoulder bag
shoulder joint
shoulder to shoulder
shoulder the burden
shoulder ride
no sweat
sweat it out
get in a sweat
stale sweat
sweat like a pig
sweat blood
sweat shop
sweat suit
drip
don’t sweat it
cold sweat
sweat shirt
shrug
Figure 7. Remote association between sore, shoulder, and sweat
This is precisely what happens with constructional frames. Producing an 
expression like first come first surf is nothing like filling a slot in a gram‑
matical construction; rather, the task requires some special literary skills. 
One can trace the process, where a speaker starts with two meanings that 
need to be combined in a memorable expression. One is the idea of Inter‑
net use and the other the meaning of ‘priority.’ This can be established 
based on a quick review of online uses of this modified expression which 
shows meanings roughly “priority for surfing (actual water surfing or 
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surfing the web) given by order of arrival.” Thus, the modification is a re‑
sult of a RAT ‑style creativity association, where a speaker must look for 
a match between ‘Internet use’ and ‘priority.’ Note that this association is 
not as obvious or easy to make as it seems after the fact (once the result‑
ing expression is known). The cohort containing expressions to do with 
priority is larger than Figure 8 suggests. For example, not shown in the 
set is the saying the early bird catches the worm and neither are (most likely 
many) others that a brain storming activity would help find. Similarly, 
the list of possible Internet ‑related expressions is simply too large to be 
accommodated in Figure 8, where there is no room for go online, log onto 
the Web, access the Internet, etc. Still, a match can be found out of what 
is most likely a staggering number of candidates. Finding that match is 
possible thanks to a clever observation that first come first serve has just 
the right kind of meaning and one of its components, serve is similar in 
form to the word surf.
antecedence
seniority
be the first to…
right of way
privilege
precedence
first dibs
earliness
priority
first come first serve
browser         online
dot com
surf
e-mail
WWW
serve
surge
search
serf
smurf
Priority Internet use
Figure 8. Remote association behind the expression 
first come first surf
None of the above ‑illustrated impressive feats are part of the usage of 
conventional constructions. First, constructions are not modified and 
they do not call for anywhere near the level of resourcefulness involved 
in adjusting first come first serve. Unlike first come first serve, which is the 
widely familiar original wording, there is no “original” use of a fully fixed 
construction that speakers bear in mind and consult when interpreting 
a new use. When a speaker inserts adjectives into the covariational the xer 
the yer construction, it is not as if some special creativity was called for 
in the process. Speakers do not modify the xer the yer frame, nor do they 
even make a reference, however, unconscious to some model form such 
as the more the better, for the construction is listed in the constructicon as 
a very schematic skeleton, not a fully fleshed out model to be modified. 
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Even if some instantiations of the construction are listed in the mental 
lexicon, such as the more the merrier, there is no reason to assume that they 
are consulted the way constructional frames necessarily are.
Indeed, the level of originality involved in modifications of construc‑
tional frames makes it clear that many such new uses are puns. Uses 
such as easy crumb easy go, once married twice shy, or beauty is in the eye 
of the beer ‑holder are evidently orders of magnitude more singular than 
him be a teacher?! or twist the night away. Constructional frames serve as 
material for word play that only some speakers are engaged in. They 
are not anywhere near the ubiquity of constructions such as the time 
away or x’s way. Of course, pun ‑like modifications may be produced 
independently by different speakers, but it is certainly not the case that 
all speakers will think of a curious combination the way they use (ef‑
fortlessly for the most part) constructions such as the covariational the 
xer the yer.
Constructional frames differ from constructions in one more im‑
portant respect, namely the time needed to enter the language. While 
the eventual success of single lexical items, constructional frames and 
traditional constructions is a notoriously difficult to predict, as noted by 
authors like Pinker (2007, p. 307) or Metcalf (2002), constructional frames 
are more like single items in that they are capable of entering the lan‑
guage practically overnight, while traditional constructions are, from the 
point of a speaker, static elements of a language. They never arise within 
the lifespan of a single speaker. Rather they seem to have been around 
forever. Of course, traditional constructions must develop at some stage 
in history, but the time of entry was never a point in time, but a longer 
period spanning generations of speakers.
By contrast, constructional frames materialize instantaneously, often 
with the speakers being aware of the exact moment a given expression 
becomes part of the language. One such expression with a pinpoint date 
of entry is mother of all battles. This expression emerged in the English lan‑
guage at the time of the First Gulf War, coming from Saddam Hussein’s 
January 17, 1991 proclamation “The great duel, the mother of all battles 
has begun.” As J. Algeo and A. Algeo (1991, p. 380) explain, the phrase 
is a literal translation of an idiom, which is what the phrase has become 
in English. The translated phrase soon spawned countless collocational 
offspring such as mother of all bombs, trips, novels, albums, smartphones, 
movies, etc., where the part mother of all bears the meaning ‘the greatest or 
most notable example of.’
1956.1. Constructional Frames
6.1.3. The question of storage
Constructions are learned pairings of form and meaning, so if modified 
phrases are productive constructions, they should be listed in a way 
that accommodates productive use. For instance, the phrase no ‑fly
zone can be recognized in a long list of copy ‑cat phrases that it inspired 
such as no ‑lie zone, no ‑phone zone, no ‑go zone, no ‑spin zone, no ‑bully
zone, to name a few examples turned up in a perfunctory Google search. 
Is no ‑fly zone an instance of a productive construction? It is rather
odd to suggest that users of English file away in their constructicons an 
entry like no ‑Inf zone. If they do, why not add an entry like no ‑fly N? 
This would be necessary to account for the possibility of phrases like 
no ‑fly list (an actual black list of people barred from boarding a plane), 
no ‑fly day, or no ‑fly policy. And of course, there is also the possibility of 
saying things like yes ‑fly zone or dead ‑fly zone. Invoking a construction 
here would not only create a burden on memory but would multiply 
entities (like 5a—c) that many speakers would probably never take 
advantage of.
(5) a. no fly   
b. no    zone
c.    fly zone
Instead of listing such “constructions” with different empty slots, it would 
sometimes be less taxing on memory to list each new invented modifica‑
tion as an independent lexical item. In fact, forms like no ‑bully zone or 
no ‑fly passenger do seem like new lexical items, novel coinages, and not 
uses of a construction. If they were used often enough, they would gain 
currency and would eventually be listed as newly coined entries in dic‑
tionaries. (Note that even very frequent uses of constructions like push or 
sleep one’s way are not listed in dictionaries; they were never neologisms, 
but realizations of the same construction).
Take another example, tug of war modified as coinages tug of more, tug 
of gore, or tug of whore. The modifications here involve a rhyme. It is un‑
likely that the common lexicon of users of English features an entry like 
tug of   , where the slot comes with a stipulation that it is to be filled 
with rhyming nouns. It makes more sense to suppose that the lexicon 
contains the fully specified entry tug of war, which can serve as a template 
for analogical extensions. This is how such examples are analyzed by 
some authors. For example, Ayto (1999) and Hickey (2006) label tug of love 
an “analogical formation.”
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This is not to say that a pattern cannot over time become a productive 
construction. Something of the sort is probably happening to forms like 
must ‑have, must ‑see, and must ‑read. Initially a conversion from a verb to 
noun and adjective done with common verbs, these forms contain the 
segment must ‑, which has now become something of a prefix produc‑
tively added to almost any verb of activity. Thus, it is possible to say that 
a product is a must ‑buy, a fragrance is a must ‑smell, a song is a must ‑hear, 
and there are even uses like must ‑fuck.
To sum up, lexical items and constructional frames enter the language 
by felicitous circumstance or force of authority endorsement—they be‑
come popular if they happen to be produced by popular figures in films 
or in memorable events, as was the case of Saddam Hussein’s mother 
of all battles. Then, the subsequent fate of an expression and its rise as 
a constructional frame is a function of some creative people’s reliable 
associative memory. What should be borne in mind is that associative 
memory is better in some people than in others or can be different in 
the same person at different times, while access to syntactic rules is 
automatic and for the most part, equal for all speakers. To put it other‑
wise, the kinds of modifications that perpetuate a constructional frame 
rely on resources of creativity not specific to any of the constructional 
frames in question. They are common to and can apply equally well 
to any constructional frame, but they are NOT relevant to the develop‑
ment of traditional constructions. These are mainly the product of event 
schemas.
6.1.4. A short digression on memes
Phrases like mother of all battles reworked in new incarnations bear
characteristics of memes, defined by Dawkins (Dawkins, 1976) as “units 
of cultural inheritance.” Typical examples of memes are music jingles, 
many of which are so infectious that they can haunt a person incessantly 
for hours, a maddeningly unpleasant experience which earned such pat‑
terns the title of Ohrwurm (‘earworm’) in German. While earworms are 
normally pieces of music, they can also be fragments of language. Like 
jingles, these too can be insidiously sticky and can replay themselves 
in the minds of speakers. In a 1876 short story Literary Nightmare, Mark 
Twain describes the experience of being haunted by the repetitive incan‑
tation of the sentence “Punch in the presence of the passanjare” heard 
on a bus. Dawkins notes that “[s]ome memes may be more infective 
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than others because of their inherent properties” (Dawkins, 1998, p. 304). 
In our case, one factor making a phrase particularly infective is the ef‑
fective use of metonymic logic. An infectively attractive phrasal meme is 
then predictably more prone to be copied and modified.
6.2. Transfers of Meaning
6.2.1. Coercions
Next I wish to turn to coercions, an otherwise well ‑known phenomenon 
which seems to pose a problem to the approach I adopt. The following are 
instances of use of what seems to be a completely schematic construction 
which is nevertheless extremely rich in semantic detail. The meanings 
conveyed by the family of constructions in question are so remarkably, 
indeed irresistibly colorful that they could be taken as a dream falsifica‑
tion of the traditional partition into open ‑ and closed ‑class ingredients of 
language.
(6) a. We’re parked out back.
b. I squeezed myself behind that van.
c. I got hit in the bumper on my way to work this morning.
d. The ham sandwich at table 3 raised a toast.
e. The trombone had to leave early today.
Before anything else, it is important to note a terminological issue. Pre‑
dictably, scholars involved in the study of these uses disagree as to how 
they should be analyzed. The above have variously been approached as 
transfer of reference phenomena (Jackendoff), or transfers of meaning 
(Nunberg, 1995).
At first glance, it seems perfectly justified to view patterns discussed 
here as grammatical constructions. They certainly meet the criteria set 
out in Goldberg’s definition of grammatical constructions:
Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some 
aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its compo‑
nent parts or from other constructions recognized to exist. (Goldberg, 
2006, p. 5)
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To the best of my knowledge, transfer ‑of ‑meaning coercions have never 
been officially certified as constructions and catalogued in the inventory 
of pairings of form and meaning, complete with a name. However, they 
are usually treated as ones. Zelinsky ‑Wibbelt (2010, pp. 192—194) discusses 
them as “elliptical linguistic constructions.” Lapata and Lascarides (2003) 
mention them as examples of logical metonymy, that is “constructions 
in which the argument of a word in syntax appears to be different from 
that argument in logical form.” Culicover and Jackendoff (2005, p. 227) 
list coercions among constructions “[creating situations] in which a piece 
of semantics has no corresponding piece in the syntax or phonology.” 
Jackendoff justifies the decision to include them in the grammar by 
observing that “[o]ne might be tempted to dismiss these phenomena as 
‘mere pragmatics,’ hence outside the grammatical system. But this proves 
impossible, because reference transfer can have indirect grammatical ef‑
fects” (Jackendoff, 2003, p. 658). At first glance, they could be examples 
of maximally schematic constructions governed by rules such as the so 
called “statue rule” which allows one to refer to a statue by the name of 
the person that the statue portrays (Bouchard, 2013).
However, this terminological issue can be settled and shown to 
involve phenomena that are actually not constructions. The discussion 
below will seek to demonstrate that these examples deceptively resemble 
grammatical constructions such as the time away or the Co ‑variational 
Conditional construction, but in reality represent what Kay (2002) terms 
as “patterns of coining,” after Fillmore (2002). Indeed, any semantically 
contentful pattern can be shown to exhibit non ‑constructional properties. 
My objective is not to remove these phenomena from grammar, for they 
clearly do have grammatical consequences, so they must be handled at 
least in part by grammar. However, in what follows, I wish to show that 
these phenomena differ from grammatical constructions.
6.2.2. Meaning transfer
Examples (6a—c) above differ from (d) and (e), and will be treated sepa‑
rately. Under Nunberg’s (1995) analysis, “[t]he name of a property that 
applies to something in one domain can sometimes be used as the name 
of a property that applies to things in another domain, provided the two 
properties correspond in a certain way.”
Adding to their unusual nature is that, according to Nunberg, we are 
not merely dealing with simple substitutions of reference confined to 
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single nouns, where burger can be intended to refer to a person. Nunberg 
approaches these uses as a case of meaning transfer, where an important 
role is played by predicates. He claims that examples like (7) work by 
transferring the meaning of the predicate, not the noun, so that the mean‑
ing conveyed by the predicate applies not merely to the poet’s oeuvre, but 
to the poet himself.
(7) Yeats is still widely read. (Nunberg, 1995, p. 124, ex. 49)
The reasoning is that this transfer operation is only possible when the 
predicate can be construed as conveying a property that is relevant not 
only to the metonymous referent (poet’s production), but is also signifi‑
cant for the person himself. This also applies to uses of pronouns, as in 
the example below, where the reflexive pronoun is to be interpreted liter‑
ally, and not as a reference to Yeats’s poems. In Nunberg’s words, “we 
assume that people who read Yeats’s poetry aloud are doing something 
to the poet as well.” By virtue of performing one operation on the poet’s 
work, a corresponding operation is also performed on the author. 
(8) Yeats did not like to hear himself read in an English accent. (Nunberg, 
1995, p. 122, ex. 40)
To use another example, in (9) himself is coreferential with Ringo and not 
his car.
(9) Ringo squeezed himself into a narrow space.
This is of course countertraditional approaches, which view such reflex‑
ives as being metonymous with an object associated with their anteced‑
ent (here, Ringo’s car), Nunberg claims what amounts to saying that 
these reflexives are actually to be interpreted literally. That is, he argues 
that such reflexives refer to the person and not an object associated with 
that person, and comes to the startling conclusion that such reflexives 
and their antecedents “are coreferential in a strict sense.” In the example 
above, this is only possible when the action performed on the car can be 
interpreted as an action performed on oneself. 
Further, Nunberg is quite explicit in insisting that it is not the mean‑
ing of the reflexive that is transferred, but the meaning of the verb. If 
the reflexive alone were all there was to it, and if the verb played no role 
in the transfer, it should be possible to apply meaning transfers of the 
reflexives with any verbs, but as Nunberg demonstrates, it would be very 
odd to say.
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(10) ?? Yeats wrote a lot of himself in sprung rhythm (Nunberg, 1995, 
p. 122, ex. 41).
Nunberg uses this and other examples to make a number of points, but 
the general claim is that transfer of meaning is not confined to a single 
word but is a more complex operation that spills over larger syntactic 
sequences.
Thus, at first glance, the impression is very much that the problem at 
hand is indeed a complex schematic construction with a rich meaning 
and not a lexical operation performed on single words.
6.2.3. Problems with the construction approach
There are several problems with this view. Anomalous examples like (10) 
above can be explained without invoking predicate transfer. Quite sim‑
ply, sentence (10) is ill ‑formed for two more ordinary reasons. First, the 
meaning “work, oeuvre” is conveyed with an intransitive verb write, so it 
is enough to say Yeats wrote in sprung rhythm or Yeats wrote a lot in sprung 
rhythm, and this usage is established enough to block, by the principle
of contrast (Clark, 1987), alternative expressions as less idiomatic. Sec‑
ondly, the example is ambiguous, or, to put it otherwise, if a poet “writes 
a lot of himself,” one could conclude that that poet incorporates thinly 
veiled autobiographical details in his work. Such uses are attested, as in 
example (11).
(11) Years ago, one of Carla’s friends and fellow authors made the percept‑ 
ive observation that Carla is only writing herself in her books.
These attempts to explain the odd grammar of (10) are of course only 
alternatives to Nunberg’s approach. There does not seem to be any theo‑
retical reason why one explanation should be preferred to another. But 
on closer inspection, Nunberg’s analysis has some weak points. Suppose 
the anomaly of example (10) is in fact because writing does not and can‑
not have the same significance to a poet’s oeuvre and the poet as well. 
One could conclude that the problem has to do with the verb of creation 
of write and the interpretation it imposes. Verbs of creation in general 
are special because their objects are not merely affected, but effected, or 
brought to existence. Obviously, the impact and significance of the op‑
eration on the oeuvre is incomparably greater than on the poet himself. 
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The asymmetry between the relevance to the oeuvre and the person is 
such that it is almost confusing to suggest the two can be compared. 
Yet, despite this asymmetry, other similar verbs, many of which are also 
verbs of creation suffer from no such problems. One can say (12) perfectly 
felicitously, meaning that Yeats repeated his writing or ideas, and even 
though the relevance to the work is not really matched by the relevance 
to the person.
(12) Yeats copied himself toward the end of his life.
Of course, it is possible to argue that copying one’s words has a tremen‑
dous significance for the person, as it diminishes a person’s reputation 
for creativity or whatever. But this is precisely what could be said about 
“writing oneself in sprung rhythm,” the reading being that sprung 
rhythm could be a defining mark of the author himself. Indeed, this 
could and would be the interpretation of “writing oneself in a particular 
technique” if only the collocation were not preempted by something 
else. 
Similarly, metonymous reflexives are found in a number of fixed ex‑
pressions such as repeat oneself or make oneself clear, where the reflexive is 
understood to stand for the person’s ideas or words. Further, similar uses 
are common in many established expressions, where the metonymy is so 
frequent and ordinary that it may go unnoticed. To explain oneself means 
“give an account of one’s motives, provide the reasons of one’s behavior,” 
not “explain one’s physical person” or less plausibly yet “explain the 
reason behind one’s existence.” To align oneself with (someone) is “to bring 
(one’s views) into agreement with (someone else’s views).” Crucially, 
what these examples show is that one can carve out of the larger mean‑
ing quite a number of senses that are related with it, but are not exactly 
synonymous with it: views, behavior, opinion. And the list does not end 
there. Other such established expressions which exploit indirect denota‑
tion include expose oneself to, express oneself, self ‑absorbed, full of oneself, or 
sort oneself out.
Some of these expressions do not come with a specific predefined 
intended referent. For example, in exceed oneself (or someone), the person 
being exceeded really means something about that person, not really 
the person in the physical sense. If someone is said (remarked) to have 
exceeded him or herself, it is understood that the person has surpassed 
a previously established standard, such as creativity, quality of work, 
endurance, or negative aspects like degree of arrogance or selfishness. 
Indeed any area of a person’s behavior or activity might be the target of 
the meaning transfer, but crucially, it is not directly the physical person 
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that the pronoun denotes in the sense that it would with verbs like pho‑
tograph or lock up.
6.2.4. Facets
At this point it is relevant to point out that the senses singled out in the 
preceding discussion are not exactly metonymous, but semi ‑autonomous 
senses referred to as facets (Croft & Cruse, 2004). The difference between 
fully autonomous senses and facets is important here, because the latter 
are considered to be part of the meaning of a word, and thus do not require 
invoking special semantic or syntactic operations proposed by Nunberg. 
That is to say, if they can be taken to be regular sub ‑manifestations of 
the meaning of a given word, that word can be used with their meanings 
without recourse to unusual constructions. Quite simply, facets can be 
confined to the lexicon and in consequence, no need will arise of invoking 
special constructional analyses for them. The following is a brief detour 
to explain some properties of facets.
In Croft and Cruse’s analysis, facets are represented by meanings 
such as: 
(13) a. letter: [COPY]  a yellowed letter.
  [MESSAGE] a love letter.
  [TEXT]  a neatly hand ‑written letter.
b. film: [STORAGE FORMAT] a cellulose film.
  [STORY] an eye ‑opening film.
There is a sense that the above facets enjoy a degree of independence, 
whereas the modifiers pick out only one of the senses and ignore the 
neighboring facets. This effect also obtains with some predicates. In the 
examples (14a—b), the predicates cross and promise attach themselves to 
the [COPY] and [MESSAGE] facets respectively.
(14) a. They corresponded almost every day and often their letters cros‑
sed in the post.
b. The letter concludes by promising reimbursement.
The reason these are not autonomous separate senses of letter is that they 
can be unified. While the modifiers and predicates in examples (14a—b) 
pick out specific facets of the words, some predicates operate on all facets 
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simultaneously. In (15), it is not possible to comb through a text that does 
not have both a physical form ([COPY] facet) and information content 
([MESSAGE]) manifested by [TEXT].
(15) to go through the letter with a pen and highlighter.
There are also cases where all facets are profiled, but with differing de‑
grees of prominence:
(16) to photocopy the letter.
Here all facets are present but the text takes center stage. What is photo‑
copied is the exact shape of the text, the font, its graphic layout, etc. As 
a result, the content is copied (and that is the point of making a photocopy 
in the first place), and for a photocopy to be possible, a physical original 
copy is needed.
It is intuitively clear that there exists a global sense that serves as 
a contact point between the facets such that even when only one of the 
facets is more prominent than the other ones, these are readily associable 
and can be called up easily.
Another signal of unification is that facets can co ‑occur serially with‑
out zeugma.
(17) Frank sent me a hardly legible, but very sweet letter.
Note that a similar serial composition is not possible with fully independ‑
ent senses.
(18) *Frank works for a reputable but steep sandy bank.
Unification is also evident in the presence of multiple facets in the figura‑
tive extensions of meanings. For example, the expressions turn a new leaf 
and take a leaf out of someone’s book both rely on access to the same facets 
of the concept of ‘book,’ [MESSAGE] and [PHYSICAL COPY]. When we 
interpret the expression turn a new leaf, we compare the content of a book 
with the storyline of a person’s life, and we make use of the image of 
a [PHYSICAL COPY] of a book, complete with pages that can be turned. 
Similarly, the meaning ‘imitate someone’ in take a leaf out of someone’s book 
relies on reference to the [MESSAGE] mapping onto a person’s unique 
style, imagined as depicted on the pages, which can be stolen.
It should be noted here that facets are a special kind of metonymy, 
distinct from whole ‑part and part ‑whole metonymies, even if they are all 
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often treated as instances of the same general mechanism by authors like 
Langacker (1999). As Bierwiaczonek (2010) observes, whole ‑part metony‑
mies involve activations of referents that act as independent participants. 
For example, in a sentence like Roger chewed on coca leaves, what the subject 
Roger really refers to is not the whole person, but the active zone ‘Roger’s 
mouth and teeth’ (a whole ‑to ‑part correspondence), but ‘mouth and teeth’ 
cannot be distilled from the whole as a separate component. The sentence 
cannot be paraphrased as ??Roger’s mouth and teeth chewed on coca leaves, 
while such paraphrases are natural for facet coercions, so that one can 
easily replace Yeats did not like to hear himself read in an English accent with 
Yeats did not like to hear his work read in an English accent.
The transfer of meaning might be an extension of a more general 
tendency of verbs to pick out a relevant aspect of a thing or person they 
take as their object, as they do not always denote that thing or person 
wholesale. For example, although the verb phrase ask yourself means the 
person asking a question is at the same time the respondent, but a ques‑
tion is really a challenge to a person’s knowledge, beliefs or principles, 
and this verb is assumed to focus only on these aspects of a person, not 
the whole person. These facets are evident enough in quite novel but 
natural enough uses such as the following sentence.
(19) With his insistence on the Übermensch ideal, Nietzsche the work 
may have seemed unforgiving, ill ‑natured and cynical, but Nietzsche 
the man was actually very warm and understanding.
The point of this example is that the name of the author is in itself am‑
biguous between at least two facet readings, which can both be possible 
interpretations, at least in this context of public perception or evaluation. 
This is why the name has to be disambiguated between these two pos‑
sible and equally justified readings.
It is possible that there is not a closed inventory of facets, and new ones 
can be both distilled out of the global Gestalt fairly spontaneously and 
understood equally effortlessly. In a BBC Great Lives program about D.H. 
Lawrence, the host Matthew Parris said that there are no remaining re‑
cordings of D.H. Lawrence’s voice and then added:
(20) If any of you have any grandparents that have any D.H. Lawrence, 
I’d love to hear the sound of his voice. (Great Lives, D.H. Lawrence, 
17 December 2010)
Delineating single facets is not only a convenient syntactic shortcut en‑ 
abling one to say “Picasso” instead of “Picasso’s painting.” The ability to 
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partition a meaning into its facets is an important tool allowing speakers 
to debate meaning distinctions.
The boundary between the facets can sometimes be a crucial point, in 
fact instrumental and central, as in the debate on whether Shakespeare 
was one person or many.
(21) [T]here are two William ‑Shakespeares, one actor and another poet. 
http://journals.berghahnbooks.com/jrs/sample/downloads/page0019.
pdf
(22) [M]any scholars argue that Shakespeare the man was a sham, that 
he wasn’t that balding man with the earring from Strafford, but 
someone else entirely or many someone ‑elses. I’m talking about 
Shakespeare the work, the style, the influence, Shakespeare the 
words. Shakespeare isn’t just a figure in popular culture; he is one of 
the architects of it. http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/6506141.
Tobias_Niell/blog/tag/shakespeare
An analysis of these examples leads to a rather counterintuitive observa‑
tion. Apart from a handful of uses like Mr. Such and such died, where 
death affects all aspects of a person (not only the physical person, but 
also that person’s ideas, behavior, preferences, etc.), the “entire person” 
reading is not an overarching reading subsuming all other readings, 
but merely one among many, and it is not clear whether it is the main 
reading.
Another way to look at it can be found in McCawley’s (1968, p. 130) 
suggestion that “probably all languages have implicational relationships 
among their lexical items, whereby the existence of one lexical item im‑
plies the existence of another lexical item, which then need not be listed 
in the lexicon.” For example, the adjective warm in the sentence This coat 
is warm is ambiguous between meaning “having a relatively high tem‑
perature” and “preserving a relatively high temperature.” McCawley’s 
claim is that only the first meaning need to be listed in the lexicon; the 
other one seems a derivative and can be predicted based on the existence 
of the original meaning. McCawley does not specify what derivational 
principles apply, nor what meaning ‑shift patterns are possible, but it is 
intuitively valid that the second meaning is not an independent entry to 
be listed separately. One clue supporting this conjecture is that this pat‑
tern is found in many languages. The same kind of ambiguity is found in 
the following Hungarian sentence:
(23) Ez a kabát meleg. (McCawley 1968, p. 130, ex. 14)
206 6. Too Contentful to Be True
The same happens in Portuguese, French, Russian, Polish, Korean, and 
probably any other language.
(24) a. Este casaco é quente.
b. Ce manteau est chaud.
c.  Это пальто теплое.
d. To palto jest ciepłe.
e. 이 옷이 따뜻하다
The point here is that it would be quite far ‑fetched to propose a grammati‑
cal construction that would convert an adjective with one meaning into 
a new adjective with a related meaning. Under the rubric of implicational 
relationships, McCawley also includes cases of meaning correspondences 
involving meaning facets:
(25) a. John has memorized the score of the Ninth Symphony.
b. The score of the Ninth Symphony is lying on the piano. 
(McCawley 1968, p. 131, ex. 15—16)
The name implicational relationship as defined by McCawley suggests 
that the derived meanings exist. It is not clear whether by “existence” 
McCawley meant that they are actually present and co ‑occur with the 
original meanings, but this is rather suspect because that would mean 
that a meaning automatically breeds its derivative listed in the lexicon. It 
is more likely that such secondary meanings can be generated as needed 
according to a logical pattern. McCawley’s assertion can be modified 
by means of a minor tweak as follows “the existence of one lexical item 
implies the potentiality of another lexical item.”
Granted, there is a difference between these straightforward implica‑
tional relationships and the clearly more elaborate correspondences such 
as DRIVER FOR CAR, but it makes sense to include them in the lexicon 
as operations that extend meanings of words through recognizable me‑
tonymic patterns. To include meanings like ‘car’ among facets of a person 
is not as facetious as it may at first seem (The facet in question could 
be expressed as [PERSON IN A CAR]). This may seem absurd at first, 
because a car is not really a part of a person, but as recent discoveries in 
cognitive science show, humans have a remarkable ability to treat vari‑
ous artifacts as extensions of their bodies. In a provocatively titled book 
Natural ‑Born Cyborgs, Clark (2003, p. 8) argues that “[t]he line between 
biological self and technological world was, in fact, never very firm.” 
This surprising conclusion is given support by a number of observa‑
tions. To use an example relevant to the facet under consideration, Clark 
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(p. 103) notes that experienced drivers are capable of deferred sensation 
of the road. One can have the “experience of feeling the road” through 
the mediation of the car’s tires, axles and other parts that are external to 
the body but not beyond its control. Further, the effortless automaticity 
involved in driving a car (most drivers experience difficulty when asked 
to consciously reflect upon the question of which pedal is the brake) is 
comparable to sensorimotor control of one’s limbs. This effortlessness 
is matched by a sense of remarkable control over the car, even when 
advanced technology takes over more and more tasks away from the 
driver. Clark observes that “[o]nce drivers are accustomed to ABS, they 
cease to feel as if the braking is in any way “out of their control.”1 (2003, 
p. 99) Finally, the fact that a person is inside a car makes the sense of 
incorporation even stronger. All of the above makes it natural for people 
to literally identify themselves with non ‑biological “extensions,” which 
become true prostheses.
The general point to be made here is that the aforementioned op‑
erations do not need to be ascribed to specific constructions. They are 
most likely not even strictly linguistic operations. They can be handled 
easily enough by reference to metonymy, a complex enough mechanism 
to be responsible for the intricate effects observed above. The fact that 
different kinds of metonymy (e.g. facets and active zones) display dis‑
tinct behaviors and the differences recur cross ‑linguistically suggests 
that metonymy is an independent cognitive skill. It is not necessary to 
posit additional mechanisms to account for the meaning transfer effects 
discussed above.
1 Recent research in neuroscience suggests that non ‑biological objects appear
to be organically integrable into the functioning of the brain. In an ingenious experi‑ 
ment, Ramachandran tricked student volunteers into perceiving objects such as 
a table as part of their own body (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). This was achieved 
by hiding the student’s hand from view and then stroking it while at the same time 
stroking the table surface for several seconds. At some point, Ramachandran hit the 
surface of the table with a hammer suddenly as the student watched. This resulted 
in a strong GSR [Galvanic Skin Response]. As Ramachandran notes, “[i]t was as 
though the table had now become coupled to the student’s own limbic system and been 
assimilated into his body image, so much so that pain and threat to the dummy are felt 
as threats to his own body, as shown by the GSR” (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998, 
p. 61).
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6.3. Universal Grinder
There seem to exist schematic constructions with very detailed and 
ornate meanings. Some of the most remarkable examples include con‑
structions involving universal grinder operations, as in examples (26) 
below, where a countable noun is used without an article and is meant to 
be interpreted as a mass noun denoting the substance coming from the 
animal in question.
(26) a. Have you ever had peacock?
b. I’ll order chicken.
c. The smell was unimaginable and there were bits and pieces of 
cow all over the place. http://midcurrent.com/books/keeper ‑the‑
dead ‑cow ‑department
In the literature, sentences like (26a—c) are known as examples of 
so called “universal grinder” (Jackendoff, 1997a, p. 53), an operation 
involving count ‑mass coercion whereby countable noun referents 
are conceptualized as substances with no internal structure. The fact 
that this conversion only applies to animals and their meat, but not to 
fruit and juices obtained from them (one cannot say Sprinkle your salad 
with orange, where orange should mean ‘orange juice’) has been taken 
as evidence that the constructions are conventionalized and stored 
as lexicon entries, rather than being general conversion rules that 
apply to any analogous situation. In other words, we seem to be dealing 
with a highly schematic construction allowing for a specific mean‑
ing to be selected. It is as if such constructions were, in contradiction 
with their closed ‑class nature, sensitive to fine graphic details. Bierwi‑
aczonek (2013) approaches such uses by means of what he terms 
“constructional metonymy,” by which he means the activation of 
a grammatical construction through its part. Bierwiaczonek uses exam‑
ples such as the rich, the poor, the jobless, each of which activating the 
construction [the Adj PEOPLE]. Here one could analyze cases (26a—c) 
as being parts of a larger [animal MEAT] pattern, where the part “meat” 
is omitted.
However, while constructional metonymy may be used to account for 
examples provided by Bierwiaczonek, it does not capture all the possible 
uses of the grinder operations. While it is true that a degree of conven‑
tionalization holds for these patterns, the readings obtained are not as 
specific as it seems. It is not the case that the construction always conveys 
‘animal = meat’ meanings only. Cases of the construction can be found 
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where the name of an animal stands not for the meat, but fur or skin, as 
in the following examples:
(27) a. If money is not an issue, there are briefcases made of alligator or 
crocodile.
b. a luxurious coat made of angora rabbit (fur).
And while orange cannot mean ‘orange juice,’ it can safely refer to cut 
up orange wedges in Halloumi salad with orange and mint. Such uses also 
include other non ‑animal foods (We’re having pizza and broccoli). There are 
also uses where food units are reframed as inedible substances, as in the 
expression end up with egg on one’s face.
Then there are uses where an article ‑free noun refers to smell, as in 
the following sentence:
(28) Thou smell of mountain goat. (William Shakespeare, Henry V)
The idea that the construction is dedicated to animal ‑meat meanings is 
obviously a result of the preponderance of exactly such uses. In reality, 
other clearly distinct instances can be chanced upon in many sources. 
The following is an excerpt from Love in the Time of Cholera by Gabriel 
García Marquez, where not an animal, but an artificial object is subject to 
the grinder operation.
Once he tasted some chamomile tea and sent it back, saying only, “This 
stuff tastes of window.” Both she and the servants were surprised be‑
cause they had never heard of anyone who had drunk boiled window, 
but when they tried the tea in an effort to understand, they understood: 
it did taste of window. (Marquez, 1985)
6.4. Ham Sandwich Coercions
6.4.1. Coercions in the opposite direction
We now turn to patterns which may initially resemble the above uses, 
but are in fact a qualitatively different group. Examples (29a—f) represent 
a different kind of coercion. This additional group features a number of 
diverse instantiations:
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(29) a.  The ham sandwich at table 4 wants another coke.
b.  The pizza in the corner is winking at you.
c.  The liver/kidney/bladder in room 312… . 
d. The flute is positioned closest to the conductor.
e.  The violin fell asleep during the concert.
f.   Romeo was late for the rehearsal.2
Known as the “ham sandwich” coercion and body banter metonymy, 
these are similar to the transfer of meaning uses described above (in fact, 
Nunberg, 1995, treats them together), in that both are metonymous in na‑
ture, but the examples presented here are the opposite of the facet ‑based 
transfers of meaning. That is, while in the latter, individuals serve as 
anchors to refer to objects related to them, here it is metonymous objects 
that help identify individuals.
Their logic is predictable enough. Like in the case of the facet transfers, 
here metonymy is the binding force. Thus, their success cannot be due to 
novelty alone; they result from people’s predilection for metonymy. Put 
another way, they succeed for the same reasons why metaphoric expres‑
sions are so pervasive. As Pinker (2007, p. 266) puts it, “[p]erhaps they 
are rare pearls that drop from the pens of an elite corps of bards and 
scribblers and then are hoarded by a grateful populace. But given their 
prevalence in language, it seems more likely that they are the natural 
products of the way everyone’s mind works.”
It is a matter of some debate how exactly these should be analyzed. 
There is little consensus on their exact status. Nunberg (1995) addresses 
the issue of whether they should be treated as transfer of reference or 
transfer of meaning (and favors the latter approach). Others, like Velasco 
(2009), see this as a case of reference transfer. Are they strictly lexical 
conversions that have nothing to do with syntax? Are they grammatical 
constructions?
Some authors lean toward a view of such uses as constructions and 
include them among other learnable items in a speaker’s linguistic rep‑
ertoire that serve to pair specific forms with meanings. Nunberg notes 
2 Productive metonymous reference patterns can emerge spontaneously for a speci‑
fic purpose in ephemeral niche ‑like environments, and then disappear along with these 
environments. In her book The Zookeeper’s Wife, Diane Ackerman tells the true Second 
World War story of the Warsaw zoo, whose director used animal enclosures and cages to 
shelter Jews hiding from the Germans. Because German soldiers visited the zoo on a dai‑ 
ly basis, the director and his wife devised a code in which they referred to specific Jews 
by the names of the animals in whose cages they were hiding. Thus, they would say 
“I think maybe the lions are hungry” or “take this to the bears.” (Book Chronicles Warsaw 
Zoo as Refuge in WWII, NPR Published: January 18, 2008). http://m.npr.org/story/18222827
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that they are associated with specific syntactic properties (That/*those 
French fries is/*are getting nervous), which suggests a degree of conven‑
tionalization normally associated with learnable items. According to 
Culicover and Jackendoff (2005), “there are conventionalized principles 
of interpretation that permit unexpressed semantic operators when 
necessary for semantic/pragmatic well ‑formedness” (2005, p. 227). In the 
case of the above examples, the nouns denoting meals are interpreted as 
customers associated with them: “[a] piece of meaning that can be left 
overtly unexpressed leaving it up to the listener to reconstruct it” (2005, 
p. 228). Jackendoff (1992) argues that these operations cannot be prag‑
matic only, because they exhibit interactions with binding theory, and 
can therefore be viewed as being syntactic in nature. The view of coerced 
uses as constructions does indeed seem tempting, given that they seem 
conventionalized in two ways. They are established patterns and devia‑
tions from them are rare. First, there is a strict meaning pattern ORDER 
FOR CUSTOMER (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Velasco, 2002), and not say, 
CUTLERY TYPE FOR CUSTOMER or TAB FOR CUSTOMER. (Some theo‑
retically possible extensions are never exploited: for example, the name 
of a company cannot be used to refer to, say, its customer’s pet). Second, 
the operation is realized by means of a common syntactic frame, where 
the noun naming a meal order is preceded by a definite determiner; it is 
hard to find uses with indefinite determiners or indeed imagine a context 
where indefinite reference would make much sense (30c—e).
(30) a. The beefstake at table 4 is getting impatient.
b. That burger in the corner wants his check.
c.  ? I remember there was once a ham sandwich that fainted.
d.  ? Any potato salad that doesn’t tip will not be served again.
e.  ? That rude fat ratatouille will get himself thrown out of the joint.
To sum up, they are entirely schematic, with sentences built on the 
formula Meal PP[location] predicate, at the same time very detailed in 
terms of semantic content. What makes the uses in (30a) special is the 
construction’s ability to equate a food and a patron at a restaurant. One 
could wonder, if this is not an exotic semantic effect, then what is? The 
construction seems to come with an inbuilt bizarrely specific description 
of what kind of participants (paying customers) are to be picked out by 
reference to what kind of objects (their meals). 
First, the semantic effect generated by the coercion uses is not as ex‑
otic or improbable as it may at first appear. It seems vaguely intuitive that 
patrons are associated with their orders and patients with their diseased 
organs. As some medical staffs admit, “We are socialized to—disease is 
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the thing. Yeah, I slip. We all do and see the patient as a disease.”3 Thus, 
one could argue that the patient‑organ equation is not even a linguistic 
operation, but a more general cognitive abbreviation that finds its way to 
forms posing as constructions.
The following discussion will attempt to establish that the construc‑
tional approach to coercions is unjustified. I will attempt to demonstrate 
that ham sandwich coercions are not conventionalized constructions, but 
rather straightforward instantiations of fairly rare metonymies. It will be 
proposed that it is the infrequency of the metonymies that is responsible 
for the construction illusion; the infrequency is confused with conven‑
tionality.
6.4.2. Source ‑in ‑target and target ‑in ‑source metonymy
Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000) distinguishes two types of metonymy, 
which he terms source ‑in ‑target and target ‑in ‑source metonymy. In the 
case of target ‑in ‑source metonymy, the referent accessed metonymically 
is contained within the conceptual domain specified by the source ex‑
pression. For example, the noun subway in the sentence The subway goes on 
strike refers to the subway personnel, a target which represents a part of 
the whole named in the source expression. In source ‑in ‑target metonymy, 
the situation is reversed and the target is a larger entity whose part is 
named by the source expression. This type is exemplified by uses such as 
four wheels referring to the whole car.
Despite the inverted mirror ‑image ‑like correspondence of the two 
types suggesting an elegant binary division, known examples of me‑
tonymy are not distributed evenly between the two categories. There 
are theoretical reasons to predict that the majority will fall within the 
target ‑in ‑source metonymy.
Metonymy is motivated by three competing forces. First is the salience 
of the point of access (Kövecses & Radden, 1998). Second is the possession 
asymmetry. Third is alienability of the possessive relation.
The first one is probably the single most robust factor. Given enough 
salience of the source, it can override the other two constraints. This 
constraint has been addressed in the literature and I will not discuss it 
at length here, other than note that certain contextual conditions make 
3 Hans A. Baer, Merrill Singer, Ida Susser, Medical Anthropology and the World
System (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).
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a metonymous association very likely. For example, in the much discussed 
ham ‑sandwich schema, the inaccessibility of the patron’s name makes it 
necessary to use a stand ‑in name and the salience of the patron’s order 
makes it a very logical and economical choice. But as should become clear 
below, this is a rather unusual setup.
The point to be made here is that when the two parts are contextually 
equal, and when none enjoys a salience head start, the direction is from 
possessor to the target, not vice versa.
6.4.3. Parallels with possession
The possessive construction serves to help identify referents through 
so called reference point relationships. As Langacker puts it, “the posses‑
sor functions as a reference point providing mental access to the entity 
possessed, its target” (Langacker, 2008, p. 505). Thus, for example, the 
phrase Jocelyn’s dog helps place a dog through the reference point, its pos‑
sessor.
Langacker observes that possessive expressions are generally irrevers‑
ible; they display an “inherent asymmetry of reference point relation‑
ships,” so that the mental path is from the possessor to the possessed, 
but not the other way round. While it is natural to say Jocelyn’s dog, it is 
very hard to even interpret *the dog’s Jocelyn.
To some extent, the same seems to be true of reference transfers. Ref‑
erence transfers where the possessed is identified through the possessor 
(31) are more frequent than cases where it is the possessor that is denoted 
by means of its possessed (32).
(31) a. James squeezed himself between two trucks.
b. Harry got shot in the leg.
c. We read a lot of Joyce.
d. They managed to authenticate a previously unknown Picasso.
e. The new Pinker is every bit as funny as the previous one.
f.  The latest Metallica is pretty disappointing (= Metallica album).
g. The Times hasn’t arrived at the conference yet (= the reporter 
from the Times). (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, p. 35)
h. Estonia scored in the first two minutes of the game.
i.  Langley abandoned its operatives (= the CIA whose site is in 
Langley, VA).
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(32) a. The ham sandwich at table 4 left without paying.
b. Many have written about the need for the medical profession to 
see patients as individuals rather than the “kidney in room #2.” 
http://www.northshore.edu/academics/departments/wha/custom3
c. The trombone had to leave earlier today.
Why then do any such cases exist if reference to the possessor through 
the possessed is cognitively unusual? If coercive metonymy follows 
a parallel logic to the irreversibility of possessive relationships, examples 
like (32) should not occur at all. However, the possessive construction too 
is sometimes used in the opposite direction, as in the wallet’s owner, the 
child’s father, or the group’s supervisor. Note that this is only possible with 
relational nouns, in whose very nature it is to profile a relationship be‑
tween one participant (e.g. father) and its argument (child). It is perhaps this 
that makes a reversed alignment clear enough. The absence of a profiled 
relationship makes examples like *the toy’s child sound strange, because 
whatever the relationship between the toy and the child, it is not a defin‑
ing property that makes a child a child (a child is considered a child even 
if it has no toys, while one cannot be a father without children). A clear 
relation is probably what makes (32) possible. In (32a), a restaurant patron 
intended by the phrase the ham sandwich may not be a classic relational 
noun, but it does assume a meal order that makes that person a customer. 
Similarly, a patient invoked in (32b) presupposes a diseased organ. Such 
quasi ‑relational characteristics act as profilers justifying the reversed 
alignment of the coercion.
6.4.4. Not exactly conventionality
The examples of coercions presented above present a paradox. On the 
one hand, they feel so intuitive that they seem natural reflexes that do not 
need to be learned, but then there are clear examples that bear marks of 
conventionalization. Why are instances like the ham sandwich coercion 
attested while other theoretically possible ones are not? For example, if 
a customer sits near the door, why is he or she not likely to be referred 
to as “the door”? Is it because such patron ‑topography coercion is not 
conventionalized?
I would like to hazard the claim that conventionalization plays no part 
here, and in fact, the conventionalization in question may be an illusion. 
It is true that ham sandwich coercions appear conventionalized if only 
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because they are rare, among many other possible—but unrealized—coer‑
cion patterns. However, what makes them rare is that they are “fortunate” 
uses that involve legal reversals of the predominant possessed ‑through‑
 ‑possessor pattern. As was shown above, such reversals are possible only 
with relational nouns, which makes them rare enough. Ham sandwich, 
body banter and orchestra banter are rare examples of situations involv‑
ing participants standing in quasi‑relational correspondence with their 
possessed objects (patron—meal, patient—organ and player—instru‑
ment). Other patterns are not found because they would be unjustified 
impossible reversals of the possessed ‑through ‑possessor pattern. Thus, 
the reason a patron at a diner cannot be nicknamed “the door” is that 
a patron does not stand in a relational position to a door.
Of course, this is not to say that conventionalization may never take 
place. Witnessing such patterns may consolidate their use (through pro‑ 
cesses like entrenchment as defined by Bybee, 2003), and certain specific 
patterns may become conventionalized in some speakers, despite their 
potential of being generated by rule. Instead, the point here is that con‑
ventionalization does not need to take place for these uses to become 
part of the constructicon. Indeed, it is likely they are not listed in most 
people’s constructicons at all and neither do they need to be. They should 
be as clear to listeners as spontaneous nicknames heard for the first time. 
(I am assuming that no one would postulate a “nickname construction” 
activated to process uses like Senator Long Face for John Kerry).
A speaker may create analogous uses even after hearing a ham 
sandwich sentence only once. What makes such uses compelling is not 
their status as established constructions, but their effectiveness and 
transparency thanks to compliance with metonymic logic. As such they 
are something of a reflex that can emerge spontaneously, independently 
in different speakers.
When they do become perpetuated, as they often do, it is as a result 
of a propagation process where a phrase is picked up by a linguistic 
community and reworked in a series of phrasal remixes. These new ver‑
sions are variations on the theme and their raison d’être is owed in part 
to their association with the original. This makes such uses more similar 
to constructional frames like mother of all battles or once bitten twice shy, 
rather than to true constructions. It makes more sense then to view these 
phrases as archetypes that can help give birth to similar phrases. They 
are quotations that become a material to be experimented on, yielding 
new creations, which though associated with their original source, are 
new phrasal units, more like new lexical items, and not uses of a gram‑
matical construction.
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6.5. Concluding Remarks
Effects exhibited by the above uses may at first glance seem strikingly 
un ‑closed ‑class ‑like. Instances like the coercions presented in the previ‑
ous section, may initially appear to be sensitive to fine semantic distinc‑
tions, in direct contradiction with the general hypothesis of this book. 
However, upon closer consideration, rather than being small autonomous 
constructions, they turn out to be regular ‑enough products of more gen‑
eral principles, whether those of linguistic processes like metonymy or 
facet selection or those of extra ‑linguistic abilities like remote association.
Goldberg claims that “all linguists recognize that a wide range of 
semi ‑idiosyncratic constructions exist in every language, constructions 
that cannot be accounted for by general, universal or innate principles 
or constraints” (Goldberg, 2003, p. 222). Linguists should also recognize 
that the presence of these principles and constraints in many apparently 
semi ‑idiosyncratic constructions is not immediately obvious. The afore‑
mentioned cases can easily be mistaken for colorful constructions, as 
indeed they are, only because signs of the workings of general principles 
and constraints are missed.
Finally, a point hinted at above, many uses described in this chapter 
are not instantiations of constructions, but coinages, genuinely independ‑
ent lexical items. Even phrase ‑length examples (e.g. mother of all battles, 
mother of all storms) are often memorable enough to be circulated and 
potentially capable of making it into dictionaries. They are not construc‑
tions but what Fillmore (2002) and Kay (2002) call “patterns of coining,” 
that is patterns “that appear in language data that do not qualify as parts 
of a grammar (i.e., as grammatical constructions)” (Kay, 2002, p. 1). Cru‑
cially, the point that should be clear from this chapter is that whenever 
a stable syntactic sequence appears to exhibit semantic properties too 
graphic or in any way too elaborate for a schematic pattern, it turns out to 
differ significantly from a grammatical construction. They are governed 
by different principles; they do not emerge through grammaticization, 
and their use involves degrees of creativity never called for by true gram‑
matical constructions.
7. Final Remarks
The hallmark of Construction Grammar, its revision of the hypothesis of 
syntactically transparent semantic compositionality, can be and has been 
taken to extreme by expecting syntactic patterns to behave semantically 
like lexical items. However, just because syntactic constructions used to 
be falsely believed to be transparent does not mean that they should now 
be vividly colorful. That would be going from one extreme to another.
Construction Grammar does not have to be a denial of syntactically 
transparent semantic composition. (After all, the belief still stands that 
the bulk of conceptual structure of a sentence is conveyed by individual 
lexical items). The innovation consists in assuming semantic composition‑
ality as a “default in a wider range of options” (Jackendoff, 1997a, p. 49). 
But although there are alternatives, a default is a default. That means that 
as much conceptual content as possible should be attributed to lexical 
items composing the sentence and only what cannot be accounted for 
by means of semantic composition can be claimed to be the semantic 
contribution of a syntactic construction. Thus, as a carrier of meaning, 
a syntactic construction is a special vehicle. It conveys only what lexical 
items clearly do not.
If we accept semantic compositionality as a default option, we 
should be prepared for one corollary, namely that of restraint in how we 
assign a sentence’s conceptual structure to its sources in that sentence. 
If a given meaning can by default be shown to come from lexical items, 
it should not be ascribed to a construction. It is only if a corresponding 
match cannot be found among lexical items that it can be claimed for the 
construction.
The lexicon ‑syntax divide is not incompatible with the general spirit 
of Construction Grammar. It does not prevent constructions, even en‑
tirely schematic syntactic patterns, from having meanings. However, in 
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describing semantic effects observed in a construction, care should be 
taken not to welcome too quickly those meanings that are implausible 
candidates of meanings of closed ‑class forms. Exactly how contentful 
a construction’s meaning is, should correlate with how lexically filled it is, 
and the more substantive meanings should be accounted for by reference 
to the lexical item inclusions present in the construction. It is justified to 
hypothesize that the behavior and nature of a category of constructions 
should correlate with some aspects of its form such as the number of 
items that make it up (is it a morpheme or a phrasal pattern?). Also, one 
should admit the possibility that some contentful semantics is part of 
grammar. Talmy posits a “universally available inventory” (Talmy, 2000a, 
p. 38) of meaningful categories that are part of closed ‑class forms, and 
it could be assumed that this inventory includes frequently recurring 
categories like possession, path, manner or result identified as part of the 
semantics in constructions discussed here. These categories may strike 
one as being quite contentful, and therefore in contradiction to the thesis 
of this study, but they have the advantage of being widely attested in 
a range of grammatical forms across languages: This way, they are quite 
unlike readings of ‘difficulty’ or ‘incredulity,’ which are postulated for 
one single construction each, so in other words, these readings do not 
enjoy independent corroboration that they can be part of the meaning of 
a closed ‑class form.
Far from being a passé illusion to be discarded as a continuum, the 
lexicon ‑syntax distinction offers important insights that may help de‑
scribe grammatical constructions more accurately. 
What implications do the above observations have for our model of 
the constructicon? How can one reconcile the division, however blurred, 
between the lexicon and syntax with the constructionist insight that all 
pairings of form and meaning must be stored, likely in one enormous 
super ‑store? The models of the constructicon presented at the beginning, 
in section 2.4, do not capture the qualitative differences between items 
that tend toward either the closed ‑class or the open ‑class extremes.
A possible alternative visualization of the constructicon could be rep‑
resented by the following diagram (Figure 9). The three components are 
still present here, and the constructicon cuts across them all as well, but 
there are differences between the various regions of the constructicon. 
Essentially, in the closed ‑class parts of the constructicon, forms contain 
more syntactic content and less semantic content. It could even be ven‑
tured that roughly, the more syntactic information a given form speci‑
fies, the less semantic and phonological content it has. Thus, while the 
phonological and semantic contents seem to be correlated directly, and 
this pair seems to be inversely proportional to the syntactic information.
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Figure 9. Constructicon sorted out
This model has some intuitive appeal. While there is still considerable 
controversy about how much semantic content a general syntactic pattern 
can convey, it should be obvious enough that, depending on the amount 
of lexical material embedded in it, such a pattern will have little or no 
phonological stipulation. On the other hand, a lexical item like keyboard 
may carry very rich phonological and semantic information. Note, 
however, the hedging tone of may here, as not all lexical items use their 
semantic potential: While some are very detailed in their meaning (e.g. 
lasso), others are quite general (e.g. thing, make). (But while lexical items 
can carry less semantic content than they are capable of, grammatical 
elements do not carry more semantic content than they are capable of).
A lexical item will also carry proportionately less syntactic informa‑
tion. It could even be argued, quite controversially, that some (though 
certainly not all) lexical words carry next to no syntactic information. To 
take one example, apart from being classified as a noun, the word beer 
does not carry argument structure frames and it is even fairly neutral 
concerning its mass/count categorization. 
This model also accommodates the whole gamut of the contents of 
the constructicon, ranging from substantive lexical items to schematic 
constructions. It assumes that they can share important properties—that 
is both carry syntactic specifications of combinability, and both carry 
meaning, and can be located across the divide if it can be pointed out, as 
it will be, that they are not contentful or specifiable to the same degree.
Finally, it shows how modularity can coexist with the continuum 
view. On the one hand, it makes provisions for some items to have trans‑
 ‑categorial membership, if they draw on various components equally; 
and on the other hand, it accounts for items located toward the extremes 
of the traditional classes. Function forms such as the subject‑predicate 
word order have no phonological content and only purely syntactic re‑
sponsibilities. If there is any semantic contribution from such forms, it is 
irreparably abstract and anti ‑contentful.
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Konrad Szcześniak
Znaczenie konstrukcji 
Kognitywne spory o podział na leksykon i składnię 
Streszczenie
Niniejsza praca poświęcona jest analizie konstrukcji gramatycznych w ramach kog‑
nitywnego modelu Gramatyki Konstrukcji (Construction Grammar). Celem pracy jest 
wykazanie, że tradycyjny podział na leksykon i składnię (oraz na wyrazy leksykalne 
i funkcyjne) podany w wątpliwość w wielu najnowszych modelach językoznawczych, 
jest nadal aktualny i nie musi być sprzeczny z założeniami językoznawstwa kogni‑
tywnego. Opracowanie rewiduje przesłanki, którymi kierują się obecnie językoznawcy 
odrzucający podział na leksykon i składnię. Jedną z tych przesłanek, którą kwestionuje 
niniejsze opracowanie, jest rozmycie granic między leksykonem i składnią. Ważnym 
argumentem przemawiającym za odrzuceniem podziału są spostrzeżenia płynące 
z kognitywnych analiz konstrukcji gramatycznych, które wskazują na zdolność schema‑
tycznych konstrukcji do wyrażania złożonych i bogatych treści semantycznych. Takie 
zdolności semantyczne są sprzeczne z przyjętą charakterystyką form funkcyjnych, 
w myśl której formy te są ubogie w znaczenia albo wręcz ich pozbawione, ponieważ ich 
głównym zadaniem jest spełnianie funkcji gramatycznych. W ostatnich latach, autorzy 
wielu opisów konstrukcji gramatycznych przekonywali, że konstrukcje gramatyczne 
mają właśnie znaczenia typowe dla wyrazów leksykalnych. Niniejsza praca skupia się 
na szeregu konstrukcji gramatycznych i wykazuje, że najnowsze analizy konstrukcji, 
takich jak „x’s way” czy „time away,” przypisywały im przesadnie bogate znaczenia. 
Powtórna analiza zachowania tych form skłania do wniosku, że zawartość semantyczna 
konstrukcji jest dokładnie tak uboga i schematyczna, jak przewiduje to tradycyjna 
charakterystyka wyrazów funkcyjnych, podczas gdy bogate znaczenia obserwowane 
w ostatnich analizach są jedynie efektami pragmatycznymi wynikającymi ze specyfiki 
konkretnych kontekstów.
Główna teza opracowania uzasadniona jest dyskusją o następującej strukturze. 
W rozdziałach 1 i 2, omówiony jest tradycyjny podział na leksykon i składnię, po 
czym przytoczone są argumenty autorów proponujących jego podważenie. Następnie 
dokonany jest przegląd cech odróżniających wyrazy leksykalne od funkcyjnych, przy 
założeniu, że znaczna liczba różnic między tymi grupami wskazuje na prawdziwość 
podziału na leksykon i składnię. Rozdział 3 zawiera krótkie opisy konstrukcji, z których 
kilka było już wcześniej analizowanych w literaturze kognitywno ‑lingwistycznej. Ni‑
niejsza analiza dowodzi jednak, że konstrukcje nie wykazują się wyjątkowo bogatymi 
znaczeniami przypisywanymi im w dotychczasowych opracowaniach. W rozdziałach 4 
i 5 przedstawione są dwie konstrukcje (t.j. manner of obtainment i x’s way), które opisane 
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są pod kątem aspektualnej struktury ich znaczenia. Tutaj celem jest wykazanie, że 
treściwość konstrukcji nie wychodzi poza ramy możliwości złożeń schematów zdarze‑
niowych (event schemas). Rozdział 6 skupia się na przykładach sekwencji składniowych, 
które charakteryzują się wyjątkowo ciekawymi znaczeniami, dość nietypowymi dla 
skonwencjonalizowanych konstrukcji schematycznych, a zatem będącymi problemem 
dla głównej tezy opracowania. Jednak, zawarta w rozdziale analiza prowadzi do 
wniosku, że przedstawione przykłady nie są konstrukcjami gramatycznymi. Różnice 
między przypadkami omówionymi tutaj a konstrukcjami gramatycznymi pokazują, że 
formy, które na pierwszy rzut oka wydają się być wyjątkiem od reguły, w ostatecznym 
rozrachunku są jej potwierdzeniem.
Konrad Szcześniak
Le sens des structures 
Un débat cognitif sur la division entre le lexique et la syntaxe
Résumé
Ce travail est consacré à l’analyse des structures grammaticales dans le cadre du modèle 
cognitif de la grammaire de construction (construction grammar). Nous nous y donnons la 
tâche de démontrer que la distinction traditionnelle entre le lexique et la syntaxe (ainsi 
qu’entre les mots lexicaux et les mots fonctionnels), tout en étant mise en doute dans 
plusieurs des nouveaux modèles linguistiques, est toujours valable et elle ne doit pas 
être contraire aux principes de la linguistique cognitive. Dans cette étude nous révisons 
les hypothèses des linguistes qui rejettent la division entre le lexique et la syntaxe. Une 
des prémisses qu’on met en cause ici est la frontière floue entre le lexique et la syntaxe. 
L’argument fort pour le rejet de la division serait donc que les idées dérivées de l’analyse 
cognitive des structures grammaticales montrent la capacité de la construction schéma‑
tique à exprimer le contenu sémantique complexe et riche. Nous essayerons pourtant 
montrer que ces capacités sémantiques sont contraires aux traits des formes fonction‑ 
nelles généralement reconnues, selon lesquels ces premières sont pauvres en sens 
ou même d’en privées parce que leur tâche principale ne consiste qu’à exercer les 
fonctions de grammaire. Dernièrement, nombreux sont les ouvrages sur les structures 
grammaticales où on nous persuade de leurs sens qui est typique des mots lexicaux. 
Dans ce travail nous nous concentrons sur une gamme de structures grammaticales 
et nous montrons que l’analyse récente de structures tel que „x’s way” ou „time away” 
leur attribue beaucoup trop de signification. Le nouvel examen du comportement de 
ces formes nous conduit à la conclusion que le contenu sémantique des structures est 
exactement si pauvre et schématique, comme prévu dans la caractéristique traditionnelle 
de mots de fonction, et que la signification riche du contenu observée dans des études 
récentes est simplement un effet pragmatique résultant de la spécificité des contextes 
particuliers. 
Pour soutenir la thèse principale de cette étude nous proposons l’ordre qui suit. 
Ainsi, dans le 1er et le 2e chapitre nous présentons la distinction traditionnelle entre le 
lexique et la syntaxe, et nous citons les arguments des auteurs minant son existence. 
Ensuite, nous passons en revue les traits caractéristiques distinguants les mots lexicaux 
des mots de fonction, tout en indiquant qu’un nombre important de différences entre les 
groupes pointe vers la justesse de la division en question. Le 3e chapitre contient une 
brève description des structures, dont certaines ont été déjà analysées dans la littérature 
cognitivo ‑linguistique. Notre analyse montre toutefois visiblement que ces structures 
ne sont pas plus riches en sens que les études les plus récentes leur auraient attribuées. 
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Par la suite, dans le 4e et 5e chapitre nous présentons deux structures (manner of obtainment 
et x’s way) qui sont décrites en fonction de la structure aspectuelle de leur signification. 
Ici, notre but est de démontrer que la richesse de la signification d’une structure ne va 
pas au ‑delà des possibilités d’assemblage des schémas d’événements (event schemas).
Le 6e chapitre, permet de nous concentrer sur les exemples des séquences syntaxiques, 
qui se caractérisent par un sens particulièrement intéressant, tout à fait inhabituel 
pour les constructions couramment utilisées et qui, par conséquent, constituent un 
défi pour la thèse principale de l’étude. L’analyse que nous y proposons mène toutefois 
à la conclusion que les exemples que nous présentons ne sont pas des structures 
grammaticales du tout. Les différences entre ces cas évoqués et des structures 
grammaticales montrent que les formes qui au début semblent être des exceptions à la 
règle tendent à la fin de la confirmer.


